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Torture at Home: Borrowing from the Torture
Convention to Define Domestic Violence
Claire Wright*
I. INTRODUCTION
The most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind
of the oppressed.1
Men are taught to apologize for their weaknesses. Women for their
strengths.2
Fourteen-year-old Josh stared mindlessly at his computer screen,
unsure of how to respond to his father’s latest angry rant. He had sent his
father an email the night before, asking if they could postpone their
weekend camping trip. Josh wanted to attend his friend’s birthday party
and get a good night’s sleep in a proper bed before his upcoming final
exams. To put it mildly, his father had not responded well to Josh’s

* Claire Wright is an associate professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law, in San
Diego, California, where she teaches property law and a variety of international law courses.
On February 27, 2009, she coordinated the Ninth Annual Women in the Law Conference
entitled Confronting Domestic Violence Head On: The Role of Power in Domestic
Relationships and 2009 Ruth Bader Ginsburg Lecture at Thomas Jefferson School of Law.
At this conference, she first presented the concept for this article.
1. Alistair Boddy-Evans, Quotes: Stephen (Steve) Bantu Biko, ABOUT.COM,
http://africanhistory.about.com/od/bikosteve/p/qts_biko.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2012); see
also STEVE BIKO & AELRED STUBBS, I WRITE WHAT I LIKE, 68, 92, 103–04 (Aelred Stubbs
ed., 1978). Biko was an anti-apartheid activist in South Africa in the 1960s and 1970s.
Background Steve Biko: Martyr of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 1997,
10:19 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/37448.stm. In 1978, he was severely beaten
and died while in police custody. Id. He was thirty years old. Id.
2. This quotation has often been attributed to Lois Wyse (see e.g., VALERIE YOUNG, THE
SECRET THOUGHTS OF SUCCESSFUL WOMEN: WHY CAPABLE PEOPLE SUFFER FROM THE
IMPOSTER SYNDROME AND HOW TO THRIVE IN SPITE OF IT 63 (Crown Business 2011);
CONNER BROWN GLASER & BARBARA STEINBERG SMALLEY, MORE POWER TO YOU: HOW
WOMEN CAN COMMUNICATE 7 (Warner Books 1995); KAREN WEEKS, WOMEN KNOW
EVERYTHING! 181 (Quirk Books 2011); ALICE D. LAVIOLETTE & OLA W. BARNETT, IT
COULD HAPPEN TO ANYONE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN STAY 15 (Sage Publications, Inc. 2d
ed. 2000). Wyse was the president of one of the largest advertising companies in the world,
and she was the author of more than sixty-five books. Claudia H. Deutsch, Lois Wyse, Ad
Wordsmith and Prolific Author, Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/07/business/07wyse.html. For thirteen years, she also
wrote a column about her life and family for the magazine Good Housekeeping entitled The
Way We Are. Id. She died in 2007 at the age of eighty. Id.
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request. He had demanded that Josh keep their “camping date” and called
Josh “selfish,” “lazy,” (presumably, he thought Josh did not like to hike or
“rough it” in the wild), “a mama’s boy,” and a number of other demeaning
names and put-downs. The truth was that Josh liked camping and hiking
and desperately wanted to have a good relationship with his father. At the
same time, he knew from his fourteen years of experience with his father
that the only way to get along with him was to agree with him 100 percent
of the time. Ironically, though his father had called him a “wimp” in his
reply message, Josh felt like a wimp only when he gave in to his father’s
demands. He knew that his resistance was futile. As he felt a nauseating
combination of frustration, depression, and fear of failure, Josh typed “ok”
and hit the send button.
On Friday afternoon, Josh’s father surprised him by picking him up
directly at school. Josh pleaded with his father to drive by his mother’s
house so he could pick up some study materials that he had planned to
review that weekend, but his father glared at him and asked, “You’re not
going to start that up again, are you?” Josh did not even know what “that”
was, but he knew better than to ask for clarification. When they arrived at
their campsite, Josh’s father instructed Josh to set up the tent, and then set
off to find a “nice, long hike” for them to take the next day. Josh tried to
set up the tent but could not find any directions, and various pieces of
equipment appeared to be missing. He sat down at a picnic table next to
his father’s van and waited for him to return to their campsite.
When Josh’s father returned, he started shouting at Josh at the top of
his lungs, accusing him of being lazy and disrespectful. Josh was terribly
embarrassed as a number of neighboring campers heard the commotion and
looked over at them. Josh’s father then said that Josh must be “brain-dead”
because he had not realized that the broom they had brought with them in
the back of the van actually served as the tent’s center pole. He then
handed Josh the broom and instructed him to hold it over his head in a
horizontal position and take ten laps around the long circular driveway of
the campground, saying this run would help Josh remember how to
assemble the tent in the future. As Josh was a member of the junior varsity
football team at his school, the run did not take a big toll on him physically.
The shame he felt as he passed other campers on his run, however, was
excruciating.
After two long, mostly silent days of hiking, Josh and his father sat
down to have their last meal before they drove back home. While eating,
they noticed that the family at the campsite next door was packing up to
return home as well. The father said he was going to fill their van with gas
and would return in half an hour to an hour, and then the mother and two
girls left the campsite for several minutes. After ensuring there were no
witnesses, Josh’s father instructed Josh to grab the family’s big cooler and
radio that were sitting on the nearby picnic table. Without thinking, Josh
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said, “Dad, that’s really crazy.” His dad towered over him and, in a low,
threatening voice, said that if Josh knew what was good for him, he would
do exactly as he was told or he would find himself walking all the way
back home. With great trepidation, Josh went over to their neighbor’s
campsite, placed the radio on top of the cooler, and carried both back to his
and his father’s campsite.
Just as he was heading back, the father of the family next door pulled
up in their van and asked Josh what he was doing. Josh looked over to his
father for guidance as to what to say, and his father then apologized
profusely to this man and explained that he had been having a lot of trouble
with Josh lately. He said Josh had probably intended to steal the items, if
only for a prank. In fact, Josh’s father remarked to the neighbor, “You
probably even heard me discipline him on Friday night.” The man nodded
sympathetically, looked Josh straight in the eye, and said, “Now you listen
to me, son—I’m going to do your dad a big favor and not call the cops.
But you’d better start respecting other people, including your father. Your
life is just going to keep going straight downhill until you can be honest
and admit that you’re the real problem.”
As unpleasant as Josh’s life is, he nonetheless possesses a number of
advantages over most abused children and adolescents in this country.3 To
begin with, on some level, he understands that his father is abusing him. In
addition, he is old enough to testify in his parents’ child custody dispute.4
Perhaps he even lives in one of the approximately twenty-five states that
recognizes a rebuttable presumption against granting sole or joint custody
to a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence in the recent past.5 It is
possible that his father’s email communications can be admitted as
evidence of his father’s mental abuse in his parents’ custody proceeding.6
As indicated, most minors who are being abused by a parent or other

3. Josh and the above-described scenario with his father are fictional, but unfortunately,
the types of abuse revealed in this vignette occur on a daily basis to many children in the
U.S. See Assessing the Effects of Domestic Violence on Children, HELIUM.COM, http://
www.helium.com/knowledge/73119-assessing-the-effects-of-domestic-violence-on-children
(last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
4. In a custody proceeding in California, the court must permit a child fourteen years or
older to testify in a custody proceeding if she or he desires, unless the court determines that
doing so is not in the child’s best interests, and in that case the court must explain that
finding on the record. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042(c) (West 2012). In addition, a child who is
less than fourteen years of age may testify in a custody proceeding, if the court determines
that permitting the child is in the child’s best interests. Cal. Fam. Code § 3042(d) (West
2012). Moreover, whenever any child is precluded from testifying, the court must provide
an alternative means of obtaining input from the child regarding his or her preferences.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042(e) (West 2012).
5. See ABACDV, infra note 351.
6. PETER JAFFE ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR SAFETY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 17 (“Domestic violence victims . . . [m]any times . . . cannot supply
the evidence to support their claim. Even when they do, judges and lawyers may not find it
relevant to determining issues related to custody and visitation . . . .”).
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guardian are not so lucky. Many such minors are too young to testify in a
custody proceeding, and some of them may not even understand that they
are being abused. Additionally, many minors are likely to live in a state
that either: 1) does not respect a rebuttable presumption against granting
joint custody to a parent who has committed domestic violence or 2) does
respect such a rebuttable presumption but likewise recognizes a rebuttable
presumption in favor of granting joint custody to both parents so that these
two presumptions counter each other.7 At the same time, even an
adolescent in a state such as California faces a formidable challenge in
convincing a judge or custody mediator that custody should be denied to a
parent who has been verbally or emotionally abusive. To begin with,
mental abuse is notoriously difficult to prove, given that it not only
typically occurs in private, but it also does not leave telltale scars that other
witnesses may see.8 Even more importantly, though, the definition of
domestic violence utilized by the overwhelming majority of states does not
encompass mental abuse (other than mental abuse caused by an abuser’s
threat of future physical harm or sexual assault, refusal to refrain from
contact with the victim, or invasion of the victim’s privacy).9 As a result,
even if Josh lives in a state that recognizes a rebuttable presumption against
granting sole or joint custody to a parent who has committed domestic
violence, a custody court today likely would order Josh to spend significant
time alone with his father in a post-separation custody arrangement.10

7. See ABACDV, infra note 351.
8. George L. Jantz et al., HEALING THE SCARS OF EMOTIONAL ABUSE 11 (Revell rev. ed.
1995) (“The signs of emotional abuse . . . are easier to overlook. There is no scar tissue to
stretch, no bruises to yellow and heal, no gaping wound to point to.”); Catharine Dowda,
INVISIBLE SCARS: HOW TO STOP, CHANGE OR END PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE 7 (New Horizon
Press 2009) (“We are the walking wounded, but you can’t see that by looking at us. The
damage is not physical. You will not see bruises, cuts, breaks or marks. We hurt from the
psychological impairment of abusive words, actions, thoughts and deeds. We seek to heal
our wounds and form strong, healthy invisible scars.”); see also Anna Marie Bowman, What
is Child Abuse and How to Spot It, HUBPAGES (Aug. 28, 2012), http://anna-mariebowman.hubpages.com/hub/What-is-Child-Abuse-and-How-to-Spot-it (“Emotional abuse is
by far the hardest to recognize, the most socially accepted, and the most difficult to prove....
The signs manifest in behavior.”); Peter Allen, Shouting at Your Wife May Get You a
Criminal Record in France, MAILONLINE, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
worldnews/article-1240770/France-introduce-new-law-banning-psychological-violencemarriages.html (explaining that since psychological abuse leaves no visible scars, “[m]any
believe the offence [of psychological abuse in an intimate relationship] will be impossible to
prove,” and indicating that the police and courts will not be able to distinguish “rudeness”
from “psychological abuse”).
9. See infra Section VI (Definitions of Domestic Violence Utilized in the Fifty States);
ABACDV, infra note 351.
10. Billie Lee Dunford-Jackson, The Role of Family Courts in Domestic Violence: The
U.S. Experience, in PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: STRATEGIES FOR
INTERVENTION 191 (Peter G. Jaffe et al., eds., Guilford Press, 2004) (“The more recent
rebuttable presumption statutes tend to be more specific about what level of domestic
violence must occur to trigger the effects of the statute . . . . [A]t the same time, they offer
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This article utilizes a psychological or behavioral perspective to
analyze the domestic violence laws in this country and it concludes that, at
the very least, states should amend their child custody laws to include
“mental abuse,” a term which is used in this article to refer to verbal,
emotional, and psychological abuse, each of which is discussed further
below. Section II of this article explains the behavioral approach to law,
while Section III provides background information regarding the
phenomenon of domestic violence. Section IV discusses the major theories
of domestic violence that have been proposed to date. Section V explains
the psychological theory of domestic violence, which strongly suggests that
the legal system should implement more effective deterrents and sanctions
for the mental abuse of one family member by another, especially when the
victim is a child. Section VI discusses the domestic violence laws in effect
in the U.S. states, paying particular attention to how states’ child custody
laws treat domestic violence in general and mental abuse in particular.
Section VII addresses possible constitutional objections to states’ inclusion
of mental abuse in their definitions of domestic violence. Section VIII
reviews legal prohibitions against other forms of abuse of power, including
bullying, hazing, torture, and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment
or punishment. Section IX sets forth a definition of domestic violence that
incorporates mental abuse. Finally, Section X concludes by proposing that
states adopt a new, psychologically-sound definition of domestic violence
that encompasses all forms of mental abuse, at least for use in child custody
proceedings.

II. BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO THE LAW
Psychological issues have influenced U.S. jurisprudence for hundreds
of years.11 This is a natural enough state of affairs, given that the primary
role of law is to regulate human behavior,12 and the word “psychology”
means “the science of mind and behavior.”13 In the 1970s, however,
no relief in cases where the abusive parent uses tactics of power and control that may be
equally harmful but that do not meet the statutory requirement to trigger the presumption.”).
11. See, e.g., ROBERT G. MEYER & CHRISTOPHER M. WEAVER, LAW AND MENTAL
HEALTH: A CASE-BASED APPROACH 116 (2005) (“Like much of our legal tradition, the
ruling of McNaughton was derived from English law. As early as the 1500s, English
common law had recognized that ‘lunatics and idiots’ whose mentality approached that of a
‘wild beast’ could not be held accountable for otherwise illegal conduct.”).
12. Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 405, 412 (2005) (“[O]ne can make a strong case that all law exists to effect changes
in human behavior[.]”).
13. Psychology Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/psychology (last visited Aug. 30, 2012); see also American Psychological
Association: Support Center, How Does the APA Define Psychology, AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGY ASSOCIATION, http://www.apa.org/support/about/apa/psychology.aspx#answer
(last visited Sept. 16, 2012) (defining psychology as “the study of the mind and behavior”
and elaborating that “[t]he discipline embraces all aspects of the of the human experience—
from the functions of the brain to the actions of nations, from child development to care for
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recognition of the new interdisciplinary field of “psychology and the law,”
which has been described as “involv[ing] the application of scientific and
professional aspects of psychology to questions and issues relating to
law,”14 began.15 The Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology and Behavioral
Science explains that this new field of study is intended to increase “the
administration of justice in our society.”16 In this respect, the behavioral
approach to law can be viewed as a sub-set of both critical legal theory17
and “law and society” legal theory.18
Behavioral theory was largely responsible for the American Law
Institute’s (ALI) Model Penal Code which relaxed the two-part insanity test
set forth in the case of Queen v. M’Naghten.19 That test provides that a
defendant was insane, if “at the time of committing the act the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or as
not to know that what he was doing was wrong.”20 The Model Penal Code
states that a person lacks the capacity to commit a proscribed act either
when he or she cannot understand that the act is prohibited, or, despite his
the aged. In every conceivable setting from scientific research centers to mental health
services, ‘the understanding of behavior’ is the enterprise of psychologists.”); DENNIS COON
& JOHN O. MITTERER, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY: GATEWAYS TO MIND AND BEHAVIOR
12 (2007) (defining the discipline of psychology as “the scientific study of behavior and
mental processes.”).
14. Careers in Psychology and Law: Overview of Psychology and Law, AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGY-LAW SOCIETY, http://www.ap-ls.org/academics/careersoverview.html (last
visited Aug. 30, 2012).
15. Id. For a good summary of the development of the law and psychology movement,
see James R.P. Ogloff et al., Education and Training in Psychology and Law/Criminal
Justice: Historical Foundations, Present Structures, and Future Developments, 23 CRIM,
JUST. AND BEHAV. 200, 203 (1996), available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=publicpolicytomkins.
16. Forensic Psychology, in THE CORSINI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 590, 591 (W. Edward Craighead et al., eds., 3rd ed. 2001).
17. “Critical legal studies (CLS) is a theory that challenges and overturns accepted norms
and standards in legal theory and practice. Proponents of this theory believe that logic and
structure attributed to the law grow out of the power relationships of the society.” Critical
Legal Studies: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu
/wex/critical_legal_theory (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). “Critical theory building in law has
developed considerably during the past two decades and . . . for applications in law and
psychiatry . . . .” B.A. ARRIGO, PUNISHING THE MENTALLY ILL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 153 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
18. The “law and society” philosophy of law, stated most generally, holds that “[l]aw is a
mirror of society that functions to maintain social order.” Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law and
Society, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 368, 368 (Dennis
Patterson, ed., 2d ed. 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract
_id=1345204.
19. Queen v. M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843) available at http://www.bailii.org
/cgibin/markup.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKHL/1843/J16.html&query=Queen+and+v.+and+M'N
aghten&method=boolean.
20. Id. at 722. A good history of the Queen v. M’Naghten case and the U.S.
Government’s adoption of the insanity test set forth in M’Naghten can be found in DAVID C.
BRODY ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 162 (2d ed. 2011).

WRIGHT MACRO 4.10 430 (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2013]

TORTURE AT HOME

4/10/2013 6:05 PM

467

or her understanding of the proscription, nonetheless is incapable of
conforming his or her conduct to it.21 The ALI explained that “[t]he law
must recognize that when there is no black and white it must content itself
with different shades of gray.”22 Most states have since incorporated the
ALI’s Model Penal Code provision on the diminished capacity defense into
their criminal codes.23 In addition, the law and psychology movement has
successfully advocated for recognition of mentally disabled people’s legal
Furthermore, legal scholars and psychologists have been
rights.24
instrumental in demonstrating the general unreliability of eyewitness
testimony,25 and numerous DNA exonerations of innocent individuals have
confirmed that many eyewitness identifications are flawed.26 Some
scholars have even proposed a new Model Penal Code that would require
the exclusion of eyewitness testimony in any criminal prosecution in which
police personnel failed to follow a strict set of procedures.27 Practicing
lawyers and legal scholars have in fact utilized tenets of psychology (as
well as neuroscience, the study of “how nervous systems [including the
brain] are organized, and how they function to generate behavior”28) to
benefit society in numerous additional ways. For example, they have
assisted in the formation of litigation settlement strategies,29 supported the

21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1) (2011) (“A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”).
22. People v. Drew, 22 Cal.3d 333, 342 (1978), superseded by statue as stated in People
v. Skinner 39 Cal.3d 765, 768–69 (1985) (citing United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606,
618–19 (2d Cir. 1966)(quoting ALI, MODEL PEN. CODE (Tent. Drafts, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, p.
158.)).
23. Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism Out of the Criminal
Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 1, 12 (2005).
24. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD 1–19 (Oxford University Press 2012);
PETER BARLETT ET AL., MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 254
(2006) (“Only in the last few decades has mental disability law has [sic] come into its own
as a field of international human rights law. The United Nations Principles for the
Protection of Persons with Mental Illness, promulgated at the end of 1991, was the first
major international instrument to articulate these rights in any detail.”).
25. See, e.g., Laura Engelhardt, The Problem with Eyewitness Testimony: Commentary
on a Talk by George Fisher and Barbara Tversky, 1 STAN. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 25, 26 (1999).
26. Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2013) (“Eyewitness
misidentification is the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions nationwide, playing a
role in nearly 75% of convictions overturned through DNA testing.”).
27. Michael J. Saks et al., Toward a Model Act for the Prevention of Erroneous
Convictions, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669, 672–74 (2001).
28. NEUROSCIENCE 1 (Dale Purves et al., eds., 4th ed. 2007).
29. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 77, 84, n.35 (1997) (in part discussing,
and in turn quoting ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & LEE ROSS, INTRODUCTION TO BARRIERS TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3, 10–19 (Kenneth J. Arrowet et al., eds., 1995) to the effect that
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creation of alternative dispute mechanisms for emotionally charged legal
disputes such as contested child custody proceedings,30 and successfully
promoted the legal system’s recognition of the disease model over the
moral deficiency model of addictions.31 Domestic violence unquestionably
constitutes aberrant human behavior, consisting, as it does, of a person
somehow injuring one of his or her supposed “loved ones.” Therefore,
utilization of a behavioral perspective to analyze the available legal
remedies and sanctions available for domestic violence victims is
particularly apt.

III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
In the twenty-first century, domestic violence continues to be one of
the most misunderstood crimes. Although commentators generally agree
that the financial cost of domestic violence is too high,32 confusion and
debate abound regarding many other aspects of domestic violence. For
example, its definition, incidence, gender symmetry, and cause(s) are all
highly controversial. Each of these issues is discussed below.
A. TYPES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
The term “domestic violence” is a creation of the state legislatures.
In the 1970s, states began to adopt statutes addressing “spousal abuse.”33
After it became clear that persons other than spouses or former intimate
partners could be subjected to violence in relationships as well, states
began to adopt statutes specifically dedicated to the various forms of
violence that can occur in the context of domestic relationships.34 These
statutes often use the terms “domestic violence” and “domestic abuse”
interchangeably,35 and, given the variation among states regarding legally

certain “cognitive and motivational processes . . . [can] cause the rejection of agreements
which ‘seemingly meet the requirements of rational self-interest.’”).
30. Ludwig F. Lowenstein, The Value of Mediation in Child Custody Disputes (Recent
Research 1996–2001), 166 JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 739, 739 (2000) (reporting that research
strongly supports the increased use of mediation in child custody disputes).
31. See, e.g., Robert G. Meyer & Christopher M. Weaver, LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH: A
CASE-BASED APPROACH 207–12 (2005) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s adoption of
the disease model of addictions in the case of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).)
32. See infra Section III.B (Costs of Domestic Violence).
33. EVA S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE 8–9, 89, 109–10 (3rd ed. 2003) [hereinafter BUZAWA]; see also Jennifer
Thompson, Comment, Who’s Afraid of Judicial Activism? Reconceptualizing a Traditional
Paradigm in the Context of Specialised Domestic Violence Court Programs, 56 ME. L. REV.
407, 417–18 (2004).
34. BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 111.
35. Cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (2010) (LexisNexis) (defining “domestic abuse” in
Arkansas’ Domestic Abuse Act of 1991) and ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-9-113 (2012)
(LexisNexis) (entitled “Domestic violence training” requiring all new law enforcement
officers in Arkansas to complete at least twenty hours of training in “domestic violence” and
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recognized domestic relationships and crime definitions, these statutes tend
to define “domestic abuse” or “domestic violence” very generally as
“abuse” or “violence” (i.e., a specifically proscribed act) inflicted by one
member of a defined “domestic relationship” against another, and then
further define “abuse” and “domestic relationship” in separate statutory
provisions.36
The American Psychological Association’s (APA) Presidential Task
Force on Violence and the Family “defined family violence and abuse as
including a range of physical, sexual, and emotional maltreatment by one
family member against another[,]”37 and clarified that “the term family
includes a variety of relationships beyond those of blood or marriage, in
recognition that similar dynamics of abuse may occur in these
relationships.”38 Numerous domestic violence experts and government
agencies are in accord with the APA’s general statement regarding
domestic violence.39 For example, psychologist and domestic violence
expert Daniel Sonkin states that “most advocates and professionals agree
that violence manifests in three general forms, physical, sexual and
psychological . . . .”40 Similarly, the Office of Violence on Women
(OVW), a U.S. Department of Justice agency, has stated that “[d]omestic
violence can be physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological
actions or threats of actions that influence another person.”41 The OVW
has also clarified that such psychological actions can include destruction of
pets or personal property as well as forced isolation of the victim.42 The
U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women likewise

twenty hours of training in “child abuse,” and specifying that some of the topics covered
will be “[t]he dynamics of domestic abuse[,]” “The Domestic Abuse Act of 1991[,]” and
“[d]omestic abuse victim interview techniques[.]”).
36. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6203, 6211 (West 2012).
37. VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY: REPORT OF THE APA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON
VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION 1 (1996), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/pii/pubsonviolence.html (last
accessed Feb. 2, 2012). “The American Psychological Association’s Presidential Task
Force on Violence and the Family was convened to bring psychological research and
clinical experience to bear on the troubling problem of violence in the family and to make
recommendations for solutions.” Id.
38. Id.
39. Joseph S. Volpe, Effects of Domestic Violence on Children and Adolescents: An
Overview, THE AM. ACAD. OF EXPERTS IN TRAUMATIC STRESS, INC., http://www.aaets.
org/article8.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013); DIANE ELMORE, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N
PUB. INTEREST GOV’T RELATIONS OFFICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, available at
http://www.apa.org/about/gr/issues/women/violence.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
40. Daniel Jay Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment in Domestic Violence
Perpetrator Treatment Programs: Multiple Perspectives, www.danielsonkin.com/
PsychAb.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Sonkin, Defining Psychological
Maltreatment].
41. What is Domestic Violence?, OFFICE OF VIOLENCE ON WOMEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
42. Id.
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defines “violence against women” as “any act of gender-based violence
that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological
harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private
life.”43 Each of these types of abuse (physical, sexual, emotional,
psychological, and economic) is discussed further below.
According to Sonkin, “there is fairly consistent agreement as to what
behaviors are included in the physical violence category. These acts would
include a range from the less lethal acts of grabbing and pushing to the
more lethal acts of choking, punching and assaults with weapons.”44 The
Fourth National Incidence Study (NIS-4) on child abuse mandated by the
U.S. Congress similarly defines physical abuse of a child as “a form of
maltreatment in which an injury is inflicted on the child by a caregiver
via various nonaccidental means, including hitting with a hand, stick, strap,
or other object; punching; kicking; shaking; throwing; burning; stabbing; or
choking to the extent that demonstrable harm results.”45 A 2008 report
synthesizing one hundred years of social science research and many
hundreds of published studies concluded “that physical punishment puts
children at risk for negative outcomes, including increased mental health
problems,”46 although forty-nine states clearly permit some forms of
corporal punishment of a child by the child’s parent or other caretaker
within the child’s home.47
Psychologists generally define “sexual abuse” as “any non-consensual
sexual activity.”48 As non-consensual sexual contact between spouses has

43. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, ¶ 14,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/
res/48/a48r104.htm.
44. See, e.g., Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40. A more
complete list of examples of physical violence compiled by Sonkin include slapping,
drowning, grabbing, hair-pulling, punching, arm-twisting, pushing, hanging by neck, arms,
or feet, kicking, handcuffing, kneeing, tying up with rope, choking, clawing or scratching,
pushing to ground, threatening with gun or knife, biting, using knife or gun, threatening with
object, burning, using object, spitting, and breaking or throwing objects. Daniel Sonkin,
What is Violence?, in DANIEL JAY SONKIN, A COUNSELOR’S GUIDE TO LEARNING TO LIVE
WITHOUT VIOLENCE (1995), available at http://www.danielsonkin.com/articles/Ch2.html
(last visited Sept. 16, 2012).
45. Angelo P. Giardino & Eileen Giardino, Physical Abuse, MEDSCAPE REFERENCE,
http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/915664-print (last updated Feb. 2, 2012) (citing AJ
SEDLAK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE
STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2006)).
46. ELIZABETH T. GERSHOFF, CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE, REPORT ON PHYSICAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: WHAT RESEARCH TELLS US ABOUT ITS EFFECTS ON
CHILDREN 7 (2008), available at http://www.phoenixchildrens.com/PDFs/principles_and
_practices-of_effective_discipline.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
47. Id. at 20.
48. See, e.g., Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40.
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been considered a crime in all fifty states since 1993,49 state domestic
violence statutes tend to include sexual assault in their definition of
domestic violence.50
Most psychologists and other domestic violence experts actually use
the terms “emotional abuse” and “psychological abuse” interchangeably,51
but those who do not tend to use the former to refer to conduct that
threatens to impair a victim’s ability to access and express his or her
emotions, and the latter to refer to conduct that threatens to impair a
victim’s entire mental faculties.52 For example, one psychologist who
insists that emotional abuse and psychological abuse are distinct
phenomena defines emotional abuse of a child as “the sustained, repetitive,
inappropriate emotional response to the child’s experience of emotion and
its accompanying expressive behavior”53 and psychological abuse of a
child as “sustained, inappropriate behaviour which damages, or
substantially reduces, the creative and developmental potential of crucially
important mental faculties and mental processes of a child . . . [including]
intelligence, memory, recognition, perception, attention, language and
moral development.”54
Psychologists have articulated psychological and/or emotional abuse in
a number of different ways.55 For example, the Concise Dictionary of
Modern Medicine (specifically in the section dedicated to pediatrics)
defines emotional abuse as “[t]he infliction of . . . coercive, demeaning, or
overly distant behavior by a parent or other caretaker that interferes with a
child’s normal social or psychological development.”56 Similarly, it
defines psychological abuse as “[a] form of mistreatment in which there is

49. Jennifer A. Bennice & Patricia A. Resick, Marital Rape: History, Research, and
Practice, 4 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 228, 231 (July 2003).
50. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.,
DEFINITIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 3 (Feb. 2011), available at
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/defdomvio.pdf.
Some
states, however, include physical force as an element of sexual assault (other than statutory
rape), and as “many battered women consent to sexual activity for fear of escalating
physical and psychological violence . . . [,] the behavior itself (sexual intercourse, for
example) may not be sufficient to [establish sexual abuse or violence in the case of intimate
partners].” Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40.
51. See, e.g., Kieran O’Hagan, Emotional and Psychological Abuse: Problems of
Definition, 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT: THE INT’L J. 449, 449 (Apr. 1995); see generally
MARY SUSAN MILLER, NO VISIBLE WOUNDS: IDENTIFYING NON-PHYSICAL ABUSE OF WOMEN
BY THEIR MEN (1996).
52. See, e.g., KIERAN O’HAGAN, EMOTIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN
28, 33–34 (1993).
53. Id. at 28.
54. Id. at 33–34.
55. See, e.g., VERA E. MOURADIAN, NAT. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN PREVENTION
RESEARCH CTR, ABUSE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS: DEFINING THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS
AND TERMS (2000), available at http://www.musc.edu/vawprevention/research/defining.shtml
[hereinafter MOURADIAN].
56. JOSEPH C. SEGEN, CONCISE DICTIONARY OF MODERN MEDICINE 217 (2002).
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intent to cause mental or emotional pain or injury . . . [which] includes
verbal aggression, statements intended to humiliate or infantilize, insults,
threats of abandonment or institutionalization.”57
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in a 2003 report,
stated that “[p]sychological maltreatment—also known as emotional abuse
and neglect—refers to ‘a repeated pattern of . . . behavior or extreme
incident(s) that convey[s] to [victims] that they are worthless, flawed,
unloved, unwanted, endangered, or only of value in meeting another’s
needs.”58 Yet another definition of emotional abuse, offered by the
psychologist Steve Hein, is “any kind of abuse that is emotional rather than
physical in nature . . . [which] can include anything from verbal abuse and
constant criticism to more subtle tactics, such as intimidation,
manipulation, and refusal to ever be pleased.”59 As indicated by these
definitions, verbal abuse is simply a verbal manifestation of emotional
and/or psychological abuse, and such verbal manifestations can include
accusing, blaming, blocking and diverting, countering, constantly
criticizing, discounting, insulting, judging, name-calling, ordering,
trivializing, and threatening,60 as well as swearing, attacking, demeaning,
belittling, undermining, denying abuse, and humiliating the victim.61
In an effort to clarify psychological or emotional abuse and distinguish
it from simple marital or family discord, numerous researchers and
domestic violence experts have attempted to more specifically detail the
characteristic features, and/or provide specific examples, of this type of
abuse. The most widely used such measure is the Conflict Tactics Scale,
which was proposed by sociologist and renowned domestic violence expert
Murray Straus in 1979.62 This scale was intended to measure four types of
psychological abuse: passive behaviors, hostile behaviors, threatening

57. SEGEN, supra note 56, at 549.
58. JILL GOLDMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE ON CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE
FOUNDATION FOR PRACTICE 19 (2003), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/ pubs/user
manuals/foundation/foundationc.cfm#backten.
59. Steve Hein, What is Emotional Abuse?, EMOTIONAL ABUSE, http://eqi.org/eabuse1.htm.
60. PATRICIA EVANS, THE VERBALLY ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIP: HOW TO RECOGNIZE IT AND
HOW TO RESPOND 81–105 (2003).
61. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40. See also Cpmcd2000,
Alec Baldwin to Daughter—“Thoughtless Little Pig . . .,” YOUTUBE (Apr. 20, 2007),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgj6NEk9xEw. In this author’s opinion, actor Alec
Baldwin’s well-publicized voicemail message for his then-eleven-year-old daughter, calling
her a ‘thoughtless little pig,’ is the kind of statement, which would constitute verbal abuse.
ABALK2, That Alec Baldwin Voicemail in Full, GAWKER.COM (Apr. 20, 2007, 4:20 PM),
http://gawker.com/254061/that-alec-baldwin-voicemail-in-full.
62. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40 (citing M. Straus,
Measuring Intrafamilial Conflict and Violence: The Conflict Tactics (CT) Scale, 45 J. OF
MARRIAGE AND FAM. 633 (1979)).
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Specific acts provided as

Insulted or swore at the other one[;]
Sulking or refusing to talk to the one [sic][;]
Stomped out of the room or house (or yard)[;]
Did or said something to spite the other one[;]
Threatening to hit or throw something at the other one[;]
Threw or smashed or hit or kicked something[.]64
The Conflict Tactics Scale has been criticized for failing to include a
number of actions that domestic violence experts today consider
psychological maltreatment, but as Sonkin notes, it was the first attempt to
specifically define and measure this form of domestic violence and it
encouraged others to provide even better tools.65
On the “other end of the spectrum of tools designed to measure
psychological or emotional abuse is that proposed by the Domestic
Containment Program in Duluth, Minnesota, which is typically referred to
as the “Duluth Model” of domestic violence.”66 This model is based on the
feminist theory of domestic violence, which is discussed further in the
following section of this article, and which maintains that domestic
violence stems from the paternalistic nature of U.S. society.67 The wellknown “power and control wheel” utilized in the Duluth Model of domestic
violence includes eights types of psychological violence and provides nonexhaustive examples of each such type.68 These eight categories of
psychological violence are:
Using coercion and threats (making and/or carrying out threats to
do something to hurt her, threatening to leave her, to commit
suicide, or to report her to welfare, making her drop charges,
making her do illegal things)[;]
Using economic power (preventing her from getting or keeping a
job, making her ask for money, giving her an allowance, taking her
money, not letting her know about or have access to family
income)[;]

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 230–32.
Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40.
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Using male privilege (treating her like a servant, making all the big
decisions, acting like the master of the castle, being the one to
define men and women’s roles)[;]
Using children (making her feel guilty about the children, using the
children to relay messages, using visitation to harass her,
threatening to take away the children)[;]
Minimizing, denying, and blaming (making light of the abuse and
not taking her concerns about it seriously, saying the abuse didn’t
happen, shifting responsibility for abusive behavior, saying she
caused it)[;]
Using isolation (controlling what she does, who she sees and talks
to, what she reads and where she goes, limiting her outside
involvement, using jealousy to justify actions)[;]
Using emotional abuse (putting her down, making her feel bad
about herself, calling her names, making her think she’s crazy,
playing mind games, humiliating her, making her feel guilty)[;]
Using intimidation (making her afraid by using looks, actions,
gestures, smashing things, destroying her property, abusing pets,
displaying weapons)[.]69
Melanie Shepard and James Campbell since developed what they
referred to as the “Abusive Behavior Inventory” based on the frequency of
the above-listed abusive behaviors in a relationship during a six-month
period.70 They distinguished their Abusive Behavior Inventory from the
Conflicts Tactics Scale on the basis that their Abusive Behavior Inventory
is “not framed within the context of conflict, but rather abuse”71 and
includes sexual abuse as well as additional types of psychological
maltreatment not included in the Conflict Tactics Scale.72
In between the “narrow” list of examples of psychological abuse
provided by the Conflict Tactics Scale and the “broad” list of such
examples provided by the Duluth Model and the Abusive Behavior
Inventory, psychologists and other domestic violence experts have
provided a number of other lists of examples of psychological and/or
emotional abuse.73
For example, such lists include the Amnesty
International list of behaviors constituting psychological violence or
terrorism, which psychologist Lenore Walker proposed be utilized in the
69. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40.
70. Id. (citing Melanie F. Shepard & James A. Campbell, The Abusive Behavior
Inventory: A Measure of Psychological and Physical Abuse, 7 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 291,
291–305 (1992)).
71. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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domestic violence context,74 and the Psychological Violence Towards
Women Inventory, which was developed by Richard Tolman in 1989.75
The behaviors included in the Amnesty International list of behaviors
constituting psychological violence or terrorism are:
Isolation of victim[,]
Induced debility-producing exhaustion[,]
Monopolization of perceptions, including obsessiveness and
possessiveness[,]
Threats, such as death to self, victim, family or friends, or sham
executions[,]
Degradation, including humiliation, denial of victim’s power, and
verbal name-calling[,]
Drug or alcohol administration[,]
Altered states of consciousness produced by a hypnotic state[,]
Occasional indulgences that keep hope alive that the abuse will
cease[.]76
The fifty-eight items included in Tolman’s Psychological Violence
Towards Women Inventory are similarly grouped into the following six
categories:
Attacking her personhood, demeaning, belittling, undermining selfworth[,]
Defining her reality, getting her to question her own perceptions
and judgments[,]
Controlling her contact with outside world and support systems[,]
Demanding subservience, complying
expectations within the family[,]

with

rigid

sex-role

Withholding positive reinforcers within the relationship[,]
Threatening nonphysical punishment for noncompliance with
requests; status and emotional regulation[.]77

74. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40 (citing L.E.A. WALKER,
ABUSED WOMEN AND SURVIVOR THEORY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST
(1994)).
75. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40 (citing R.M. Tolman,
The Development of a Measure of Psychological Maltreatment of Women by Their Male
Partners, 4 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 159, 159–78 (1989)).
76. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40 (also providing specific
examples of these behaviors in the domestic violence context).
77. Id.
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Whatever general definition of psychological or emotional abuse or
examples that psychologists and other domestic violence experts have
provided, they agree that such abuse is almost always perpetrated through a
“series of acts” or a “course of conduct,” rather than through a single event,
which torments the victim with anxiety, depression, and self-doubt.78 That
is, a single communication, such as a derogatory remark made by one
member in a domestic relationship to another (including a child) is not
considered emotional or psychological abuse.79 In addition, experts agree
that communications between parties in a domestic relationship which
serve a legitimate purpose (e.g., conversations regarding a subject of
interest, disagreements between couples, and the delivery of disappointing
or even hurtful news) do not constitute psychological or emotional abuse.80
Economic abuse is generally defined as behavior that is intended to
prevent the victim “possessing or maintaining any type of financial selfsufficiency or resources and enforcing material dependence of the victim

78. See, e.g., Adam M. Tomison & Joe Tucci, Emotional Abuse: The Hidden Form of
Maltreatment, 8 ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION, AUSTRALIAN INST. FAM. STUD.,
(1997), available at http://www.aifs.gov.au/nch/pubs/issues/issues8/issues8.html (stating
that “[a] common feature of most definitions . . . is the basic tenet that isolated instances of
inappropriate responses do not constitute emotional abuse for the purposes of intervention.
Unlike physical and sexual abuse, where a single incident may be considered abusive,
emotional abuse is characterised by a climate or pattern of behaviour(s) occurring over time.
Thus, ‘sustained’ and ‘repetitive’ are the crucial components of any definition of emotional
abuse.”); see also Andrew Vacchs, You Carry the Cure in Your Own Heart, PARADE
MAGAZINE, Aug. 28, 1995, available at http://www.vachss.com/av_dispatches/disp_
9408_a.html (author, lawyer, and former sex crimes investigator defining emotional abuse
as “the systematic diminishment of another. It may be intentional or subconscious (or both),
but it is always a course of conduct, not a single event.”).
79. See, e.g., Yvonne M. Vissing et al., Verbal Aggression by Parents and Psychosocial
Problems of Children, 15 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 223, 230 (1991) (stating that
“occasional verbal aggression does not constitute verbal abuse.”).
80. See, e.g., Steven Stosny, Emotional Abuse of Family Members Should be Legal?,
PSYCHOLOGYTODAY.COM (Feb. 15, 2010, 9:46 AM), http://www.psychologytoday.com
/print/38335 (renowned U.S. psychologist commenting, with respect to France’s new law
prohibiting psychological abuse of a spouse or other intimate partner, that “[o]bviously the
law would not be applicable to ‘passive-aggressive husbands’ or ‘nagging wives’ or
irrational behavior in infrequent arguments. It would prohibit harmful behaviors, not
unpleasant ones. It would address human suffering, not unhappiness . . . . The legal
standard would be the same applied in most social laws: what reasonable people (not
paranoid or vengeful spouses) would regard as harmful, demeaning, humiliating, or fearinvoking.”); James Chapman, Domestic violence laws will now criminalize mental torment,
mind games and money controls too . . . and laws will be applied to those aged under 18,
MAILONLINE, Sept. 17, 2012, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2204778/Domestic-violence-include-mental-torment-laws-applied-aged-18.html (accessed
Mar. 27, 2013) (discussing how the executive branch of the U.K. government has recently
expanded the U.K.’s definition of domestic violence to “‘raise awareness that domestic
violence and abuse does not just encompass physical abuse but can also include coercion
and control’” and clarifying that this type of abuse “isn't about people having a row and
shouting. It's about people's whole lives being controlled, whether that's not being allowed a
bank account, access to a phone or to leave the house . . .”).

WRIGHT MACRO 4.10 430 (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2013]

TORTURE AT HOME

4/10/2013 6:05 PM

477

on the abusive partner.”81 Some psychologists also explicitly include
actual or threatened property damage or financial injury in their definition
of psychological or emotional abuse.82
As stated above, the term “mental abuse” is used in this article to refer
to both emotional and psychological abuse, whether expressed verbally or
otherwise, and the story presented at the beginning of this article illustrates
several examples of such abuse. These examples include describing Josh
as “lazy” and a “wimp,” glaring at Josh with tremendous hostility,
humiliating Josh both in private and in public (when he orders Josh to run
ten laps around the campground while holding a broom over his head),
implicating Josh in criminal activity, shifting blame to Josh by falsely
indicating to their campground neighbor that it had been Josh’s idea to steal
the cooler and radio, continually elevating his own needs above Josh’s, and
denying Josh’s existence as a separate person (when he refuses to cancel
the camping trip, insists that he and Josh drive straight to the campground
without stopping by Josh’s mother’s house so that Josh can retrieve his
study materials, and endangers Josh simply in order to obtain a free cooler
and radio).
Of course, not every perpetrator of domestic violence continually
engages in physical, sexual, mental, and economic abuse. In fact, Michael
Johnson of Pennsylvania State University reports that a domestic violence
perpetrator tends to engage in one of two major types or categories of
domestic violence, which he refers to as “situational couple violence,” and
“intimate terrorism.”83 As described by Johnson, situational couple
violence is characterized by physical violence, which the perpetrator
engages in on an occasional basis in response to “particular conflicts or

81. See, e.g., MOURADIAN, supra note 55.
82. See, e.g., Melissa Smith & Jeanne Segal, Domestic Violence and Abuse: Signs of
Abuse and Abusive Relationships, HELPGUIDE.ORG, http://helpguide.org/mental/domestic_
violence_abuse_types_signs_causes_effects.htm (last updated Apr. 2012).
83. MICHAEL JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE TERRORISM,
VIOLENCE RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE 2, 24 (Northeastern Univ.
Press 2008) [hereinafter JOHNSON 2008]; Michael P. Johnson, Differentiating Among Types
of Domestic Violence: Implications for Healthy Marriages, in MARRIAGE AND FAMILY:
PERSPECTIVES AND COMPLEXITIES 281, 282 (H. Elizabeth Peters, Claire M. Kamp Dush,
eds., 2009) [hereinafter Johnson 2009]. In these two works, Johnson also mentions two
other types of domestic violence, “mutual violent control,” which he describes as “the true
mutuality of two people fighting for general control over the relationship” (JOHNSON 2008,
supra at 12) and “violent resistance,” which he defines as “the use of violence to resist an
intimate terrorist’s attempt to dominate the relationship” (Johnson 2009, supra at 282).
However, Johnson does not consider mutual violent control to be a major category of
domestic violence, because, as he explains, “whatever it’s [sic] dynamic, it is very rare.”
JOHNSON 2008, supra at 24; Johnson 2009, supra at 294 n.1. Similarly, according to
Johnson, “for most heterosexual women, the usual size difference between them and their
partners ensures that violent resistance will not help and may make things worse, so they
abandon violence and focus on other means of coping.” Johnson 2009, supra at 286.
Accordingly, mutual violent control and violent resistance are not discussed further in this
article.
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tensions within the relationship.”84 Intimate terrorism, on the other hand, is
characterized by mental abuse,85 with other types of abuse constituting only
components86 of the perpetrator’s concerted “attempt to take complete
control of or at least generally dominate the relationship.”87
Johnson emphasizes that it is exceedingly important to distinguish
between the different types of domestic violence, as otherwise important
features of these two major types of domestic violence can be missed.88 He
notes, for example, that some researchers in the past have used data
regarding situational couple violence to support the erroneous conclusion
that just as many women perpetrate intimate terrorism as men.89 Additional
features of both situational couple violence and intimate terrorism are
described below.
1. Situational Couple Violence
According to Johnson, most incidents of physical abuse in domestic
relationships (ranging from a minor punch, slap, or scratch to homicide) are
examples of situational couple violence.90 Again, Johnson reports that a
perpetrator of situational couple violence engages in domestic violence
solely in response to stressful situations that arise in the course of the
relationship.91 As perpetrators of situational couple violence are not
attempting to control their victims’ behavior on an ongoing basis,92 it
logically follows that situational couple violence is characterized by
occasional physical violence.93 Johnson furthermore notes that, in
heterosexual couples, females commit forty-five percent of all events of
situational couple violence and males effectuate fifty-five percent of such
events.94
It is important to recognize that situational couple violence is still a
very serious societal problem. Victims can suffer severe physical injuries
and even death,95 and twenty-nine percent of females who are victims of
situational couple violence at the hands of a male partner have suffered a
severe injury at least once.96 Moreover, as Johnson concedes, physically
84. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 282.
85. Id. at 284–85.
86. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 285–86.
87. Id. at 282.
88. Id. at 283.
89. Id. at 283–84.
90. Id. at 287. Johnson estimates that situational couple violence occurs three to four
times more often than intimate terrorism. Id. at 294, n.3.
91. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 282, 287–88; JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 3, 11–
12.
92. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 287–88.
93. Id.
94. JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 22.
95. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 288.
96. Id.; PowerPoint: Michael P. Johnson, Distinguishing Types of Domestic Violence,
Paper Presented at Second International Conference on Violence Against Women, at 18
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injuring another person (other than in self-defense) can never be viewed as
healthy behavior.97 In fact, it is probably misleading to refer to this type of
violence as “situational couple violence,” as that name implies that the
couple, rather than the perpetrator, is responsible for the violence, and a
better name for it would simply be “situational violence.” However, in this
article, the term “situational couple violence” is used in order to maintain
continuity with Johnson’s categories of domestic violence.
Lastly, situational couple violence appears to possess three additional
characteristics distinguishing it from intimate terrorism. To begin with, the
great majority of serious physical injuries and deaths attributable to
domestic violence occur at the hands of an intimate terrorist rather than at
the hands of a perpetrator of situational couple violence.98 Additionally,
some perpetrators of situational couple violence appear to be able to take
responsibility for their own behavior and over time learn how to react to
stressful events in a nonviolent manner.99 Finally, situational couple
violence does not appear to be transmitted throughout generations of a
family, as children exposed to situational couple violence do not possess a
higher risk of committing situational couple violence or intimate terrorism
in their own adult relationships than children who have not been exposed to
any type of domestic violence.100
2. Intimate Terrorism
To repeat, Johnson maintains that an intimate terrorist’s use of physical
violence is simply one aspect of an intimate terrorist’s seemingly relentless
effort to completely control a domestic relationship.101 In other words,
intimate terrorism is a course of conduct that consists primarily (and
sometimes exclusively) of mental abuse, and the intimate terrorist tends to
utilize physical abuse and sexual abuse merely as instruments to further his
or her regime of control.102 Of course, it is logical that an intimate terrorist
primarily engages in mental abuse, because mental abuse erodes the
victim’s self-esteem and ultimately his or her autonomy to challenge the
intimate terrorist’s regime of control.103 That is, as Steve Biko’s quote at
(May 30, 2011) available at personal.psu.edu/mpj/2011%20Montreal.pptx (last accessed
Sept. 27, 2012) (clarifying that “severe injury” means “injury requiring hospitalization”).
97. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 281.
98. Id. at 285.
99. Id. at 291; see also Jennifer E. Daly & Susan Pelowski, Predictors of Dropouts
Among Men Who Batter: A Review of Studies with Implications for Research and Practice,
15 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 137, 138 (2000).
100. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 283.
101. Id. at 282–88; JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 7–12, 40–41.
102. Id.
103. CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, Substance Abuse Treatment and
Domestic Violence, in TREATMENT IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL (TIP) SERIES, NO. 25, 27 (U.S.
Substance Abuse & Mental Health Serv’s Admin. ed., 1997), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK64431 (“NONPHYSICAL abuse generally targets the
victim’s sense of self-esteem, well-being, and autonomy.”) (emphasis added); T. L.
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the beginning of this article implies, it is much easier for an oppressor to
control his or her victim by convincing the victim that his or her
subjugation is justified than by constantly physically coercing the victim
into a subservient position.104
As indicated above, compared to situational couple violence, intimate
terrorism also “is more likely . . . to produce injuries, long-term health
effects, depression, posttraumatic stress, suicide, and homicide.”105
Intimate terrorism, in fact, is the type of domestic violence that comes most
readily to mind when one considers domestic violence, because it is the
type of domestic violence that makes headline news, and the type that
domestic violence shelters and health care workers encounter on a regular
basis.106 Intimate terrorists often abuse a child living in their home in the
same manner in which they abuse their intimate partner.107 They do so for
two main reasons: to control their intimate partner through the child108 and
prevent that child from challenging the intimate terrorist’s control through
the child’s assertion of autonomy.109
After years of being subjected to intimate terrorism, many victims live
in a world of never-ending (but again, primarily mental) abuse that is both
constantly denied by the terrorist and largely hidden from the outside
world.110 Such a regime of abuse is akin to torture, brainwashing, bullying,
and hazing.111 Unfortunately, programs designed to correct intimate
terrorists’ aberrant behavior experience a low success rate.112 In addition,
intimate terrorism appears to be the type of domestic violence transmitted
from one generation to another within families.113 In particular, there is a
strong positive correlation in males between childhood exposure to intimate
terrorism and later engagement in intimate terrorism as adults.114 It is no
exaggeration to state that intimate terrorism is the ultimate betrayal of trust
BEAUCHAMP ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 58 (4th ed. 1989) (“The
autonomous individual acts freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan. . . . A person with
diminished autonomy, in contrast, is in at least some respect controlled by others or
incapable of deliberating or acting on the basis of his or her desires and plans.”).
104. See Morton Deutsch, Oppression and Conflict, Plenary Address at the Annual
Meeting of the Int’l Soc’y of Justice Research in Skovde, Swed. (June 17, 2002), available
at http://www.humiliationstudies.org/documents/DeutschIOSJPaper.pdf (containing a good
summary of the myths and propaganda that dominant groups throughout history have used
to convince subjugated groups that their own domination is justified).
105. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 285 (citing numerous studies).
106. JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 2–3, 6.
107. Id. at 8, 26; Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 284.
108. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 284.
109. JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 8 (explaining that an intimate terrorist uses children
to support his control in that “[f]irst of all, they, too, know he is the boss.”).
110. LUNDY BANCROFT, WHY DOES HE DO THAT? 1–20, 49–52, 68–78, 83–87, 120, 245,
and passim (2003).
111. See, e.g., JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 26.
112. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 291.
113. Id. at 283.
114. Id.
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and ultimate abuse of power. That is, an intimate terrorist is able to
repeatedly abuse his or her victim(s) only because he is in an intimate
relationship with his victim(s)115
A few females are intimate terrorists.116 However, intimate terrorism in
heterosexual couples is almost exclusively perpetrated by males against
their female partners.117 Understandably, the male-dominated nature of
intimate terrorism has led many feminist scholars and other domestic
violence experts to conclude that paternalism is the main driving force
behind this form of domestic violence.118 Given this male-on-female
asymmetry of intimate terrorism, throughout the remainder of this article,
when discussing the intimate terrorism form of domestic violence, only the
male pronoun “he” is used when referring to the perpetrator and only the
female pronoun “she” is used when referring to the victim.
B. COSTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
“[I]t is generally agreed that the most under-reported crime is domestic
violence.”119 Even so, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the
U.S. Department of Justice reports that, in 2010, 1336 individuals were
murdered by their spouse, former spouse, girlfriend, or boyfriend,120 and

115. Melanie Platt et al., A Betrayal Trauma Perspective on Domestic Violence, in 1
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN FAMILIES AND RELATIONSHIPS 185, 206 (Greenwood Press E.
Stark & Eve S. Buzawa eds., 2009) (“Victims of violence in intimate relationships are
profoundly betrayed by someone they depend on.”); Bonnie Brandl et al., The Parallels
Between Undue Influence, Domestic Violence, Stalking, and Sexual Assault, 17 J. ELDER
ABUSE & NEGLECT 37, 40 (2005), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/administrative/law_aging/2011_aging_arta2251_undueIflu_tb.authcheckdam.pdf (stating
that, in “UI [Undue Influence], domestic violence, stalking, and sexual assault cases, . . . [t
]he victim and exploiter are in an on-going relationship”) [hereinafter Brandl].
116. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 285; JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 20.
117. JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 20, 26, 48; Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 285.
118. See, e.g., JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 1–4, 6. While paternalism indeed appears
to play a role in the development of an intimate terrorist, paternalism and the traumatic
abuse of male children may work hand-in-hand in this process, as is explained further in
Section V of this article.
119. See, e.g., Crime and Violence: Violence Against Women, ECE GENDER STATISTICS,
U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE (last updated Mar. 24, 2004),
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/stats/gender/web/genpols/keyinds/crime/violence.ht
m; see also Spouse/Partner Abuse Information, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CHILD ABUSE AND
FAMILY VIOLENCE, http://www.nccafv.org/spouse.htm (last visited Feb. 10. 2013) (“[W]e
know that spouse/partner abuse . . . is the most common unreported crime occurring in
families from all economic, social, cultural, religious and educational backgrounds.”). This
underreporting of domestic violence has occurred for many years. See, e.g., PATRICIA
TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., EXTENT, NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES
OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN SURVEY V (2000) (“Most intimate partner victimizations are not reported to the
police.”), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/181867.htm.
120. Crime in the United States, 2010, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUST., Table 10, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/2010/crime
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the 2010 report entitled “National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence
Survey,” published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, reveals that approximately 35.6% of women and approximately
28.5% of men in the United States report having suffered physical violence,
rape, and/or stalking by an intimate partner (IP) (defined as a current or
former intimate partner)121 at some point in their lives.122 This same CDC
report indicates that, in 2010 alone, approximately 686,000 incidents of
rape,123 approximately 3,819,000 incidents of stalking,124 and
approximately 37,126,000 incidents of psychological aggression,125 and

-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10shrtbl10.xls (indicating that, of the 7,272 murder victims for
whom states had reported the victim’s relationship with the offender, 603 wives or former
wives were murdered by their husbands or former husbands and 492 girlfriends were
murdered by their boyfriends, for a total of 1095 females murdered by an intimate partner,
whereas 110 husbands or former husbands were murdered by their wives or former wives
and 131 boyfriends were murdered by their girlfriends, for a total of 241 males murdered by
an intimate partner) [hereinafter 2010 FBI Statistics]. Note that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) does not include former boyfriends or girlfriends in its definition of
intimate partners. Id.; see also JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2010 9 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cv10.pdf; Measuring Intimate Partner (Domestic) Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (last
modified May 12, 2010), http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/intimate-partner-violence/measur
ing.htm [hereinafter National Institute of Justice Report]. Note that, as a result of this
omission, the number of intimate partner murders in 2010 likely was higher, because exboyfriends are responsible for up to eleven percent of intimate partner murders committed
by males and ex-girlfriends are responsible for up to three percent of intimate partner
murders committed by females. Id. In addition, the number of intimate partner murders
reported by the FBI for 2010 was based only on the data which states had conveyed to the
FBI, and some of the remaining unclassified 7,822 murders in 2010 (see id.; 2010 FBI
Statistics, supra at Table 3) most likely had been committed by an intimate partner.
121. MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT, NAT’L CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL 37
(2011), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf [hereinafter
2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report].
122. Id. at 2, 38.
123. Id. at 42–43 (Figure is the sum of (686,000 estimated rapes of female victims by an
intimate partner (IP) during 2010, as listed in Table 4.5 on page 42) plus (zero (0) estimated
rapes of male victims by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.6 on page 43)).
124. Id. at 44–45 (Figure is the sum of (the estimated 3,300,000 acts of stalking committed
against a female victim by an IP during 2010, as stated on page 44) plus (the estimated
519,000 acts of talking committed against a male victim by an IP during 2010, as stated on
page 45)).
125. Id. at 45 (This figure is sum of (the estimated 16,578,000 acts of psychological
aggression committed against a female victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.9 on
page 46) plus (the estimated 20,548,000 acts of psychological aggression committed against
a male victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.10 on page 46)). Note that, in the
2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, “psychological aggression” includes
“expressive aggression” and “coercive control.” Id. at 9. Expressive aggression “includes
acting [in a] dangerous [manner], name calling, insult[ing], and humiliati[ng], while
[c]oercive control includes behaviors that are intended to monitor and control an intimate
partner such as threat[ening] [to inflict some type of harm], interfere[ing] with family and
friends, and limiting access to money. Id. at 10.
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approximately 14,817,000 incidents of physical violence126 occurred
between IPs. Approximately 5,429,000 of those estimated 14,817,000
incidents of physical violence between IPs were incidents of severe
physical violence (defined as acts more severe than slapping, shoving, or
pushing, e.g., beating, burning, choking, suffocating, kicking, harming with
a knife or a gun, slamming against something, and being hit with a fist or
something else that is hard127).128
Women suffered 82% of the above-stated 1,336 murders at the hands
of an IP,129 58% of the incidents of severe physical violence,130 51% of all
acts of physical violence,131 100% of the rapes,132 86% of the stalking
126. Id. at 44–45 (Figure is the sum of (the estimated 7,485,000 acts of physical
violence—3,163,000 estimated acts of severe physical violence and 4,322,000 estimated
acts of less severe physical violence—committed against a female victim by an IP during
2010, as listed in Table 4.7 on page 44) plus (the estimated 7,332,000 acts of physical
violence—2,266,000 estimated acts of severe physical violence and 5,066,000 estimated
acts of less severe physical violence – committed against a male victim by an IP during
2010, as listed in Table 4.8 on page 45)).
127. 2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, supra note 121, at 2, 10.
128. Id. at 44–45 (Figure is the sum of (the estimated 3,163,000 acts of severe physical
violence committed against a female victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.7 on
page 44) plus (the estimated 2,266,000 acts of severe physical violence committed against a
male victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.8 on page 45)).
129. 2010 FBI Statistics, supra note 120, at Table 10 (Figure is the ratio obtained by
dividing (the estimated 1,095 females (603 wives or former wives plus 492 girlfriends)
murdered by an IP during 2010) by the total estimated 1,336 individuals (the estimated
1,095 females plus the estimated 241 males (110 husbands or former husbands plus 131
boyfriends) murdered by an IP during 2010)). Note, as stated above, that the FBI does not
include former boyfriends or girlfriends in its definition of intimate partners. Id.; see also
National Institute of Justice Report, supra note 120. As a result of this omission, the
percentage of females murdered by an IP most likely is understated, because ex-boyfriends
are responsible for up to eleven percent of intimate partner murders committed by males and
ex-girlfriends are responsible for up to three percent of intimate partner murders committed
by females. 2010 FBI Statistics, supra note 120, at Table 10; National Institute of Justice
Report, supra note 120.
130. 2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, supra note 121, at 44–45 (Figure is the
ratio obtained by dividing (the estimated 3,163,000 acts of severe physical violence
committed against a female victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.7 on page 44)
by the total estimated 5,429,000 acts of severe physical violence committed against either a
female victim or a male victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 on
pages 44–45.
131. Id. at 44–45 (Figure is the ratio obtained by dividing (the estimated 7,485,000 acts of
physical violence—3,163,000 severe acts and 4,322,000 less severe acts—committed
against a female victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.7 on page 44) by the total
estimated 14,817,000 acts of physical violence committed against either a female victim or a
male victim (the estimated 7,485,000 acts of physical violence committed against females
plus the estimated 7,332,000 acts committed against males—2,266,000 severe acts and
5,066,000 less severe acts—by an IP during 2010, as listed in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 on pages
44–45)).
132. Id. at 42–43 (Figure is the ratio obtained by dividing (the estimated 686,000 rapes
committed against a female victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.5 on page 42)
by the total estimated 686,000 rapes committed against either a female victim or a male
victim (the 686,000 estimated rapes committed against a female victim plus the zero
estimated rapes committed against a male victim) by an IP during 2010, as listed in Tables

WRIGHT MACRO 4.10 430 (DO NOT DELETE)

484

HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL

4/10/2013 6:05 PM

[Vol. 24:2

incidents,133 and 45% of the incidents of psychological aggression134
perpetrated by either a heterosexual or same-sex IP during 2010.135
Moreover, approximately 8.7% of women have been subjected to both rape
and physical violence by an IP,136 approximately 14.4% have been
subjected to both physical violence and stalking, and approximately 12.5%
have been subjected to rape, physical violence, and stalking.137 In contrast,
92% of men who have been subjected to domestic violence by either a
heterosexual or same-sex IP have suffered only physical violence,138 while
6.3% have suffered physical violence and stalking.139
Certainly, domestic violence is a serious problem for men as well as
women. In 2010, 2% of all men experienced severe physical violence
perpetrated by an IP140 (compared with 2.7% of all women141), 4.5% of all
men suffered non-severe physical violence by an IP142 (compared with
3.6% of all women143), 0.5% of all men experienced stalking by an IP144
(compared with 2.8% of all women145), 2.5% of all men experienced sexual
violence other than rape by an IP146 (compared to 2.3% of all women),147
and 18.1% of all men experienced psychological aggression by an IP148
4.5 and 4.6 on pages 42–43). Note that no estimated rapes were reported for males,
because either the relative standard error in the sample was more than 30% or the cell size
was equal to or smaller than 20. Id. at 43 (Table 4.6).
133. 2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, supra note 121, at 42–43 (Figure is the
ratio obtained by dividing (the estimated 3,300,000 acts of stalking committed against a
female victim by an IP during 2010, as stated on page 44) by the total estimated 3,829,000
acts of stalking committed against either a female victim or a male victim (the 3,300,000
estimated acts of stalking committed against a female victim plus the 519,000 estimated acts
of stalking committed against a male victim) by an IP during 2010, as stated on pages 44–
45). Note that no estimated rapes were reported for males, because either the relative
standard error in the sample was more than 30% or the cell size was equal to or smaller than
20. Id. at 43 (Table 4.6).
134. Id. at 42–43 (Figure is the ratio obtained by dividing (the estimated 16,578,000 acts
of psychological aggression committed against a female victim by an IP during 2010, as
listed in Table 4.9 on page 46) by the total estimated 37,126,000 acts of psychological
aggression committed against either a female victim or a male victim (the 16,578,000
estimated acts of psychological aggression committed against a female victim plus the
20,548,000 estimated acts of psychological aggression committed against a male victim) by
an IP during 2010, as listed in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 on page 46).
135. Id. at 41.
136. Id.
137. Id..
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 45 (Table 4.8).
141. Id. at 44 (Table 4.7).
142. Id. at 45 (Table 4.8).
143. Id. at 44 (Table 4.7).
144. Id. at 45.
145. Id. at 44.
146. Id. at 43 (Table 4.6).
147. Id. at 42 (Table 4.5).
148. Id. at 44 (Table 4.7).
148. Id. at 46 (Table 4.10).
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(compared with 13.9% of all women149). At the same time, the fact that a
significant number of female victims suffer various types of violence at the
hands of an intimate partner suggests that females are more likely than
males to suffer from intimate terrorism150 whereas it appears that most male
victims suffer from the milder (but still very serious and occasionally
lethal) situational couple violence.151 As the U.S. Department of Justice
stated in 2010, “‘violence is instrumental in maintaining control and . . .
more than 90 percent [sic] of ‘systematic, persistent, and injurious’
violence is perpetrated by men.”152
As indicated, the above-discussed FBI statistics on intimate partner
murders committed in 2010, as well as the CDC study on nonlethal acts of
domestic violence committed in 2010, encompass domestic violence
committed by same-sex intimate partners,153 and a report published by the
National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs (NCAVP) in 2012 confirms
that domestic violence is a very serious problem in same-sex couples.154 In
fact, this report reveals that the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer
and HIV-affected (LGBQH) community suffered a very alarming 300.17%
increase (from 6 to 19) in intimate partner homicides between 2010 and
2011, with males, gays and lesbians, and people of color suffering a
disproportionate percentage of these homicides.155
In addition, researchers estimate that, every year, between one and two
million Americans age sixty-five years or older are “injured, exploited, or
otherwise mistreated by someone on whom they depended for care or
protection.”156
Most alarmingly, a number of studies reveal that
149. Id. at 46 (Table 4.9).
150. JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 13–23.
151. Id.
152. National Institute of Justice Report, supra note 120 (citing Michael S. Kimmel,
‘Gender Symmetry’ in Domestic Violence: A Substantive and Methodological Research
Review, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1331 (Nov. 2002)).
153. 2010 FBI Statistics, supra note 120, at Supplementary Homicide Reports, Table 10;
2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, supra note 121, at 91, 100–03.
154. National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, Intimate Partner Violence 2011:
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer and HIV-Affected (2012), http://www.avp.org
/storage/documents/Reports/2012_NCAVP_2011_IPV_Report.pdf
[hereinafter
2011
NCAVP Report]; see also DIANE R. DOLAN-SOTO & SARA KAPLAN, NYC GAY AND LESBIAN
ANTI-VIOLENCE PROJECT 3 (2005), http://www.avp.org/publications/reports/2005
nycdvrpt.pdf [hereinafter DOLAN-SOTO].
155. 2011 NCAVP Report, supra note 154, at 7–8.
156. COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL STATISTICS & COMMITTEE ON LAW AND JUSTICE, ELDER
MISTREATMENT: ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND EXPLOITATION IN AN AGING AMERICA 1 (Richard J.
Bonnie & Robert B. Wallace, eds., 2003); see also Pamela B. Teaster et al., The 2004
Survey of State Adult Protective Services: Abuse of Adults 60 Years of Age and Older, THE
NAT’L CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE 5 (2006), http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/ncearoot/main_site/
pdf/2-14-06%20FINAL%2060+REPORT.pdf (reporting that Adult Protective Services in
24 states had substantiated 88,455 of the 192,243 claims of elder abuse, neglect, or
exploitation in 2004 which they investigated, a substantiation rate of over 46%); Fact Sheet:
Elder Abuse Prevalence and Incidence, NATIONAL CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE 1 (2005),
http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/main_site/pdf/publication/FinalStatistics050331.pdf (stating that
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approximately 2,000 children under the age of eighteen die from child
abuse or neglect each year,157 at least 3.3 million children of all ages are
exposed to domestic violence annually,158 and approximately 2.8 million
children live in a household in which at least one member of the household
age twelve or older experienced violent crime (defined as rape, sexual
assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault).159
The physical, mental, and financial cost of domestic violence for its
victims and for society at large are enormous. To begin with, even though
approximately forty percent of victims of nonfatal intimate partner violence
do not report such events to the police,160 law enforcement costs related to
domestic violence are quite substantial. It is estimated that at least onethird of all calls made to local police departments concern domestic
violence,161 and some researchers have stated that most police calls concern
domestic violence.162 In New York City alone, “the police recorded more
than 226,000 domestic violence incidents in 2005—an average of roughly
620 domestic violence incidents per day,”163 and its law enforcement costs

only 1 in 14 incidents of elder abuse in domestic settings (excluding self-neglect), are
reported to authorities) (citations omitted.).
157. LESLIE DELONG & NANCY W. BURKHART, GENERAL AND ORAL PATHOLOGY FOR THE
DENTAL HYGIENIST 23 (Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins 2007) (reporting that “as many as
5,000 children are fatalities of child abuse and neglect each year) [hereinafter DELONG,
GENERAL AND ORAL PATHOLOGY].
158. SHARMILA LAWRENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WELFARE POLICY: RESEARCH
FINDINGS THAT CAN INFORM POLICIES ON MARRIAGE AND CHILD WELL-BEING, NAT'L
CENTER FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY 5 (2002) (citing L. Carter et al., Domestic Violence and
Children: Analysis and Recommendations, 9 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 4–20 (1999))
[hereinafter Carter]. Note that Lawrence stated that between 3.3 million and ten million
children are exposed to domestic violence annually. However, the authors of the study cited
by Lawrence stated in their own study that the 3.3 million figure “is based on a study sample
that did not include two groups particularly at risk for domestic violence—families with
children under age three and families in which parents were divorced. This study also used
an overly narrow definition of domestic violence.” Carter, supra, at 15–16. In addition,
these same authors stated in their own study that “[t]he 10 million figure is derived from a
study conducted in 1992 that used retrospective, self-report methods to survey individuals
about the existence of domestic violence in their families.” Id. at 16. These two comments
imply that the 3.3 million figure is on the low side and the ten million figure may be on the
high side as an estimate of the number of U.S. children exposed to domestic violence
annually.
159. Erica L. Smith & Jennifer L. Truman, Prevalence of Violent Crime among
Households with Children, 1993–2010, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.
gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4472.
160. Shannan Catalano, Intimate Partner Violence in the United States, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, Office of Justice Programs, 2007, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
ipvus.pdf.
161. Loretta J. Stalans, Family Harmony or Individual Protection? Public
Recommendations About How Police Can Handle Domestic Violence Situations, 39
American Behavioral Scientist 433 (1996).
162. Machaela M. Hocktor, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 643, 646 (1997).
163. City Spending on Domestic Violence: A Review, NYC Independent Budget Office, 1,
2 (2007), http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/DomesticViolenceSpending.pdf.
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related to domestic violence that year totaled nearly forty-four million
dollars.164
In addition, a very conservative estimate of the total health care costs
attributable to domestic violence each year is $5.8 billion.165 More than
1,400,000 hospital emergency room visits per year are attributable to
domestic violence,166 and the American Medical Association reported that,
in 1992, “domestic violence account[ed] for at least 21,000
hospitalizations, 99,800 days in the hospital, and 39,000 visits to personal
physicians annually in the United States.”167 Furthermore, in addition to
the immediate health care required immediately following a domestic
violence event, a number of researchers have discovered that victims of
domestic violence suffer much higher rates of physical, mental, and
reproductive health problems over the course of their lives than nonvictims.168
For example, the prevalence of asthma, irritable bowel syndrome,
diabetes, frequent headaches, chronic pain, difficulty sleeping, and activity
limitations is significantly higher among women who have suffered
physical violence at the hands of an intimate partner or been raped or
stalked by any perpetrator.169 Male victims of domestic violence also
suffer much higher rates of frequent headaches, chronic pain, difficulty
sleeping, and activity limitations.170 Even if a victim experiences only
psychological abuse (as sometimes occurs in cases of intimate terrorism171),
he or she tends to suffer a much higher number of physical and mental
problems than non-victims over the course of his or her life.172
While some of the long-term health problems suffered by domestic
violence victims are attributable to a specific physical injury received
during a domestic violence incident (e.g., walking difficulties traceable to
having had one’s back broken during such an incident) and certain other

164. Id. at 1.
165. Intimate Partner Violence: Consequences, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/consequences
.html [hereinafter CDC Study: Consequences] ($4.1 billion estimated for medical and
mental health care costs in 1995, updated to 2003 dollars (multiplying $4.1 billion for such
costs in 1995 by 1.034)); see also DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV’S DIVISION OF
VIOLENCE PREVENTION, Costs of Intimate Partner Violence against Women in the United
States 40 (TABLE 12) (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv_cost/ipv
book-final-feb18.pdfhttp://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv_cost/ipvbook-final-feb18.pdf
[hereinafter DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV’S DIVISION OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION].
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing Harris Meyer, The Billion Dollar Epidemic, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 6, 1992,
at 7).
168. See, e.g., 2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, supra note 121, at 62; CDC
Study: Consequences, supra note 165.
169. 2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, supra note 121, at 62.
170. Id.
171. Supra text accompanying notes 101–04.
172. CDC Study: Consequences, supra note 165.

WRIGHT MACRO 4.10 430 (DO NOT DELETE)

488

HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL

4/10/2013 6:05 PM

[Vol. 24:2

problems may be attributable to risky coping behaviors that some victims
adopt, the higher prevalence of a number of health problems suffered by
domestic violence victims seems to be attributable to biological changes
caused by chronic stress associated with domestic violence.173 Specifically,
chronic stress appears to impair one’s cardiovascular, gastrointestinal,
endocrine, and immune systems, primarily through the disregulation of
certain hormones, such as adrenaline and cortisol.174 As Rita Smith,
Executive Director of the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence,
once remarked, “living in a dangerous and stressful environment has longterm health impacts. It’s like living in a war zone[.]”175
The losses employers suffer as a result of lost lives, absences, and
decreased productively are likewise very substantial. In a 2005 survey
conducted by the Corporate Alliance to End Partner Violence, 44% of fulltime employees stated that they had personally experienced the effects of
domestic violence at work and 21% of full-time employees revealed that
they themselves were victims of domestic violence.176 Furthermore, 64%
of the domestic violence victims indicated that their work productivity had
decreased due to their victimization, with 57% of these victims indicating
that they were distracted at work, 45% of these victims indicating that they
feared others in the workplace would discover their victim status, 40% of
these victims indicating that they were concerned their intimate partner
173. 2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, supra note 121, at 61; see also CDC
Study: Consequences, supra note 165 (citing numerous studies).
174. See, e.g., Michele C. Black, Intimate Partner Violence and Adverse Health
Consequences: Implications for Clinicians, 5:5 AM. J. LIFESTYLE MED. 428, 429–31(2011).
In this article, the author explains that:
[d]uring the past 2 decades, research has substantially improved our
understanding of the physiology that underlies the association between
violence victimization and an array of adverse health outcomes . . . . During
the stress response, the body releases a host of chemical mediators, for
example adrenaline and noradrenaline, cortisol, catecholamines,
glucocorticoids, pro- and anti-inflammatory cytokines, serotonin, systemic
hormones (e.g., insulin), pituitary hormones, and a number of
neurotransmitters.
These mediators are interconnected in a network of regulation; when any
one mediator increases or decreases, there are compensatory changes in the
other mediators. Whereas this increased physiologic activity in response to
challenge is protective in the short run (e.g., the release of hormones that act
on multiple neural and endocrine receptors to produce the adaptive
physiologic fight or flight response), the long-term effects of prolonged
stress (e.g., increased heart rate or blood pressure over extended periods)
takes a toll on the human body.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
175. Will Dunham, Quarter of U.S. Women Suffer Domestic Violence, REUTERS.COM,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/07/us-violence-domestic-usa-idUSN07378963200
80207 (last accessed Dec. 10, 2012).
176. National Benchmark Telephone Survey on Domestic Violence in the Workplace,
CORPORATE ALLIANCE TO END PARTNER VIOLENCE 1 (Oct. 2005), http://www.ncdsv.org/
images/CAEPVSurvey.WorkPlace.pdf [hereinafter National Benchmark Telephone Survey].
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might harass them at work, 34% of these victims indicating that they were
fearful their intimate partner would unexpectedly visit them at work, 24%
indicating that they found it difficult to complete their assignments on time,
and 21% indicating that they had lost a job on account of their
victimization.177
Interestingly, in this same study, 31% of victims’ co-workers reported
that they felt obligated to perform victims’ work or make excuses for their
failure to complete their work, 27% of such co-workers stated that they in
fact frequently performed victims’ work, 25% of such co-workers admitted
that they resented the victims on account of their negatively-impacted work
situations, and 38% acknowledged they were at least somewhat fearful that
their safety at work was threatened as a result of the victims’ situation.178
Victims’ higher rates of absenteeism and tardiness at work have been
documented in a number of studies,179 and a 2003 study published by the
National Center for Injury Prevent and Control within the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services reported that each year victims of severe
domestic violence lose nearly 8 million days of paid work—the equivalent
of more than 32,000 full-time jobs—as well as almost 5.6 million days of
household productivity.180 A very conservative estimate of the turnover
and decreased productivity losses attributable to domestic violence every
year is $2.5 billion,181 while the Bureau of National Affairs has estimated
that these costs for employers are between $3 billion to $5 billion each
year.182 The American Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence
has stated that total employer costs for absenteeism, employer turnover,
reduced productivity, higher health insurance premiums, and administrative

177. National Benchmark Telephone Survey, supra note 176, at 1, 3.
178. Id. at 2.
179. See, e.g., Carol A. Reeves & Anne M. O’Leary-Kelly, Study of the Effects of Intimate
Partner Violence on the Workplace (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
227266.pdf (reporting that “lifetime IPV victims were more likely to be tardy and absent
than were non-victims”); J. Swanberg et al., Intimate Partner Violence, Employment and the
Workplace: Consequences and Future Directions, 4 Trauma, Violence & Abuse 1, 9–10
(2005), http://www.caepv.org/membercenter/files/TVASwanberg_Logan_Macke%20(3).pdf
(stating that “[r]esearch [has] found that between 23% and 54% of employed partner
violence victims reported being absent from work because of the abuse, with between 4%
and 6% reporting that this happened frequently” . . . [and] “the studies conducted to date . . .
suggest that 50% to 65% of partner violence victims reported being late for work or leaving
work early because of the victimization”).
180. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV’S DIVISION OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION, supra note
165, at 7.
181. CDC Study: Consequences, supra note 165 ($1.8 billion estimated for lost
productivity of employees suffering non-lethal injuries plus lost lifetime earnings of
murdered employees in 1995, updated to 2003 dollars (multiplying $1.8 billion for such
costs in 1995 by 1.034)).
182. BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NUMBER 23 VIOLENCE AND STRESS: THE
WORK/FAMILY CONNECTION, 2 (Aug. 1990).
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costs attributable to domestic violence are $4 billion to $5 billion per
year.183
Domestic violence is also a significant contributor to job loss,184
divorce,185 poverty,186 and homelessness,187 and the U.S. Justice
183. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, A GUIDE FOR
EMPLOYERS: VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE 3 (1999).
184. See, e.g., Barbara Johnson, Reducing Intimate Partner Abuse: National, State, and
Local Strategies for Prevention of Domestic Violence, Minnesota Center Against Violence
and Abuse 2 (2002), http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/barbara/barbara.html
(explaining that embarrassment over recurring injuries can lead to absenteeism, secrecy, and
isolation, frequent periods of infirmary and dysfunctional coping mechanisms of addictive
behavior cause many victims from retaining steady employment, and abused partners often
voluntarily abandon their jobs, homes, and personal possessions in order to escape abuse);
Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, Women’s Safety & Health Issues at Work, available at http://health.groups.yahoo.
com/group/globalocchyg-list/message/180 (accessed Dec. 11, 2012) (reporting that
“homicide is the leading cause of death for females in the workplace, accounting for 40% of
all female workplace deaths. Twenty-five percent of female victims were assaulted by
people known to them, and 16% of women workplace homicides are a result of domestic
violence”); Domestic Violence: Prevalence and Implications for Employment Among
Welfare Recipients, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE 19 (1998) (revealing that “between 35%
and 56% of employed battered women were harassed at work by their batterers; 55% to
85% missed work because of domestic violence; and 24% to 52% lost their jobs as a result
of the abuse”); see also Nina W. Tarr, Employment and Economic Security for Victims of
Domestic Abuse, 16 REV. OF L. & SOC. JUSTICE 351 (2007) [hereinafter Tarr].
185. PETER JAFFE ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR SAFETY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 6 (2002) (“Numerous divorce studies that ask women why they
ended their relationship find rates of domestic violence well about the rates in the general
population.”); Paul R. Amato & Denise Previti, People’s Reasons for Divorcing: Gender,
Social Class, the Life Course, and Adjustment, 24 J. FAMILY ISSUES 602, 602–04, 615 (2003)
(stating that “marital discord and divorce are gendered experiences, with wives more likely
to initiate a divorce than husbands, physical and emotional abuse are common reasons why
women seek divorce (as illustrated in Table 1), and 0% of men and 9.5% of women listed
“physical or mental abuse” as a motivating factor in their divorce (as illustrated in Table 3));
Xenia P. Montenegro, The Divorce Experience: A Study of Divorce at Midlife and Beyond,
AARP MAGAZINE, 14, 20–21 (2004) http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/general/divorce.pdf
(concluding, based on a study of people between the ages of 40 and 69, “[w]omen usually
initiate the divorce,” “[v]erbal, physical, or emotional abuse is the foremost reason for
divorce[,]” and “[v]ictims of physical or verbal use . . . are much more apt to ask for the
divorce”).
186. Eleanor Lyon, Welfare, Poverty and Abused Women: New Research and Its
Implications, Building Comprehensive Solutions to Domestic Violence, NATIONAL
RESOURCE CR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 4, 7–8 (Oct. 2000) (stating that abused women “were
more likely to have been unemployed when they wanted to be working, to have lower
personal income, and to have received AFDC, food stamps, and Medicaid in the past year”);
see also BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 40 (citing Eleanor Lyon, Poverty, Welfare and Battered
Women: What does the research tell us?, THE NAT’L RESOURCE CENTER ON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE (1997) http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/welfare/welfare.pdf.) (pointing
out that abused women are also more likely than others to . . . have partners who oppose or
interfere with school or employment, and to have more frequent periods of unemployment
and welfare receipts”); Tarr, supra note 184, at 371–80 (discussing how victims of domestic
violence often lose their jobs due to the perpetrator’s interference with their jobs or their
pursuit of legal actions against their abuser and often abandon their jobs in order to escape
from their abuser); Erica Pearson, Heavy Price of Domestic Abuse: Victims Not Only Beaten
But Often Left in Debt by Their Tormentors, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, http://www.nydailynews.
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Department Institute has estimated that, when medical costs, indirect costs,
and diminished quality of life costs are taken into account, adult victims of
domestic violence suffer economic costs of $67 billion dollars per year
(stated in 1993 U.S. dollars).188
Finally, although domestic violence “is disproportionately concentrated
in population subgroups that are stressed by poverty, [it] . . . is present in
all social strata and ethnic groups[.]”189 In sum, domestic violence in this
country and around the world190 appears to be an epidemic that is spiraling
out of control.191

IV. MAJOR THEORIES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
com/new-york/domestic-violence-takes-financial-toll-article-1.1172451 (discussing how
domestic violence perpetrators often saddle their victims with enormous debts).
187. See, e.g., 2011 Hunger and Homelessness Survey: A Status Report on Hunger and
Homelessness in America’s Cities, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS 23, 80 (2011),
http://usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/2011-hhreport.pdf (revealing that, across the 29
cities which participated in the 2011 survey, 13% of the homeless population in these cities
were victims of domestic violence); U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, 2002 HUNGER AND
HOMELESSNESS SURVEY 82 (2002) (stating that “[d]omestic violence was identified by 11
cities as a primary cause of homelessness”); see also CDC Study: Consequences, supra note
165 (stating that “[v]ictims of IPV (intimate partner violence)] sometimes face . . .
[h]omelessness” and citing a number of studies); Committee Opinion on Intimate Partner
Violence, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS 2 (2012),
http://www.acog.org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions/Committee%20on%20Health%20Ca
re%20for%20Underserved%20Women/co518.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20121125T1707214097(“stat
ing that “d]estruction of the family unit often results in loss of financial stability or lack of
economic resources for independent living, leading to increased populations of homeless
women and children”) (Citation omitted.)) [hereinafter ACOG Committee Opinion].
188. Ted R. Miller et al., Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look, National Institute
of Justice, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 23 (1996) available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/
victcost.pdf.
189. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH, VIOLENCE BY
INTIMATE PARTNERS 99 (2002) [hereinafter WORLD HEALTH ORG.]; BUZAWA, supra note 33,
at 40; ACOG Committee Opinion, supra note 187, at 1; Spouse Abuse/Partner Abuse
Information, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CHILD ABUSE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE 1 (2012),
available at http://www.nccafv.org/spouse.htm.
190. See, e.g., Violence Against Women and Girls Still a Global Epidemic, UNICEF (May
31, 2000), www.unicef.org/newsline/00pr45.htm); Mary Kimani, Taking on Violence
Against Women in Africa: International Norms, Local Activism Start to Alter Laws,
Attitudes, AFRICA RENEWAL (July 2007), http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/
afrec/vol21no2/212-violence-aganist-women.html (reporting that Kofi Annan, then
Secretary-General of the U.N., stated in 1999 that “violence against women knows no
boundaries of geography, culture or wealth . . . [and] is perhaps the most shameful human
rights violation . . . [and] perhaps the most pervasive”).
191. See, e.g., Press Release, Domestic Abuse Against Women is Epidemic in America,
Shalala Says, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services (Mar. 11, 1994),
http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/1994pres/940311.txt (reporting that then-U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services Secretary Donna Shalala referred to domestic abuse against
women as ‘terrorism in the home’ and “called for ‘a national awakening to this
unacknowledged epidemic in America’”).
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As indicated above, the phenomenon of domestic violence literally
appears to be tearing the society of the United States apart. Halting the
perpetuation of domestic violence throughout succeeding generations of
families is imperative for both the federal government and each state
government, as any society can have no more important task than the
protection of its youth.192 Accordingly, legislators in each jurisdiction in
the United States should make every attempt to thoroughly understand the
causes of domestic violence and then address those causes in the
jurisdiction’s laws.
Over the years, a number of theories of domestic violence have been
proposed,193 although several of these theories overlap with others194 and a
number of them are focused on explaining the asymmetrical nature of
male-on-female violence in heterosexual relationships.195 In an article of
this length, it is not possible to discuss all of the different theories of
domestic violence that have been proposed, but the major theories of
domestic violence are summarized below.
One of the early theories of domestic violence was the “mental defect”
theory, which held that a perpetrator of domestic violence possesses a
physical brain abnormality or a serious mental illness, such as
schizophrenia, which essentially causes him to experience a break from
reality.196 Some theorists also posited that a victim of domestic violence
likewise possesses a physical brain abnormality or serious mental illness,197

192. This sentiment has been expressed in many different ways throughout history.
Nelson Mandela, for example, stated that “[t] here can be no keener revelation of a society’s
soul than the way in which it treats its children.” President Nelson Mandela, Speech at the
Launch of the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund, Mahlamba’nlopfu, Pretoria (May 8, 1995),
available
at
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1995/sp950508.html.
Similarly, when the United States Senate dedicated a building to former U.S. Senator Hubert
Humphrey, he remarked that “[t]he moral test of government is how that government treats
those who are in the dawn of life, the children; those who are in the twilight of life, the
elderly; and those who are in the shadows of life—the sick, the needy and the handicapped.”
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Speech at the Dedication of the Headquarters of the U.S.
Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 4, 1977), available at
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/276362/Hubert-H-Humphrey.
193. See, e.g., JOAN MCCLENNEN, SOCIAL WORK AND FAMILY VIOLENCE 222–25 (Springer
Publishing Company 2010) [hereinafter MCCLENNEN].
194. Id.; see also David A. Wolfe & Peter G. Jaffe, Emerging Strategies in the Prevention
of Domestic Violence, 9 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILDREN 133, 134 (Winter 1999)
[hereinafter Wolfe & Jaffe].
195. MCCLENNEN, supra note 193, at 222–25.
196. BATTERER MANIPULATION AND RETALIATION IN THE COURTS: A LARGELY
UNRECOGNIZED PHENOMENON SOMETIMES ENCOURAGED BY COURT PRACTICES 47–48 (Joan
Zorza, ed. 2002) [hereinafter Zorza]; Eli H. Newberger et al., Child Abuse: The Current
Theory Base and Future Research Needs, 22 J OF THE AMER. ACAD. OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY
262, 266 (1983) (citing R. J. Gelles, Violence in the Family: A Review of Research in the
Seventies, 42 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 873, 873 (1980) (stating that “research in the ‘60’s
tended to view domestic violence as rare and confined to mentally disturbed and/or poor
people . . . .”)).
197. Zorza, supra note 196, at 47–48.
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which others have attributed to researchers mistaking a victim’s resulting
mental injuries for a rationale explaining why she would choose to remain
in an abusive relationship in the first place.198 People who suffer from
brain injuries and diseases that affect specific sections of the brain, such as
the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala, may experience difficulty in
regulating their emotions199 and do, in fact, possess a higher than average
propensity to commit domestic violence.200 However, the “mental defect”
theory fell out of favor when many, if not most, domestic violence
perpetrators did not appear to suffer from any physical brain abnormality or
be out of touch with reality.201 In all likelihood, the “mental defect” theory
is best explained as an example of the human tendency to simply label
incomprehensible human behaviors as “insane.”202
Researchers over the years have also suggested various biological and
chemical explanations of domestic violence, with testosterone being “the
most researched and proven link to violent behavior.”203 As testosterone
level is positively associated with aggression and violence,204 one
advantage of the “testosterone” theory is that it could explain the higher
incidence of male-on-female violence that occurs in heterosexual
relationships, given that males generally possess higher testosterone levels
than females.205 Similarly, several researchers have theorized that domestic
violence is attributable to unusual levels of serotonin, dopamine, and/or
other naturally occurring hormones, and some studies have indeed shown
that unusual levels of serotonin and/or dopamine are positively correlated
with aggression toward oneself and others, substance abuse, exaggerated
depression as a result of precipitating life stressors, and suicide.206 In fact,

198. Zorza, supra note 196, at 47–48.
199. See, e.g., JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN 177 (1998); Research Links Brain
Damage and Violent Crime – USC Studies Point to Underlying Causes of Violent Crime in
Young Offenders, SCIENCE DAILY, Sept. 13, 1997, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/
1997/09/970913073401.htm [hereinafter USC Studies] (stating that “[t]he prefrontal cortex
is involved in the inhibition of aggressive behavior . . . [and] [s]tudies have shown that
damage to the region correlates with impulsiveness and unpredictable, uncontrolled
actions”); NICKY ALI JACKSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 520–21 (2007).
200. USC Studies, supra note 199.
201. Domestic Violence – Explore the Issue: Theories of Violence, U. OF MINNESOTA
HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY & MINN. ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2003), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/svaw/domestic/link/theories.htm (summarizing Zorza,
supra note 196, at 47–48, and reporting that “[b]atterers attack only their intimate partners
[or other family members]. People who suffer from mental illnesses such as schizophrenia
do not limit their violence to their intimate partners.”).
202. See, e.g., D. L. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250, 250
(Jan. 19, 1973).
203. BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 39.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Dongiu Seo et al., Role of Serotonin and Dopamine System Interactions in
the Neurobiology of Impulsive Aggression and its Comorbidity with Other Clinical
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“[m]ost researchers have reported that a high percentage of domestic
violence offenders use illegal drugs or consume excessive quantities of
alcohol, at rates far beyond the general population . . . [,]”207 and some
writers have theorized that the chemical composition of alcohol and other
narcotics alters human’s brain chemistry to such an extent that people who
otherwise would not perpetrate domestic violence end up doing so.208
However, it is important to understand that a positive correlation
between a factor and domestic violence does not establish that the factor
causes domestic violence. A number of studies have actually “suggested
that the relationship between alcohol and domestic violence is indirect and
a function of attitudes supporting the use of violence.”209 In addition,
researchers have conceded that testosterone alone certainly cannot explain
all cases of domestic violence, because many individuals, including
successful businessmen and professional athletes, possess a higher than
average level of testosterone, and yet they do not all commit domestic
violence.210 Likewise, neither serotonin nor dopamine, nor any other
biological or chemical factor that has been identified to date, can explain a
significant percentage of domestic violence cases.211
Socio-biologists, who attempt to explain gender-linked human
behavior, due to the natural selection of traits that guarantee the human
species’ survival,212 have also offered a theory of domestic violence.213
Specifically, they have proposed that, due to the fact that a child’s paternity
is not easily identifiable (unlike his or her maternity), males over time
developed an aggressive posture vis-à-vis their intimate female partners so
as to limit their partners’ interactions with other males, thereby reducing
other males’ opportunities to impregnate their intimate female partners.214
Psychologists, however, have pointed out several problems with this
theory. For example, as one commentator has noted, this theory does not

Disorders, 13 AGGRESSIVE VIOLENT BEHAV. 383, 383 (Oct. 2008); V. M. Linnoila, M.
Virkkunen, 53 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 46 (Oct. 1992).
207. BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 37.
208. See, e.g., Robert A. Nash, The Serotonin Connection, 11 THE J. OF ORTHOMOLECULAR
MED. 35, 39 (1996) available at http://www.orthomolecular.org/library/jom/1996/articles
/1996-v11n01-p035.shtml (last visited Jan. 21, 2013) (stating that “[t]his paper goes on to
show that low serotonin is associated with poor impulse control and most likely leads to
violence to self and others in susceptible individuals”).
209. BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 38.
210. ELIZABETH KANDEL ENGLANDER, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE 76–77 (Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates 2006).
211. See, e.g., Wolfe & Jaffe, supra note 194, at 134 (stating that “[t]here are several
different, and at times, overlapping theories of causation”).
212. See, e.g., D.C. ROWE, THE LIMITS OF FAMILY INFLUENCE: GENES, EXPERIENCE AND
BEHAVIOR (1994); David M. Buss, Evolutionary Psychology: A New Paradigm for
Psychological Science, 6 PSYCH. INQUIRY 1, 9–10 (1995).
213. See, e.g., DAVID M. BUSS, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN
MATING 16, n. 19 (2003).
214. Id.
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explain why only a small minority of men actually inflict violence on their
mates, why some women are the violent aggressor in heterosexual
relationships, why lesbian couples inflict violence on each other, or why
men do not instead attack males whom they perceive as sexual threats.215
In addition, numerous researchers have noted that, across a broad range
of societies, domestic violence occurs more often in low-income families
than in high-income families.216 Some studies have suggested that this
phenomenon is explained by the unusually high number of stressful
situations that low-income families face.217 Some writers have posited that
domestic violence occurs more often in such families because males in
these families suffer a masculine identity crisis when they cannot support
their families and they tend to take their frustration out on their intimate
female partners.218 Still other researchers suggest that the apparent inverse
relationship between domestic violence and income may be explained
simply by “the additional obstacles that poor women face to leaving rather
than a greater propensity of poor men to batter.”219 In any case, given that
domestic violence “affect[s] individuals in every community, regardless of
age, economic status, race, religion, nationality or educational
background[,]”220 poverty appears to be at most a factor contributing to
domestic violence, rather than a comprehensive explanation of this aberrant
behavior.221
215. DONALD G. DUTTON, THE ABUSIVE PERSONALITY: VIOLENCE AND CONTROL IN
INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 31–33 (The Guilford Press 2007) [hereinafter DUTTON].
216. See, e.g., Rachel Jewkes, Intimate Partner Violence: Cause and Prevention, 359 THE
LANCET 1423, 1424 (Apr. 20, 2002) (citing M.C. Ellsberg et al., Wife Abuse Among Women
of Childbearing Age in Nicaragua, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 241–44 (1999) [hereinafter
Jewkes]; S.L. Martin et al., Domestic Violence in Northern India, 150 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL
417, 417–26 (1999); R. BACHMAN & L.E. SALTZMAN, WASHINGTON: BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE
DESIGNED SURVEY 1, 4 (1995); G.T. Hotaling & D.B. Sugarman, An Analysis of Risk
Markers in Husband to Wife Violence: The Current State of Knowledge, 1 VIOLENCE VICTIM
101, 114 (1986); RICHARD J. GELLES & MURRAY A. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE: THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ABUSE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1988); see also BUZAWA,
supra note 33, at 40.
217. See, e.g., JOHN HAMEL & TONIA L. NICHOLS, FAMILY INTERVENTIONS IN DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: A HANDBOOK OF GENDER-INCLUSIVE THEORY AND TREATMENT 349, 501–02
(2006) [hereinafter HAMEL & NICHOLS]; EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN
ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 59 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
218. See, e.g., Jewkes, supra note 216, at 1424.
219. See, e.g., LUNDY BANCROFT, JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT:
ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 30 (2d ed., 2012).
220. Tami Lorbecke, The Story of Domestic Violence and Tribal Child Support, in 33:10
Child Support Report (Oct. 2011), Administration of Children and Families, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/
default/files/ocse/csr1110_0.pdf (last accessed Jan. 21, 2013) (citing Domestic Violence
Facts,
National
Coalition
Against
Violence,
2007,
available
at
http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf (last accessed Jan. 5,
2013)).
221. See also SUSAN WEITZMAN, NOT TO PEOPLE LIKE US: HIDDEN ABUSE IN UPSCALE
MARRIAGES 3–17 (Basic Books 2000) (comprehensive study of 14 middle and high-income
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A theory of domestic violence that was especially popular in the 1960s
and 1970s was the “learned behavior” theory, which proposes that abusers
and victims alike are merely modeling the behavior of their childhood role
models.222 The learned behavior theory of domestic violence is very
attractive, both because it implies that today’s domestic violence
perpetrators were once victims and because it suggests that domestic
violence can be abolished through education. It is this theory that is most
often proffered as the explanation for inter-generational transmission of
domestic violence in certain families.223 Unfortunately, the “learned
behavior” theory, just like all of the other above-discussed theories, at most
appears to provide only a partial explanation of domestic violence, in that
while exposure to domestic violence during childhood is positively
correlated with involvement in domestic violence in adulthood,224 most
people who are exposed to domestic violence in their youth do not
perpetrate domestic violence as adults.225
Today, the two dominant theories of domestic violence are the family
dynamics theory and the feminist theory.226 The family dynamics theory is
a specific application of general systems theory,227 which holds that one
should analyze any organic situation from the perspective of how each
action causes reactions from each of the other dynamic elements rather than
from a simple linear perspective.228 Essentially, the family dynamics
theory conceptualizes violence in domestic relationships as the expression
of violence in response to normal stresses in family life by dysfunctional
families.229
The feminist theory, in general, maintains that violence in domestic
relationships is an outgrowth of patriarchal systems of male dominance in

female victims of domestic violence conducted by author after she had encountered
hundreds of such victims and learned that ‘“spouse assault by wealthy and powerful men
rarely leads to police intervention’” . . . “and in more prosperous neighborhoods, spacious
homes and large lots made it unlikely that neighbors or friends would learn about and report
the abuse[ ].” WEITZMAN, supra, at 8.).
222. See, e.g., HAMEL & NICHOLS, supra note 217, at 501.
223. See, e.g., MARGI LAIRD MCCUE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 13–
14 (2d ed. ABC-CLIO 2008) [hereinafter MCCUE].
224. DUTTON, supra note 215 at 48–52.
225. Id.; see also MCCUE, supra note 223, at 13–14.
226. Diane L. Zosky, The Application of Object Relations Theory to Domestic Violence,
27 CLINICAL SOC. WORK. J. 55, 55 (1999) [hereinafter ZOSKY].
227. See, e.g., Family Systems Theory – Basic Concepts/Propositions, Challenges and
Future Directions, http://family.jrank.org/pages/599/Family-Systems-Theory.html (last
visited Jan. 21, 2013) (“Family systems theory’s heritage emerged from the work of Ludwig
Von Bertalanffy’s work on general systems theory which offered the world of the midtwentieth century a different way of viewing science.”).
228. ZOSKY, supra note 226, at 57.
229. MCCUE, supra note 223, at 12 (“The family systems model looks at the function of
the entire family.”).
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the society at large.230 Feminist theorists maintain that it is paternalism that
permits heterosexual males to abuse their intimate female partners in the
first place and that such abuse, in turn, reinforces the female partners’
subservient status vis-à-vis their male abusers.231 In short, feminist
theorists hold that domestic violence is primarily an instrument which
males utilize to retain power and control over females in their personal
lives.232
Like the above-discussed theories of domestic violence, however,
neither the family dynamics theory nor the feminist theory of domestic
violence can explain a majority of domestic violence cases. For example,
critics of the family dynamics theory argue that it does not explain why
women suffer a disproportionately high percentage of the physical injuries
and fatalities caused by domestic violence incidents within heterosexual
relationships.233 Further, critics claim that this theory falsely suggests that
the victim of domestic violence, who usually is female, is equally as
culpable as her abuser, who usually is male, for the perpetuation of
domestic violence in the United States.234
At a minimum, the premise of the family dynamics theory that
domestic violence is a “family problem” is troubling because it suggests
that a domestic violence perpetrator is not entirely responsible for his or her
own behavior.235 This concept is contrary to the philosophy of personal
responsibility, which is the lynchpin of the U.S. criminal justice system.236
Ironically, it appears that the family dynamics theory could even promote a
perpetual cycle of domestic violence; each time the victim objects to the

230. MCCUE, supra note 223, at 12 (explaining that the feminist theory, in general, holds
that “[a] patriarchal society supports male power, female submission, and inequities that
lead to violence against intimate partners”).
231. See, e.g., Barbara Hart, Reading: Why Men Batter Women: An Analysis of Male
Violence, IOWA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ICADV TRAINING MANUAL FOR
CRIME VICTIM COUNSELORS 15–16, available at http://icadv.org/pdf/Victim%20Counselor
%20Manual.pdf.
232. See, e.g., Alison Cunningham et al., Theory-Derived Explanations of Male Violence
Against Female Partners: Literature Update and Related Implications for Treatment and
Evaluation 20–26, LONDON FAM. COURT CLINIC (1998).
233. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 129–37.
234. PEGGY PAPP, COUPLES ON THE FAULT LINE: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THERAPISTS 154
(2001) (“In the family theory field, feminist family therapists began to question the notion
of reciprocity that was central to systems theory.”) [hereinafter PAPP]; see also MCCUE,
supra note 223, at 12 (stating that some commentators maintain that the family systems
theory “places partial blame on the victim”).
235. See, e.g., Michele Bograd, Family Systems Approaches to Wife Battering: A Feminist
Critique, 54 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 558, 558 (Oct. 1984).
236. See, e.g., MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME 263 (New York
Univ. Press 2002) (pointing out that “[criminal] [o]ffenders must be persons . . . they must
possess the capacity for autonomy . . . . This makes sense because . . . [c]rime . . . is nothing
but the exercise of that capacity [for autonomy] against, or to the detriment of, another
person”) [hereinafter DUBBER].
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perpetrator’s abuse, the theory appears to justify an abusive response by
pointing an accusatory finger back at the victim.237 In sum,
the natural difficult[y] in applying this model [of domestic
violence] to the real world is that virtually all conduct not
immediately acceding to the wishes of the other party might be
viewed as “provocative” or “antagonistic” [to the abuser].
[However,] [i]n most households this is rarely followed by
violence. So this model does not explain those instances in which
violence erupts[.]238
Critics of the feminist theory, on the other hand, argue that the theory
unfairly portrays domestic violence as a crime committed solely or almost
entirely by men against women in heterosexual relationships and minimizes
the role that other factors, such as witnessing domestic violence and
dysfunctional family dynamics, can play in the perpetuation of domestic
violence.239 That is, while it is certainly the case that women in cultures
that condone violence against women suffer a disproportionately high share
of domestic violence incidents,240 proponents of the feminist theory must
concede241 that it does not explain why all males in heterosexual
relationships do not abuse their female partners.242 The feminist theory
also does not explain a number of significant categories of domestic
violence, such as violence committed by females against males in
heterosexual relationships243 and violence committed against intimate
partners in same-sex relationships.244 Additionally, the feminist theory of
domestic violence does not explain domestic violence directed at a nonintimate partner, such as an elderly relative or a child.245
Apart from the psychological theory of domestic violence (discussed in
depth below), the last major theory of domestic violence is that offered by
Michael Johnson of Pennsylvania State University, whose work was

237. See, e.g., William G. Herron et al., Sources of Family Violence, 3 J. SOC. DISTRESS &
THE HOMELESS 213 (1994).
238. BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 50.
239. PAPP, supra note 234, at 157

(“Critics of this feminist approach cite the lack of
attention paid to the frequency with which women return to their abusive partners . . . .
Often what they want is to remain in the relationship, but without the violence. And a pure
feminist approach seems to miss the underlying relationship dynamics that may contribute
to the cycle of violence.”).
240. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 189, at 99.
241. DUTTON, supra note 215, at 36–40.
242. Id. at 38–39.
243. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 122; 140–49.
244. DOLAN-SOTO, supra note 154, at 3.
245. DELONG, GENERAL AND ORAL PATHOLOGY, supra note 157, at 22 (reporting that
“[t]ypical data show that as many as 3 [sic] million children each year are reported to child
protective services (CPS) agencies in the U.S. . . ., as many as 2,000 [sic] children are
fatalities of child abuse and neglect each year[,] . . . and [e]lderly abuse is at least as
common as child abuse”).
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discussed in the previous section of this article.246 Johnson argues that
there are two major types of domestic violence:247 situational couple
violence (which he describes as domestic violence which arises out of
“particular conflicts or tensions within the relationship”248) and intimate
terrorism (which he describes as a “[male] attempt to . . . generally
dominate the [heterosexual] relationship”249). Furthermore, he argues that
the family dynamics theory largely explains situational couple violence and
the feminist theory of domestic violence largely explains intimate
terrorism.250 Through his insight that there are two primary types of
domestic violence, Johnson has made a major contribution to our
understanding of domestic violence. For example, as discussed above, he
has revealed that conflating these two different types of domestic violence
can lead researchers to reach misleading conclusions, such as that femaleon-male violence occurs as frequently as male-on-female violence in
heterosexual relationships.251 In addition, his insight helps clarify why
each of the above-discussed theories of domestic violence appears to
explain only certain cases of domestic violence.
From the perspective of this article, however, Johnson’s insight
suggests an even more significant fact regarding domestic violence:
intimate terrorism is characterized by mental abuse, while situational
couple violence is characterized by physical abuse.252 The psychological
theory explained below clarifies the significance of this distinction and
furthermore suggests that both of Johnson’s two types of domestic violence
are likely caused by trauma experienced by the abuser during childhood.253
Hence, it appears that Johnson’s two types of violence may best be viewed
as two points along a continuum of psychological trauma, suggesting that
the psychological theory of domestic violence is the most comprehensive
theory of domestic violence that has been proposed to date.

V. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
In this article, the “psychological” theory of domestic violence
refers to the theory that one of the main causes of domestic violence, if not
the primary cause, is the fact that perpetrators of domestic violence tend to
be persons whose individuation process was interrupted by their own
exposure to domestic violence (and typically intimate terrorism) during

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See supra text accompanying notes 83–118.
Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 282.
Id.
Id. at 283–84.
JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 19, 25, 32, and 63.
See supra text accompanying notes 88–89.
Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 282, 284–85.
See infra Section V.B.
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childhood.254 This theory could also be referred to as the “trauma” theory
of domestic violence. In this section, the normal development of the
human brain and mind is first discussed. Then, the effects of childhood
exposure to domestic violence, and especially intimate terrorism, on the
normal development of the human brain and mind are summarized.
Finally, the male-on-female asymmetric incidence of intimate terrorism in
heterosexual couples is explained.
A. NORMAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN BRAIN AND MIND
Until just a few decades ago, scientists believed that the various
physical structures of the human brain grew larger but were otherwise
genetically determined at the time of an infant’s birth.255 Techniques and
technologies employed by researchers in recent years, however, have
revealed that “large areas of . . . [one’s] brain don’t begin to develop until
after . . . [he or she is] born.”256 The significance of this fact for this article
is that an infant’s physical brain structures and functions can be
compromised by events that occur during this post-birth development
process, especially in the first few years of life.257 For example, the right
orbitofrontal system of the brain, which is key to regulating one’s
emotions, develops and shapes the brain’s circuits during the period from
approximately ten to twelve months to sixteen to eighteen months after
birth.258
Of course, psychologists have known for many years that the human
mind or “psyche” is not fully formed at an infant’s birth,259 and Sigmund
Freud and Carl Jung in the early 1900s proposed the first major theories of
human psychological development.260 While many different theories of

254. ZOSKY, supra note 226, at 58–59; Diane L. Zosky, Disruptions in the SeparationIndividuation Process of Domestically Violent Men: An Empirical Examination of Mahler’s
Theory, 12 J. OF HUM. BEHAV. IN THE SOC. ENV’T 43, 44 (Mar. 4, 2006); D.J. Sonkin & D.
Dutton, Treating Assaultive Men in Attachment Perspective, 7 J. OF AGGRESSION,
MALTREATMENT AND TRAUMA 105 (2003) [hereinafter Sonkin & Dutton].
255. See, e.g., NORMAN DOIDGE, THE BRAIN THAT CHANGES ITSELF 294–96 (2007)
[hereinafter DOIDGE].
256. Id. at 306, 343.
257. Id. at 225–29, 307, 343–44. In addition, if certain physical structures and functions
of an infant’s brain are defective or have been compromised at the time of an infant’s birth,
these structures or functions may be able to repair or heal themselves during the post-birth
development phase. Id. at 258–71.
258. Id. at 225–29, 343–44.
259. See, e.g., WILLIAM DAMON & RICHARD M. LERNER, 1 HANDBOOK OF CHILD
PSYCHOLOGY: THEORETICAL MODELS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 946 (2006) (discussing how
Jean Jacques Rousseau, in his book EMILE: OR, ON EDUCATION (1979) (original work
published 1762), did not propose a systematic theory or description of age changes, but
nonetheless contemplated that a human being’s psyche continues to develop at least until he
or she is an adolescent).
260. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, Three Essays on Sexuality, in THE PELICAN FREUD
LIBRARY (1977) [hereinafter FREUD]; C. J. JUNG, PSYCHOLOGY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (2003)
[hereinafter JUNG]; MARIO JACOBY, INDIVIDUATION AND NARCISSISM: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
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psychological development have been proposed since, developmental
psychologists tend to generally subscribe to either the Freudian or the
Jungian theory of mind development.261 Furthermore, as demonstrated
below, these two theories of human psyche development are very similar.
Freud and Jung agreed that a mature human psyche is composed of
both a “conscious” component and an “unconscious” component.262 In
addition, they agreed that a mature human mind is capable of performing
the following three major functions: engaging in rational thought, adhering
to a moral code (or conscience), and recognizing and expressing
emotions.263
Freud and Jung agreed that a newborn human being does not possess a
fully developed psyche.264 That is, no infant is born with the capacity to
speak a particular language, such as Russian or French, adhere to any
particular moral or cultural code, or express distinct emotions, such as joy
and sadness. Freud and Jung’s theories of maturation of the human psyche
demonstrate how each of the three major functions of the psyche develops
through an elaborate process whereby its development is dependent on the
development of the other two functions.265
The normal maturation of the human psyche proceeds essentially as
follows. To begin with, at the moment of an infant’s birth, the infant does
not possess any sense of existing as a “separate being” from his or her
primary caregiver.266 Shortly thereafter, however, the infant’s primary
caregiver makes an appeal to the infant’s emotional capacity,267 and, after
the two “share” emotions for several months, the normal infant’s psyche
has developed to the point where he or she is amenable to learning a
language.268 Through the process of learning a language, the infant’s

SELF IN JUNG AND KOHUT 96 (1991) (Jung described the development of the ‘self’ as the
‘individuation’ process) [hereinafter JACOBY].
261. JACOBY, supra note 260, at ix–x, 33–40, 47–49 (1991); Tom Colls, Myths of the Mind,
BBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_8318000/
8318707.stm; Kendra Cherry, Freud and Jung, ABOUT, http://psychology.about.com/od
/sigmundfreud/ig/Sigmund-Freud-Photobiography/Freud-and-Jung.htm.
262. See, e.g., FREUD, supra note 260; JUNG, supra note 260, at xxxviii–xxxxix.
263. CHRIS BARKER, CULTURAL STUDIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 20–21 (2003) (citing and
discussing FREUD) [hereinafter BARKER]; CARL GUSTAV JUNG, THE THEORY OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS 54, 105 (Nabu Press 2010) [hereinafter JUNG, THEORY OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS].
264. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 260.
265. BARKER, supra note 263, at 21–22; 17 C.G. Jung, The Development of Personality, in
COLLECTED WORKS OF C.G. JUNG 165–87 (Gerhard Adler trans., 1921) [hereinafter Jung,
Development of Personality]. In addition, as noted above, psychologists and neurologists
now understand that the development of the human psyche is influenced by, and, in turn,
influences, the on-going development of the physical structures and functions of the brain.
DOIDGE, supra note 255, at 225–29, 307, 343.
266. BARKER, supra note 263, at 21–22; JACOBY, supra note 260, at 96; Jung,
Development of Personality, supra note 265, at 172.
267. JACOBY, supra note 260, at 96–97.
268. Id.
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ability to engage in rational thought is fostered, as any language contains a
logical structure.269 Furthermore, through this process, the infant learns
aspects of his or her culture, including its moral code,270 and develops a
greater capacity to communicate with the caretaker and others.
Then, after the infant is able to communicate at least in at least a
rudimentary form, the infant’s primary caregiver appeals again to the
infant’s emotional capacity by encouraging the infant to explore the world
away from the caretaker.271 Freud maintained that most infants have
completed this first “narcissistic phase” (colloquially referred to as the
“terrible twos”) within eighteen to twenty-four months of age.272 From the
time when a child is approximately five years old until he or she is
approximately twelve or thirteen years old, a child simply further develops
each of the three major functions of the child’s psyche.273 Finally, the child
enters the second “narcissistic phase” (often referred to as an individual’s
“rebellious teenage years”).274 During this second narcissistic phase, the
child explores various cultures in the larger society and exercises his or her
autonomy on a more or less constant basis.275 If, as a result of this second
narcissistic phrase,276 a child ultimately possesses a fully autonomous
“personality” capable of confidently asserting itself in the world, he or she
is said to have completed the “narcissistic transformation” process, in terms
of Freudian psychic development theory277 or the “individuation” process,
in terms of Jungian psychic development theory.278
Psychologists have emphasized that, during both of the abovedescribed “narcissistic phases” but especially during the first such phase, it
is critically important for the infant’s caregivers to permit him or her to
exercise his or her autonomy while providing frequent assurances that the

269. JACOBY, supra note 260, at 96–97.
270. See, e.g., MADAN SARUP, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO POST-STRUCTURALISM AND
POSTMODERNISM 8–10 (1993). Cultural theorists have pointed out that a child’s conscience,
in particular, is developed through appeals to both his or her capacity to appreciate emotions
(i.e., ability to empathize with others’ emotions) as well as his or her capacity to engage in
rational thought (i.e., ability to learn the society’s moral code). See, e.g., BRIGID DANIEL,
CHILD DEVELOPMENT FOR CHILD CARE AND PROTECTION WORKERS 236 (Brigid Daniel et al.
eds., 1999).
271. See, e.g., BARKER, supra note 263, at 21–22.
272. Id.
273. Id.; Jung, Development of Personality, supra note 265, at 165–87; PETER GAY,
FREUD: A LIFE FOR OUR TIME 147 (1998).
274. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, THE PENGUIN FREUD READER 357–59 (Adam Phillips ed.,
2006).
275. BARKER, supra note 263, at 21–22; Jung, Development of Personality, supra note
265, at 165–87.
276. Recent research has revealed that the average person does not complete this process
and become fully emotionally mature until approximately twenty-five years of age. See,
e.g., Elizabeth Williamson, Brain Immaturity Could Explain Teen Crash Rate, WASH. POST
(Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52687-2005Jan31.html.
277. SIGMUND FREUD, THE FREUD READER 639 (Peter Gay ed., 1995).
278. JACOBY, supra note 260, at 96.
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caregivers will remain a stable fixture in his or her new existence.279 This
constant encouragement and soothing is needed, according to
psychologists, because the child feels very excited but also very frightened
of the larger world beyond his or her comfort zone.280
Furthermore, during the first narcissistic phase in particular, it is
essential that the infant’s (typically strong) emotions be reflected back to
him or her, as otherwise the infant may not learn how to recognize, express,
and regulate his or her emotions.281 If a child’s emotions are constantly
ignored or denied, he or she ultimately becomes numb to those emotions.282
Once a child has failed to develop the capacity to recognize his or her
emotions, he or she most likely will also be unable to establish firm
psychological boundaries between his or her self and others, which the
hallmark of an autonomous personality.283 In addition, if a child cannot
recognize his or her own emotions, he or she in all likelihood will be
unable to recognize others’ emotions and develop empathy.284 Moreover, a
child who is bereft of empathy most likely will be unable to internalize his
or her society’s moral code, or, in other words, develop a conscience.285
B. THE EFFECTS OF CHILDHOOD EXPOSURE TO INTIMATE TERRORISM
As explained, the goal of an intimate terrorist is to completely control
his or her intimate partner, and he or she can accomplish this goal only by
completely controlling his or her domestic situation.286 The intimate
terrorist’s assertion of control over almost every aspect of such a
household, by definition, is intended to thwart the assertion of autonomy of
any other member of the household, and that certainly includes any child
living in the home.287 Furthermore, the intimate terrorist’s weapons of
choice primarily are mental—including, for example, insults, derogatory
names, humiliating and unfair punishments, false accusations, involvement
of the victim in criminal or immoral activities, and the constant elevation of

279. PHYLLIS TYSON & ROBERT L. TYSON, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORIES OF
DEVELOPMENT: AN INTEGRATION 101–05 (1993).
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., ALICE MILLER, THE UNTOUCHED KEY: TRACING CHILDHOOD TRAUMA IN
CREATIVITY AND DESTRUCTIVENESS 60 (1990) [hereinafter MILLER, THE UNTOUCHED KEY].
282. Id.
283. CHARLES WHITFIELD, BOUNDARIES AND RELATIONSHIPS: KNOWING, PROTECTING AND
ENJOYING THE SELF 54 (1994).
284. MILLER, THE UNTOUCHED KEY, supra note 281, at 60.
285. See, e.g., Jennifer Copley, Why Most People Are Not Psychopathic, SUITE 101 (Aug.
9, 2008), http://personalitydisorders.suite101.com/article.cfm/why_most_people_are_not_
psychopathic; see also Conscience, ENOTES, http://www.enotes.com/gale-psychologyencyclopedia/conscience (defining conscience as “[t]he moral dimension of human
consciousness, the means by which humans modify instinctual drives to conform to laws
and moral codes”).
286. JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 88, 94; Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 282, 285–
86.
287. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 284.
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his needs above the victim’s needs – and such abuse fails to validate a
child’s emotions and undermines the child’s self-esteem.288 In the story
presented at the commencement of this article, Josh’s father engages in all
of the above types of mental abuse.289
The numerous mental injuries suffered by children in Josh’s situation
have been documented by many different researchers over many years.290
Such injuries include: the inability to recognize, express, and regulate one’s
emotions;291 the inability to self-soothe following upsetting events;292
significant cognitive impairments;293 dissociative states;294 lack of selfesteem;295 depression;296 the inability to trust others;297 unprovoked
aggression toward others;298 and failure to respect others’ rights and
boundaries.299 In addition, the child’s developing brain structures and
functions are damaged.300
Psychologists typically have relied on either “object relations theory”
or “attachment theory” within the general field of psychology to explain
how a child exposed to intimate terrorism and such mental injuries would
cause the child’s individuation process to be interrupted and predispose
him to commit intimate terrorism himself.301 Very generally, object
relations theory traces an insecure self and ambivalence in relationships to
intermittent frustration by one’s mother figure during early childhood and
failure to complete the individuation process.302 Similarly, attachment
theory traces an insecure self to the fracture in a basic socio-biological
need, that of physical attachment to one’s primary caregiver.303
It would be uncharacteristic of an intimate terrorist to apologize for his
abuse or attempt to soothe the trauma which a child suffers as a result of

288. JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 88, 94; Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 285–86.
289. See supra Section I.
290. See id; see also, e.g., Carter, supra note 158, at 1 (citing, among other studies, J.L.
Edleson, Children’s Witnessing of Adult Domestic Violence, 14 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
839 (Aug. 1999); J. Wolak & D. Finkelhor, Children Exposed to Partner Violence, in
Partner Violence: A Comprehensive Review of 20 Years of Research (J.L. Jasinski & L.M.
Williams eds., 1998)).
291. Child Welfare Information Gateway, Understanding the Effects of Maltreatment on
Brain Development, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (2009)
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/issue_briefs/brain_development/effects.cfm#emotional.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE – FROM
DOMESTIC ABUSE TO TERRORISM 102 (1997).
295. Carter, supra note 158, at 6.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. DOIDGE, supra note 255, at 225–29, 343–44.
301. See, e.g., Sonkin & Dutton, supra note 254, at 105.
302. DUTTON, supra note 215, at 126–27.
303. Id. at 150–531.
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witnessing his abuse.304 Intimate terrorists tend to lack empathy,305 believe
their children should meet their (the intimate terrorists’) needs,306 and be
preoccupied with maintaining control over their partner and their home.307
Moreover, the ability of the intimate terrorist’s partner to comfort such a
child may be compromised by the intimate terrorist’s abuse.308 As a result,
a child growing up in such an atmosphere may very well be unable to
complete the individuation process and become an autonomous individual,
develop his rational thought processes, or recognize his or others’
emotions.309
Donald Dutton made several significant contributions to the
psychological theory of domestic violence in his 2007 book, The Abusive
Personality.310 He compiled and analyzed the behavioral traits of a large
number of domestic violence perpetrators, concluding that they tend to
suffer from traumatic stress, as is often caused by exposure to intimate

304. See, e.g., Lundy Bancroft & Jay G. Silverman, Assessing Risk to Children From
Batterers (2002), http://www.lundybancroft.com/?page_id=261 (“It should be noted that a
large proportion of batterers are unable to create or support most of the critical healing
elements [that children need in order to recover from suffering or witnessing the batterer’s
abuse] . . . Domestic violence perpetration has its roots in a definable set of attitudes,
beliefs, and behavioral patterns. These characteristics include among others the man’s
belief in his right to use violence against a partner to impose his will, his sense of
entitlement within the family, his patterns of controlling and manipulative behaviors,
disrespect for his partner and lack of empathy for her feelings, and his externalizing of
responsibility for his actions”) (internal citations omitted.); H. Lien Bragg, Child Protection
in Families Experiencing Domestic Violence, Office on Child Abuse and Neglect, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 15–20 (2003) https://www.childwelfare.
gov/pubs/usermanuals/domesticviolence/domesticviolence.pdf (stating that “[d]omestic
violence is a pattern of coercive and assaultive behaviors that include physical, sexual,
verbal, and psychological attacks and economic coercion that adults or adolescents use
against their intimate partner”) [hereinafter Bragg]. Id. at 29–30 (explaining that
perpetrators of domestic violence tend to cultivate a favorable public image and blame their
abuse on their intimate partner and deny, minimize and justify their abuse in general). Id. at
31–32 (revealing that common characteristics of perpetrators as fathers include
authoritarianism, preoccupation with maintaining control over their partner and meeting
their own emotional needs, irresponsibility toward, and lack of involvement with, their
children, undermining of their victim’s parenting efforts, self-centeredness, and
manipulation of their victim and children for the purpose of maintaining power in the
home).
305. See, e.g., Nancy VerSteegh, Differentiating Types of Domestic Violence: Implications
for Child Custody, 65 LA. L. REV. 1379, 1392 (2005).
306. Id.
307. Bragg, supra note 304, at 30–31.
308. DUTTON, supra note 215, at 136–37; 196–97; see also Peter G. Jaffe & Claire V.
Crooks, Understanding Women’s Experiences Parenting in the Context of Domestic
Violence: Implications for Community and Court-Related Service Providers, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, (Feb. 2005), http://www.vaw.umn.edu/
documents/commissioned/parentingindv/parentingindv.html; Alytia A. Levendosky &
Sandra A. Graham-Bermann, Parenting in Battered Women: The Effects of Domestic
Violence on Women and Their Children, 16 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE 173, 187 (2001).
309. See supra notes 279–87, 290–303, and accompanying text.
310. See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 215.
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terrorism in one’s childhood.311 Furthermore, their symptoms of stress
were so unmistakable and similar to abused children’s symptoms of stress
that he realized that “[c]learly there . . . [is] more than mere modeling going
on in abusive families[.]”312
Additionally, Dutton determined that the behavior traits of perpetrators
of domestic violence appear to fall into one of three types of wellrecognized “Cluster B” personality disorders313— avoidant, borderline, and
anti-social personality—that can occur as a result of abuse experienced or
witnessed in childhood.314 Specifically, according to Dutton, abusers who
lack impulse control and engage in domestic violence on an occasional
basis (perpetrators of situational couple violence, in Johnson’s typology)
often suffer from avoidant personality disorder, whereas abusers who
engage in domestic violence on a routine basis, in a cold and calculating
manner (perpetrators of intimate terrorism, in Johnson’s typology) often
suffer from antisocial disorder or borderline personality disorder.315
Finally, Dutton discussed several “protective factors” or “positive
events” that help prevent a child exposed to intimate terrorism from
evolving into an intimate terrorist himself.316 These factors include:
“having one supportive adult in an otherwise hostile early environment,
being in an emotionally supportive family as an adult, or involvement in
psychotherapy as an adolescent or young adult.”317 While he conceded that
it may take some time to conclusively prove the psychological theory of
domestic violence, the evidence that he presented in support of this theory
is quite strong and he “believe[s] it is just a matter of time until . . . a
comprehensive lifespan developmental portrait of the long-term
consequences of early abuse [can be presented].”318
C. THE MALE-ON-FEMALE ASYMMETRIC INCIDENCE OF INTIMATE
TERRORISM IN HETEROSEXUAL COUPLES
As mentioned above, one of the factors that Dutton listed as protecting
children exposed to domestic violence from developing into an intimate
terrorist is “having one supportive adult in an otherwise hostile early
development.”319 The world-renowned psychologist Alice Miller went so
far as to state that “[t]he absence or presence of a helping witness in
childhood determines whether a mistreated child will become a despot who

311. DUTTON, supra note 215, at 197–209.
312. Id. at 126.
313. The APA publishes the DSM-IV-TR, which classifies aberrant behavior into various
personality disorders. DSM-IV-TR at 8.
314. DUTTON, supra note 215.
315. Id. at 8–16.
316. Id. at 51–52.
317. Id.
318. DUTTON, supra note 215, at 209.
319. Id. at 51–52.
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turns his repressed feelings of helplessness against others or an artist who
can tell about his or her suffering.”320 Unfortunately for boys, this
protective factor appears to be much more available to girls than boys, 321
as “[boys] . . . are taught to apologize for their weaknesses. [Girls] . . . for
their strengths[.]”322 For many boys, they perceive their only choices to be
turning into an angry, controlling abuser themselves or retreating into
themselves, where they “begin[ ] the task of expunging every possible
source of shame from [their] identity.”323
The male-on-female asymmetry of abuse has been variously attributed
to males’ higher levels of testosterone,324 paternalistic societal norms that
justify men’s control over women,325 and/or male children witnessing and
then later modeling their father’s abusive behavior of their mother.326 Each
of these theories (the biological, feminist, and learned behavior theory,
respectively327) most likely at least partially explains this asymmetry. At
the same time, while further research certainly needs to be conducted on
this point, Dutton’s psychological (or “trauma”) theory of domestic
violence,328 in light of society’s inadequate soothing of abused boys’
trauma due to its the credo that “boys don’t cry; they must be ‘toughened,
[both] physically and mentally,’”329 seems to provide a more
comprehensive explanation for this asymmetry, at least to this writer. In
particular, unlike each of the above-mentioned three alternative
explanations,330 it answers why some boys who witness their father abusing
their mother turn into intimate terrorists themselves, while other such boys
(who likewise possess similar testosterone levels and live in a similarly
paternalistic society) do not.

320. MILLER, THE UNTOUCHED KEY, supra note 281, at 60.
321. See, e.g., id. at 55, 192 (explaining that boys learn early in life that it is more
acceptable to convert their fear of abandonment into anger, as anger is a more appropriate
emotion to display than fear); DAVID B. WEXLER, WHEN GOOD MEN BEHAVE BADLY:
CHANGE YOUR SELF, CHANGE YOUR BEHAVIOR 57–61 (2004) (discussing “the credo of
toughening boys up, physically and mentally”) [hereinafter WEXLER].
322. See sources cited supra note 2.
323. DUTTON, supra note 215, at 192, 209 (noting that the latter “process is no more
clearly represented than in the case of the entertainer Michael Jackson, who, in response to
an abusive childhood, attempted to expunge every aspect of his visual identity, including his
race, through repeated operations on his nose and skin bleaching”).
324. BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 39.
325. Amy Elizabeth Lappen, The Neglected Side of Domestic Violence: Case Studies of
Female Aggressors [sic] in Intimate Partnerships 12 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Univ. S. Cal.) (on file with author).
326. Walter S. DeKeseredy & Martin D. Schwartz, Theoretical and Definitional Issues in
Violence Against Women, in SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 11 (Claire
Renzetti et al. eds, 2d ed. 2010).
327. See supra notes 203, 222, 230–32, 324–26.
328. Supra Section V.
329. Wexler, supra note 321, at 60.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 324–27.
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This section has discussed how exposure to intimate terrorism in one’s
childhood has particularly deleterious effects on a child’s developing brain
and mind, precisely because this type of domestic violence is characterized
by mental abuse. It has also explained how exposure to the trauma of
intimate terrorism in one’s childhood appears to predispose a child (and
especially a male child) to developing into an intimate terrorist himself or
herself. Finally, this section has noted that intimate terrorism appears to be
the mechanism through which domestic violence is perpetrated throughout
generations of American families. In sum, with respect to domestic
violence, “the primary risk to . . . children is the intimate terrorist.”331
The next section reveals that some states include a few forms of mental
abuse in the statutory definition of domestic violence which their family
courts utilize during child custody proceedings.332 However, the few forms
of mental abuse included in these particular definitions of domestic
violence could be categorized as 1) threats of future physical harm or
sexual assault; 2) nonconsensual contacts with the victim, and 3) invasions
of the victim’s privacy,333 which certainly do not encompass all of the types
of mental abuse which an intimate terrorist typically inflicts on his intimate
partner and other household members.334 Moreover, given that no state
requires a person to obtain pre-authorization to contact or infringe the
privacy of a current intimate partner, at least the last two categories of
mental abuse incorporated in such statutory definitions of domestic
violence—unauthorized contacts with the victim and invasions of the
victim’s privacy—are premised on the notion that the intimate relationship
between the domestic violence perpetrator and his victim(s) has terminated.
In short, it appears that state legislatures intentionally excluded most of the
forms of mental abuse which an intimate terrorist inflicts on his victim(s)
from the definitions of domestic violence which family courts utilize in
child custody cases.335
Finally, the state legislatures’ almost complete exclusion of the forms
of mental abuse suffered during an intimate relationship from their
definitions of domestic violence suggests that the legislators erroneously
believe it is impossible for a person to mentally abuse an intimate partner if
that intimate partner is an autonomous adult who has chosen to remain in
the relationship. This belief ignores scientific evidence that the autonomy

331. Michael P. Johnson, Apples and Oranges in Child Custody Disputes: Intimate
Terrorism vs. Situational Couple Violence, 2 J. CHILD CUSTODY 43, 51 (2005).
332. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 371–418, discussing Cal. Fam. Code § 3044.
333. Id.334.See supra Section I (events which occurred to Josh, the teenager in the story
presented at the commencement of this article) and text accompanying notes 51–80, 83–87,
101–15.
334. See supra Section I (events which occurred to Josh, the teenager in the story
presented at the commencement of this article) and text accompanying notes 51–80, 83–87,
101–15.
335. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 371–418, discussing Cal. Fam. Code § 3044.
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of an adult victim can be eroded by an intimate terrorist’s persistent mental
abuse.336 Furthermore, this belief is inconsistent with numerous studies
documenting the many understandable reasons why an adult victim of
intimate terrorism often chooses not to terminate such a relationship.337
Not infrequently, foremost among these reasons is the victim’s wellfounded fear that the intimate terrorist will kill or seriously injure her or her
children if she does so.338 Most important, all state legislatures mandate
that family courts decide each child custody case in accordance with the
best interests of the child. Yet, the statutory definitions of domestic
violence which these courts must follow exclude most acts of intimate
terrorism even though such acts may have significantly harmed the child.
The next section of this article reviews such statutory definitions of
domestic violence in some detail.

VI. DEFINITIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UTILIZED IN
THE FIFTY STATES
A major premise of this article is that each state’s laws for combating
and treating domestic violence should be based on the most accurate
information available regarding the causes and consequences of domestic
violence. Only if these laws are based on such information can they
provide the most effective interventions and remedies possible for the
many victims of domestic violence. To that end, this section of the article
reviews the various state statutory definitions of domestic violence and
assesses the extent to which they reflect the above-discussed contributions
made by the field of psychology to our understanding of domestic violence.
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that “[t]he U.S. legal system’s
treatment of domestic violence has evolved a long way from the ‘rule of
thumb’ and the principle that children are always the exclusive property of
the father upon the dissolution of a marriage, regardless of the reason for

336. See, e.g., LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 69–73, 360–61
(3d ed. 2009); see also supra text accompanying notes 101–104, 110–111.
337. The Facts about Domestic Violence, Minn. Ctr. Against Violence & Abuse (2010)
http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/inbriefs/domesticviolence/domesticviolence.html#tjad
en1998 (“Victims of domestic violence experience many barriers when leaving abusive
relationships. These include fear of the abuser, believing the abuser will take their children,
hoping the abuser will change, embarrassment, shame and self-blame about their situation.
Limited financial options, lack of transportation, lack of knowledge the services exist, and
lack of proximity to those services are also factors.”).
338. In fact, an intimate terrorist’s tendency to increase his violence when the victim
attempts to separate from him is so common that domestic violence experts have dubbed
this phenomenon “separation assault.” Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991); Martha R. Mahoney,
Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 79
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk, eds., 1994) (noting that more than half of
domestic violence homicides are committed after the victim leaves the relationship).
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the dissolution.”339 Since the U.S. Congress’s enactment of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA)340 in 1994, several states have enacted
domestic violence laws,341 and many victims of domestic violence have
benefitted as a result.342
At the same time, much work remains to be done to provide the
majority of domestic violence victims with effective legal assistance.
Today, most states’ domestic violence laws are a bewildering jumble of
inconsistent, incomplete and nonsensical provisions. This morass reflects
society’s deep misunderstanding and confusion regarding domestic
violence. In California, for example, “domestic violence” is regulated in
the Penal Code,343 the Health and Safety Code,344 the Welfare and
Institutions Code,345 the Family Law Code, 346 the Civil Code,347 and the

339. Claire Wright, Confronting Domestic Violence Head On: The Role of Power in
Domestic Relationships, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 21, 21 (citing James Gillray, Judge
Thumb, or Patent Sticks for Family Corrections: Warranted Lawful! (Nov. 27, 1872),
available at http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/cph.3c14396/; Marian Bussey & Jean
Biesecker, Protecting the Rights of Children in Disputed Custody Cases: Mental Health and
Legal Considerations, 16 FAMILY ATT’Y 34, 34 (citing R.A. GARDNER, FAMILY EVALUATING
IN CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION (1982)). “The phrase rule of thumb originated in the
common-law rule that a husband could beat his wife without legal sanction if he used a rod
not thicker than his thumb.” MARTHA ALBERSTON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY:
THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 218, n. 9 (1994) (citing Davidson, Wife
Beating: A Recurring Phenomenon Throughout History, in BATTERED WOMEN: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 18–21 (M. Roy ed., 1977)). See also
THOMAS JEFFERSON SCHOOL OF LAW, CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HEAD ON: THE
ROLE OF POWER IN DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIPS, Brochure for Ninth Annual Women and the
Law and Ruth Bader Ginsburg Lecture (Feb. 27, 2009) (on file with the Thomas Jefferson
Law Review).
340. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–322, 108
Stat. 1902.
341. See, e.g., Domestic Violence: Encyclopedia of Everyday Law, ENOTES,
http://www.enotes.com/everyday-law-encyclopedia/domestic-violence (last visited Jan. 19,
2013); Leslye Orloff & Olivia Garcia, Dynamics of Domestic Violence Experienced by
Immigrant Victims, ch. 1.1 in BREAKING BARRIERS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO LEGAL RIGHTS
AND RESOURCES FOR BATTERED IMMIGRANTS 1, 6, 8–9 (Women’s Legal Defense and
Education Fund, 2004), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/ our-work/immigrantwomen-program/breaking-bariers.html (explaining that immigrant women and children are
particularly vulnerable to domestic violence due to an abuser’s threat that he can have her
deported (possibly without her children), their lack of family and other support networks in
the United States, their unfamiliarity with the English language and the United States legal
system and discussing how the VAWA permits immigrant women and children to obtain
legal status in the United States without the abuser’s assistance and provides immigrant
victims of domestic violence with a variety of social services).
342. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Dep’t Commemorates Fifteen Years of
Violence Against Women Act (Sept. 14, 2009) http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/
September/09-ag-953.html (stating that “[i]n the past 15 years [since the passage of the
VAWA], countless lives have been saved, the voices of survivors have been heard, families
have been protected, and the criminal justice community has been trained on the complex
responses to domestic violence, sexual assault, dating violence and stalking”).
343. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13700(a), 13700(b) (Deering 2010).
344. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124250(a)(1) (Deering 2010).
345. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18291 (Deering 2010).
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Civil Procedure Code.348 The first four codes contain different definitions
of domestic violence.349 In addition, “abuse,” “child abuse,” and “elder
abuse” are addressed in a number of different code sections, some of which
contain conflicting definitions.350
While it will take a concerted effort and a fair amount of time to
rationalize this area of the law, state legislatures should address the most
pressing concerns of domestic violence as soon as possible. The
psychological explanations of the causes and effects of domestic violence
suggest that because children are the most vulnerable victims of domestic
violence, there are two particularly pressing issues that states should
address. These are (1) the failure of most child custody schemes to treat a
party’s prior commission of domestic violence as a rebuttable presumption
against awarding custody to that party; and (2) the failure of the
overwhelming majority of states to include in their definition of domestic
violence for child custody proceedings the type of mental abuse perpetrated
by an intimate terrorist.351
As stated above, in every state a family court is required to make a
child custody decision in accordance with “the best interest of the child,”352
and, in many states, a party’s prior commission of domestic violence is a
factor which the court must or may consider in this determination.353
However, only one-half of the states stipulate that a parent’s prior
commission of domestic violence creates a rebuttable presumption that the
court’s grant of custody of the child to a party who has committed domestic
violence would not be “in the best interest of the child.”354 Furthermore, in
at least seven of these states, a family court is required to respect a
competing rebuttable presumption in favor of granting joint custody to the
child’s parents.355 Therefore, in those seven states, the rebuttable
presumption in favor of joint custody tends to effectively rebut the

346. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6203, 6211 (Deering 2010).
347. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.6(a) (Deering 2010).
348. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (Deering 2010).
349. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13700(a), 13700(b) ((Deering 2010) and CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124250(a)(1) (Deering 2010), with CAL. WELF. & INST. § 18291
(Deering 2010) and CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6203, 6211 (Deering 2010).
350. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.6 (Deering 2010); see also, e.g., CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 18951(e) (Deering 2010) (contrasting definitions of “child abuse”).
351. See, e.g., Child Custody and Domestic Violence by State, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N
ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (Feb. 2008), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/domviol/docs/Custody.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABACDV]; Custody
Decisions in Cases with Domestic Violence Allegations, AM. BAR ASS’N PROJECT ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
legalservices/probono/childcustody/domestic_violence_chart1.authcheckdam.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 22, 2013) [hereinafter ABACD].
352. ABACDV, supra note 351.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
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rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a party who has
committed domestic violence.356
Several of the state child custody statutes that do include a rebuttable
presumption against awarding custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence
stipulate that only an act of domestic violence committed within the last
few years will trigger the presumption.357 In addition, some of these
statutes further limit the presumption to situations in which the perpetrator
committed repetitive acts of physical violence.358 Finally, the presumption
in some such states only concerns the perpetrator’s physical custody of the
child, when a perpetrator can continue to abuse the other party as well as
the child concerned through his or her legal custody of the child.359
A. CALIFORNIA’S DEFINITION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FOR USE IN CHILD
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS
Many commentators believe that Section 3044 of the California Family
Code provides some of the strongest protections against domestic violence
in the child custody context.360 It provides that:
Upon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a child
has perpetrated domestic violence against the other party seeking
356. ABACDV, supra note 351.
357. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(d) (West 2008 & Supp. 2010)
(presumption is triggered only if party has a history of perpetrating domestic violence
“during the two years preceding the date of the filling the suit or during the pendency of the
suit”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(j) (2009) (presumption is triggered only if the
domestic violence in question occurred “within a reasonable time proximate to the
proceeding”).
358. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B(5) (2008) (presumption that joint custody is
not in best interests of child arise “if one (1) of the parents is found by the court to be a
habitual perpetrator of domestic violence . . . .”); ABACD, supra note 351; ABACDV,
supra note 351.
359. See, e.g., Pa. Coalition Against Domestic Violence, PCADV Briefing to House
Judiciary
Committee
19
(2009),
http://www.pcadv.org/Resources/Briefing_
CustodyReform.pdf (stating that “[j]oint custody is simply not appropriate in cases where
one is parent abusive. Joint custody is dangerous to abused parents and their children
because it forces continued contact and interaction even where the abusive parent poses a
known risk of continued abuse.” (citing Robert Bauserman, Child Adjustment in JointCustody Versus Sole Custody Arrangements: A Meta-Analytic Review, 16 J. FAM.
PSYCHOLOGY 91–102 (2002)); see also Nat’l Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges,
MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE 33 (1994), http://www.ncjfcj.
org/images/stories/dept/fvd/pdf/modecode_fin_printable.pdf (“In every proceeding where
there is . . . determination by the court that domestic or family violence has occurred raises a
rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to the child and not in the best interest of the
child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody with the
perpetrator of family violence.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, FAMILY LAW SECTION, MODEL JOINT
CUSTODY STATUTE, § 1 (Aug. 1989) http://www.abanetorg/child/joint-custody.doc (“Joint
custody is inappropriate in cases in which spouse abuse, child abuse, or parental kidnapping
is likely to occur.”).
360. See, e.g., Marie De Santis, California Passes Tough New Domestic Violence Laws,
WOMEN’S JUSTICE CENTER, http://www.purpleberets.org/violence_new_law.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2013).
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custody of the child or against the child or the child’s siblings
within the previous five years, there is a rebuttable presumption
that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to
a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to
the best interest of the child, pursuant to Section 3011. This
presumption may only be rebutted by a preponderance of the
evidence.361
...
For purposes of this section the requirement of a finding by the
court shall be satisfied by, among other things, and not limited to,
evidence that a party seeking custody has been convicted within
the previous five years, after a trial or a plea of guilty or no contest,
of any crime against the other party that comes within the
definition of domestic violence . . . .362
The requirement of a finding by the court shall also be satisfied if
any court, whether that court hears or has heard the child custody
proceedings or not, has made a finding . . . based on conduct
occurring within the previous five years.363
Both the five-year period for review and the power granted to a family
court to conduct its own domestic violence investigation provided in
Section 3044 of the California Family Code are particularly powerful tools
for combating domestic violence.364 These provisions recognize that even
if a domestic violence incident occurred a few years in the past and no legal
tribunal declared the incident to constitute domestic violence at the time,
such an event can effectively intimidate family members and obviate a
perpetrator’s need to engage in physical violence in more recent years.365
In addition, these provisions reflect the fact that a victim often is too
intimidated to pursue domestic violence charges while he or she is co-

361. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(a) (Deering 2010).
362. Id. at § 3044(d)(1).
363. Id. at § 3044(d)(2).
364. See supra text accompanying notes 357, 358, 360; see also Lisa Bolotin, When
Parents Fight: Alaska’s Presumption Against Awarding Custody to Perpetrators of
Domestic Violence, 25 ALASKA L. REV. 263, 276, 281, 284 (2008) (arguing that although
Alaska’s presumption against an award of joint custody to a domestic violence perpetrator
could provide even greater protection for children in certain respects, a number of aspects of
its presumption provide relatively strong protections for children and also pointing out that
California’s presumption, with respect to these same aspects, is at least as child-protective
as Alaska’s) [hereinafter Bolotin].
365. See, e.g., Jan Elizabeth Brown, Debunking The Myths: Anyone Can Be an Abuser or
Victim, HARTFORD COURANT (Sept. 3, 2009 2:14PM), http://blogs.courant.com/overcoming_
battered_lives/2009/09/debunking-the-myths-anyone-can.html
(“[R]egarding
physical
abuse, battered women’s advocates have stated that male abusers do not necessarily need to
use physical force in order to control their victims once power and control is established.
Neither do abusive women.”).
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habiting with the perpetrator and therefore it’s logical that a victim might
raise the matter in court for the first time during the course of a custody
dispute.366
Moreover, Section 3044 of the California Family Code explicitly states
that California’s preference that a child maintain frequent and continuing
contact with both parents cannot rebut the presumption against granting
sole or joint custody to a parent who has committed domestic violence.367
Only a few of the other state statutes that recognize a rebuttable
presumption against granting custody to a domestic violence perpetrator
contain an explicit statement to this effect.368 Section 3044 of the
California Family Code even specifies the categories of evidence that can
rebut the presumption against granting custody to a perpetrator of domestic
violence.369
Examples of such evidence include the perpetrator’s
completion of a batterer’s treatment program, the perpetrator’s compliance
with the terms and conditions of any protective order or restraining order,
the perpetrator’s completion of a program of alcohol or drug abuse
counseling, and the perpetrator’s completion of a parenting class (assuming
the court believes such counseling or class was warranted).370
In all of the above-mentioned respects, Section 3044 of the California
Family Code serves as a model for how child custody courts should treat
domestic violence.
However, the definition of domestic violence
incorporated in section 3044 is deficient because it does not explicitly
include any and all forms of mental abuse.371 Section 3044(c) of the
California Family Code provides that, with respect to the presumption
against awarding custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence,
a person has “perpetrated domestic violence” when he or she is
found by the court to have intentionally or recklessly caused or
attempted to cause bodily injury to that person or to another, or
sexual assault, or to have placed a person in reasonable
apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to
another, or to have engaged in any behavior . . . for which a court

366. Ruth Wilson Zamierowski, Why Does a Woman Stay in a Violent Relationship? The
Very Real Risks of Leaving a Batterer, SUITE 101 (Aug. 20, 2009), http://physicalabuse.suite101.com/article.cfm/why_does_a_woman_stay_in_a_violent_relationship#ixzz0
TPR6ZRJH (“When a woman leaves an abusive relationship, it does not mean that the
violence will end. In fact, the violence and the risks to her and her children often
escalate.”).
367. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(b) (Deering 2010).
368. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 598.41.1(b) (2007); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (2007).
369. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(b) (Deering 2010).
370. Id.
371. See infra text accompanying notes 372–418. California Family Code § 3044 also
would be improved if the presumption against awarding custody to a party who has
committed domestic violence were not triggered solely by acts of domestic violence
committed against another party to the custody proceeding, the child concerned, or the
child’s siblings. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(a) (Deering 2010).
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may issue an ex parte order pursuant to section 6320 to protect the
other party seeking custody of the child or to protect the child and
the child’s siblings.372
To be sure, causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, committing
sexual assault, and placing a person in reasonable apprehension of
imminent serious bodily injury to that person or another can cause
significant mental harm to a victim. Still, as discussed above, an intimate
terrorist mentally abuses his victim in a myriad of ways that are designed to
control his victim.373 As discussed above, such acts, include, for example,
routinely ignoring the victim’s needs and desires, calling the victim
derogatory names, humiliating the victim in private and public, and
requiring the victim to account for every second of time that she spends
outside of the perpetrator’s presence,374 and few, if any, of these acts appear
to be encompassed within the language of Section 3044(c) of the California
Family Code. In fact, as the above-quoted language from section 3044(c)
makes clear, the only possibility that such forms of mental abuse are
included in section 3044(c)’s definition of domestic violence is if they are
the type of activities that a court can enjoin under Section 6320 of the
California Family Code.375
Section 6320 of the California Family Code is a component of
California’s Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA),376 which was
intended to provide victims with a broad range of legal protections against
domestic violence.377 A section 6320 protection order in particular is
intended to facilitate the temporary or permanent separation of the
domestic violence perpetrator and victim, while also protecting the victim
from any further acts of domestic violence by the perpetrator.378 To that
end, section 6320 provides that an ex parte “protective order may be issued
to a petitioner upon a showing of ‘reasonable proof of a past act or acts of
abuse,’”379 specifically enumerated in section 6320 as:
molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually
assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, including, but not
limited to, annoying telephone calls as described in Section[sic]
653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting,
either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a

372. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(c).
373. See supra text accompanying notes 51–80, 83–87, 101–15.
374. Id.
375. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(a) (Deering 2010).
376. Alanis-Alvarado v. Holder, 558 F.3d 833, 838 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing CAL. FAM.
CODE § 6200).
377. In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1498 (2009).
378. Id. at 1494 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 6300; Gonzalez v. Munoz, 156 Cal. App. 4th
413, 421 (2007)).
379. Id. (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 6200).
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specific distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other
party . . . .380
In ascertaining the proper interpretation of any California statute,
including section 6320, one must be mindful that, in California:
[the] “fundamental task is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers
so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.381 [Citation.]” (Estate
of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 910, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 24
P.3d 1191.). [In addition, one begins] “by examining the statutory
language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.’
[Citations.] If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, we
presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain
meaning of the language governs. [Citations.] If there is ambiguity,
however, we may then look to extrinsic sources, including the
ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.
[Citation.]”382
In addition, Section 13 of the California Civil Code clarifies that
California follows the statutory construction principle that, unless the
statute in question indicates otherwise, one can “[p]resume that the
legislature uses the same term consistently in different statutes.”383 The
California Supreme Court has held, however, that, in applying any rule of
statutory construction, “the fundamental concern . . . [is] the ascertainment
and furtherance of legislative intent.”384
Accordingly, as Section 3044 of the California Family Code contains a
specific definition of domestic violence for use in child custody
proceedings, definitions of domestic violence in other California statutes
are irrelevant regarding the legislature’s meaning of domestic violence in
Section 3044 of the California Family Code. On the other hand, as the
Legislature, in Section 6320 of the California Family Code, did not
specifically define any of the acts of abused listed therein, definitions of
those acts in other California statutes may very well provide guidance as to
the meaning of those acts.
In light of California’s statutory construction rules, it is clear that the
acts of “attacking,” “striking,” “sexually assaulting,” “battering,” and
“destroying personal property,” each of which is an act of physical
violence, do not encompass the various types of mental abuse which an
intimate terrorist regularly inflicts on his victim(s) during the course of a

380. Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1498 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 6320).
381. Id. at 1497.
382. In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1497 (2009).
383. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J.
341, 418 (2010) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 13 (West 2007)).
384. Parsley v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty., 9 Cal. 3d 934, 945 (1973) (internal
citations omitted.).
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domestic relationship. In addition, Section 646.9 of the California Penal
Code defines the crime of stalking as 1) the repeated following or
harassment of a person, 2) “a credible [explicit or implicit] threat with the
intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety or the
safety of his or her immediate family,” and 3) conduct which would cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress and in fact causes
the victim to suffer such emotional distress, and the California Civil Code
similarly defines the tort of stalking as 1) a course of conduct by which the
defendant intends to follow, alarm, or harass the plaintiff, 2) as a result of
which the plaintiff reasonably fears for his or her safety or the safety of an
immediate family member, and 3) the defendant either a) makes a credible
(explicit or implicit) threat with the intent to place the plaintiff in
reasonable fear for his or her safety or the safety of an immediate family
member, or b) violates a restraining order.385 Given these statutes’
requirements that the perpetrator must intend to cause the victim to suffer
severe emotional pain and also must make a credible threat to the physical
safety of the victim or an immediate family member of the victim (or,
alternatively, violate a restraining order, in the case of the tort of stalking),
the word “stalking” in Section 6320 of the California Family Code also
does not encompass all of the various forms of mental abuse which an
intimate terrorist commits against his victim(s). Furthermore, the acts of
“telephoning,” “contacting,” and “coming within a specified distance of . . .
the other party” listed in section 6320 are premised on the notion that the
intimate relationship between the perpetrator and his victim has terminated,
because intimate partners regularly telephone and contact one another and
typically are in close physical proximity with each other. Accordingly,
these actions likewise do not encapsulate all of the various forms of mental
abuse which an intimate terrorist inflicts on his victim(s).
Accordingly, the only acts listed in Section 6320 of the California
Family Code which could encompass the various forms of mental abuse
which an intimate terrorist inflicts on his victim(s) during an intimate
relationship are “molesting,” “threatening,” “harassing,” and “disturbing
the peace of the other party.” Unfortunately, as is further explained below,
it appears that none of these acts is broad enough to include the various
forms of mental abuse which an intimate terrorist inflicts on his victim(s)
either.

385. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (Deering 2010); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.7 (Deering 2010);
see also Lambers Royakkers, The Dutch Approach to Stalking Laws, 3 Cal. Crim. L. Rev. 2,
¶ 23 (2000), available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjcl/vol3/iss1/2 (accessed Mar.
27, 2013) (stating that a flaw in California's definition of the crime of stalking is that “the
stalker must evoke fear in any reasonable person that he/she or his/her next of kin are in
danger of physical violence or of being killed”); David J,. Loundy, Online Stalking, in 2 THE
INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA, 812 (John Wiley & Sons Hossein Bidgoli eds., 2004) (indicating
that the tort of stalking in California likewise requires that the defendant's actions must
cause the victim to fear for his or her physical safety).
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Neither section 6320 nor any other section of the California Family
Code defines the terms “threatening,” “molesting,” “disturbing the peace
of,” or “harassing.”386 Other California code sections, as well as various
court cases, however, provide some clarification of these terms. For
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case discussing section
6320, indicated that the term “threatening” in section 6320 refers simply to
“credible threats of violence.”387
In the case of In re Marriage of Nadkarni,388 the California Court of
Appeals for the Sixth District defined the term “disturbing the peace of the
other party” in section 6320 as “conduct that destroys the mental or
emotional calm of the other party.”389 While this definition, on its face,
appears broad enough to include an intimate terrorist’s mental abuse of his
victim(s), the court’s opinion indicates that the act of “disturbing the peace
of the other party,” in the context of Section 6320 of the California Family
Code, assumes the separation of the parties.390
In Nadkarni, the petitioner alleged that her former spouse had
“access[ed], read[ ], and publicly disclos[ed] . . . her confidential
emails,”391 “used the information obtained from her e-mail account to
subpoena the records of third parties, including her business contacts [for
use in a pending child custody dispute], and to find out what social events
she would be attending.”392 She elaborated that the petitioner had ‘“told
others that he knew which social events I would be attending within the
past three months.”393 She also stated that “she feared that he would
continue to use the ‘private and privileged’ information that he had
obtained from her e-mails ‘to control, harass, and abuse’ her if he were not
enjoined from such conduct[,]”394 specifically “us[ing] this information to
harm her business and livelihood, her reputation in the community and her
personal relationships.”395 The respondent’s various actions, according to
the petitioner, had caused her “‘shock’ and ‘embarrassment,’ . . . fear [of]
the destruction of her ‘business relationships,’ and . . . fear for her

386. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6320; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 50-155 (Deering 2010) (defining
certain terms used in CAL. PENAL CODE § 646).
387. Alanis-Alvarado v. Holder, 558 F.3d 833, 839 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that “every
portion of a protective order issued under section 6320 ‘involves protection against credible
threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury’”) (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)).
388. In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (2009).
389. Id. at 1497.
390. See infra text accompanying notes 400–08.
391. Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1498–99.
392. Id. at 1490.
393. Id. at 1490.
394. Id. at 1492.
395. Id.
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safety,”396 especially given that her former spouse had physically abused
her during their marriage.397
On appeal, the petitioner furthermore asserted that, “[h]ad she been
able to be heard on the merits, the [trial] court would have heard testimony
about how [the respondent’s] . . . conduct [had] harassed her, disturbed her
peace, invaded her privacy, frightened her and intimidated her.”398 After
acknowledging that its scope of review was limited to determining if the
trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the petitioner’s
application for a protective order under section 6320,399 the court of appeals
reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s application and
remanded the case back to the trial court for a hearing on the merits of her
claim. Specifically, the court of appeals held that the respondent’s conduct
of “accessing, reading and publicly disclosing her confidential e-mails”400
constituted either “contact[ ] [with] . . . the [petitioner] . . . . ‘directly or
indirectly, by mail or otherwise’”401 or “destr[uction] . . . [of her] . . .
mental or emotional calm . . .” and hence a “disturb[ance] . . . [of] her
peace,”402 thereby warranting the trial court’s issuance of a permanent
restraining order pursuant to Section 6320 of the California Family Code if
the petitioner proved her allegations.403
While the court did not explicitly state that the actions of “contacting
. . . the other party” and “disturbing the peace of the other party” in Section
6320 of the California Family Code are premised on the parties’ separation,
the court addressed only these two specific actions in section 6320,404 even
though the petitioner also had alleged that the respondent’s conduct
constituted several other of the proscribed actions listed in section 6320 as
well.405 Additionally, each of these actions arguably is premised on the
parties’ separation (e.g., when two parties share an intimate relationship,
their ongoing contact with one another is assumed and furthermore no
California court has held that a party to an intimate relationship could be
held accountable for “disturbing the peace” of the other party to that
relationship.) In addition, the parties in Nadkarni were themselves
separated at the time of the respondent’s alleged conduct.406
Moreover, in its opinion, the court of appeals seems to consider the
gravamen of the petitioner’s complaint to be the respondent’s access to her

396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

Id. at 1499.
Id. at 1490, 1496.
Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1496.
Id. at 1495.
Id. at 1498.
Id. at 1496–97.
Id. at 1498–99.
Id. at 1496–97, 1499.
Id. at 1497–99.
See, e.g., id. at 1488, 1490.
Id. at 1487.
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confidential emails and public disclosure of the same.407 That is, the court
of appeals seems to emphasize the respondent’s alleged infringement of the
petitioner’s privacy,408 even though the court does not explicitly
acknowledge that this is the case, and no California court has held that a
person possesses a cause of action against an intimate partner for
infringement of his or her privacy. Of course, if the act of “disturbing the
peace of the other” in Section 6320 of the California Family Code is
premised on the parties’ separation, then by definition this act does not
encompass the mental abuse which an intimate terrorist inflicts on his
victim(s) during the course of an intimate relationship. In sum, even after
Nadkarni, it’s far from certain that the act of “disturbing the peace of the
other,” listed in Section 6320 of the California Family Code, is broad
enough to encompass the mental abuse which an intimate terrorist regularly
inflicts on his victims during an intimate relationship.
Finally, neither “molesting” nor “harassing,” the two remaining acts
listed in Section 6320 of the California Family Code, appear to include the
acts of mental abuse which an intimate terrorist inflicts on his victim(s)
during an intimate relationship. The California Supreme Court has
clarified that the phrase “to molest another” in the California Penal Code
means “to interfere with or meddle with unwarrantably so as to injure or
disturb.”409 It has also stated that “molestation is a willful injury inflicted
upon another by interference with the user of rights as to person or
property.”410 The court’s association of the word “molest” with the word
“disturb,” its use of the word “unwarranted” when describing the type of
interference or meddling that constitutes “molestation,” and its definition of
“molestation” in terms of infringements to the victim’s rights to
personhood or property all suggest that the act of “molesting” (like the act
of “disturbing the peace of the other party”) in Section 6320 of the
California Family Code is premised on the perpetrator’s nonconsensual or
unauthorized contact with the victim. According, the act of “molesting”
similarly appears not to be broad enough to include the acts of mental
abuse which an intimate terrorist commits against his victim(s) during the
course of an intimate relationship.
Finally, given that Section 6320 of the California Family Code does not
define the act of “harassing,” definitions of “harassing” or “harassment” in
other California statutes may provide guidance as to the meaning of this act

407. See, e.g., id. at 1488 (referring to the
information accessed through [the petitioner’s]
petitioner] . . . feared that [the respondent] . . .
privileged information that he had obtained”).
408. Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1496.
409. People v. Lopez, 19 Cal. 4th 282, 290
DICTIONARY (2d. ed.)).
410. Lopez, 19 Cal. 4th at 290.

respondent’s alleged “use of personal
. . . email”), 1492 (stating that [the
would continue to use the private and
(1998) (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L
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in section 6320.411 Section 527.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
defines “harassment” in the civil law context, as:
unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and
willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously
alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no
legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress,
and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the
plaintiff.412
. . . “Course of conduct” is a pattern of conduct composed of a
series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a
continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an
individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or
sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means,
including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails,
interoffice mail, fax, or computer e-mail . . .413
To be sure, an intimate terrorist’s acts of mental abuse constitute a
“course of conduct” directed at his victim(s)414 and the above-quoted
definition of “harassment” in section 527.6 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure similarly includes a “course of conduct” directed by the
perpetrator at a specific victim. However, the above-stated definition of
“harassment” indicates that the California Legislature intended for the
phrase “course of conduct” in the context of “harassment” to possess a
relatively narrow scope. That is, the above-quoted definition of “course of
conduct” provides that a complainant claiming that the respondent has
perpetrated such a “course of conduct” must prove not only that an
“average” or “typical” person would have suffered substantial emotional
distress as a result of the perpetrator’s course of conduct but that he or she
in fact suffered substantial emotional distress as a result of the perpetrator’s
course of conduct. Moreover, all of the examples of “course of conduct”
provided in the above-quoted definition involve either a credible threat of
violence,415 unauthorized contact with the victim, or infringement of the
victim’s privacy.
Therefore, as California follows the statutory

411. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6320; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 50-155.
412. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(b)(3) (Deering 2010).
413. Id. § 527.6(b)(1).
414. See supra text accompanying notes 51–80, 83–87, 101–15.
415. Again, a “stalker” in California is defined as “[a]ny person who willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows or willfully and maliciously harasses another person and
who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or
her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family . . . .” CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a)
(Deering 2010).
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construction principle of ejusdem generis,416 these examples suggest that
the California Legislature intended that only credible threats of violence,
unauthorized contact with the complainant, or infringements of the
complainant’s privacy constitute the type of conduct which would rise to
the level of “harassment.”
Based on all of the above, the terms “threatening,” “disturbing the
peace,” “molesting,” and “harassing” in Section 6320 of the California
Family Code together appear to refer only to the specific mental harm
which a victim suffers on account of a domestic violence perpetrator’s
credible threats of physical harm, unauthorized contacts with the victim, or
infringements of the victim’s privacy, and a number of statutory
construction principles support this conclusion. As noted above, a
California statute must always be interpreted in accordance with the
context and the Legislature’s purpose,417 and while the Legislature’s clear
intent in enacting the DVPA,418 of which Section 6320 of the Family Code
is a part, was to provide victims of domestic violence with a broad range of
remedies,419 as discussed above, the language of section 6320 strongly
suggests that the Legislature considered domestic violence to consist of
physical harm, threats of physical harm, and acts premised on the
separation of the parties (such as unauthorized contact with the victim and
infringement of the victim’s privacy).
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in the case of AlanisAlvarado v. Holder,420
some acts [listed in Section 6320], such as telephoning one’s
domestic partner, or coming within a specified distance of him
or her, do not typically constitute violence, threats, or
416. The term “ejusdem generis” means “of the same kind, class, or nature.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 517 (6th ed. 1990). The doctrine of ejusdem generis “presumes that if the
Legislature intends a general word to be used in its unrestricted sense, it does not also offer
as examples peculiar things or classes of things since those descriptions then would be
surplusage.” Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Svcs., 23 Cal. 4th 116, 141 (2000). “‘Ejusdem generis
applies whether specific words follow general words in a statute or vice versa. In either
event, the general term or category is “restricted to those things that are similar to those
which are enumerated specifically.’” People v. Giordano, 42 Cal. 4th 644, 660 (2007)
(internal citations omitted.); see also Trinity Services, Inc. v. Marshall, 593 F.2d 1250, 1258
(1978) (“It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that where specific words
precede or follow general words in an enumeration describing a particular subject, the
general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects
enumerated by the specific words.”) (internal citations omitted).
417. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4 (Deering 2010) (“[P]rovisions [of the Code] are to be liberally
construed with a view to effect its objects . . . .”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 13 (Deering 2010)
(“Words and phrase are construed according to the context . . . .”); see also Parsley v.
Superior Court of Riverside Cnty., 9 Cal.3d 934, 945 (1973) (stating that, in applying any
rule of statutory construction, “the fundamental concern . . . [is] the ascertainment and
furtherance of legislative intent.”) (internal citations omitted.)
418. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6200-6409 (West 2010).
419. In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1498 (2009).
420. Alanis-Alvarado v. Holder, 558 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2009).
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harassment. Indeed, such conduct is entirely expected in
normal interactions. But Petitioner’s argument ignores the
crucial context: At the time of his conduct, he was subject to a
protective order. As noted above, courts may issue a
protective order only upon a showing of a past act of abuse.
When a court has enjoined a person from, for example,
telephoning his domestic partner in the context of a domestic
violence protective order, the injunction involves protection
against threats and harassment.421
The California Legislature also explicitly included the term “mental
suffering” in its definitions of other types of familial abuse,422 such as
“child abuse”423 and “dependent adult abuse”424 but did not include this
term in Section 6320 of the California Family Code. In light of this fact,
the statutory construction principle of “inclusio unius est exclusio alterius,”
which means “to express one thing is to exclude another,”425 supports the
conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to include all forms of
“mental suffering” in section 6320, but rather intended to include only
those forms of mental suffering caused by the specific acts listed therein.
As discussed above, it appears that the specific acts (apart from physical
injury and sexual assault) listed in section 6320 include only credible
threats of physical violence, unauthorized contact with the victim, and
infringement of the victim’s privacy.
In a child custody proceeding, the California Legislature distinguishes
between “child abuse,” which a family court must simply consider in
accordance with Family Code section 3011(b)426 and “domestic violence,”
which triggers a presumption against awarding custody to the perpetrator
thereof in accordance with section 3044(a).427 Furthermore, the Legislature
explicitly includes “mental suffering” in its definition of “child abuse,”428
but, as discussed above, it does not explicitly include “mental suffering” in
its definition of “domestic violence.” If the definition of “domestic
violence” in section 3044(c)—and specifically, the terms “threatening,”
“molesting,” “disturbing the peace,” and “harassing” in section 6320—

421. Id. at 839 (internal citations omitted).
422. This is supported by the principle (related to “inclusio unius est exclusion alterius”)
that “[a] broad reading[] of statutory provisions [should be avoided] if . . . [the legislature]
has specifically provided for the broader policy in more specific language elsewhere.”
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term: Foreword:
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 99 (1994) [hereinafter Eskridge].
423. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.3 (West 2010).
424. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.07 (West 2010).
425. BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 432 (2d ed. 2001); see
also Eskridge, supra note 422, at 97.
426. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011(b) (West 2010).
427. Id. § 3044(a).
428. See infra note 448 and accompanying text.
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were interpreted to include mental abuse per se in any case, then arguably
the Family Code provisions distinguishing between child abuse and
domestic violence arguably would be rendered ineffective.429 The wellestablished principle of statutory construction requiring that each provision
of a statute should be given effect430 argues against such an interpretation.
For all of these reasons, it appears that the type of mental abuse
perpetrated by an intimate terrorist during the course of a domestic
relationship is not included in any of the acts listed in Section 6320 of the
California Family Code. Hence, it likewise appears that this type of mental
abuse is not included in the definition of “domestic violence” in section
3044(c), which triggers a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody
to a domestic violence perpetrator. Unfortunately, therefore, the mental
abuse that an intimate terrorist perpetrates, despite the severe harm caused
by this type of abuse, does not appear to be sufficient to raise a rebuttable
presumption against awarding sole or joint custody to an intimate terrorist
in California.431
B. OTHER STATES’ TREATMENT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CHILD
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS
The definitions of domestic violence utilized by other states in child
custody proceedings are similarly deficient. For example, Arkansas’s
domestic relations law (of which its custody statute is a part) defines
“domestic abuse” (which it uses interchangeably with “domestic
violence”),432 as:
(A) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of
imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault between family
or household members; or
429. “Child abuse” is also defined to include “neglect.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.2
(West 2010). Therefore, even if “domestic violence” as defined in California Family Code
section 3044(c) were interpreted so as to include “mental suffering” per se, “child abuse”
still would be distinguished from “domestic violence” based on its inclusion of “neglect.’”
However, as the Legislature could have easily clarified that the only distinction between the
two terms was the inclusion of the additional term “neglect” in “child abuse” but did not do
so, this suggests that it meant to exclude “mental suffering” per se from the definition of
“domestic violence” as well.
430. Select Base Materials v. Bd. of Equal., 51 Cal. 2d 640, 645 (Cal. 1959); Weber v.
Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 15 Cal. 2d 82, 85–86 (Cal. 1940); see also Stafford v. Realty Bond
Service Corp., 39 Cal.2d 797, 805 (Cal. 1952) (every provision should be interpreted with
reference to the entire law of which it is a part); CAL. CIV. CODE § 13 (West 2012) (“Words
and phrases are construed according to the context and . . . technical words and phrases . . .
as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law . . . are to be construed
according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.”); see also Eskridge,
supra note 422, at 98 (citing various cases discussing the statutory construction principle
that interpretation of “a provision in a way that would render other provisions of the Act
superfluous or unnecessary” should be avoided).
431. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(a), (c) (West 2010).
432. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(c)(1) (West 2010) (using the term “domestic
violence”); Id. § 9-13-101(c)(2) (using the term “domestic abuse”).
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(B) Any sexual conduct between family or household members,
whether minors or adults, that constitutes a crime under the laws of
this state . . . .433
Similarly, Indiana defines “domestic or family violence” in its family
law, including its child custody law, as follows:
[E]xcept for an act of self defense, the occurrence of one (1) or
more of the following acts committed by a family or household
member:
(1) Attempting to cause, threatening to cause, or causing physical
harm to another family or household member without legal
justification.
(2) Placing a family or household member in fear of physical harm
without legal justification.
(3) Causing a family or household member to involuntarily engage
in sexual activity by force, threat of force, or duress.
(4) Beating, torturing, mutilating, or killing a vertebrate animal
without justification with the intent to threaten, intimidate, coerce,
harass, or terrorize a family or household member . . . .434
Oklahoma’s child custody law likewise provides that domestic violence
is:
[A]ny act of physical harm, or the threat of imminent physical
harm which is committed by an adult, emancipated minor, or minor
child thirteen (13) years of age or older against another adult,
emancipated minor or minor child who are family or household
members or who are or were in a dating relationship.435
In its child custody law, South Dakota refers to “domestic abuse” and
defines “domestic abuse” as “physical harm, bodily injury, or attempts to
cause physical harm or bodily injury, or the infliction of fear of imminent
physical harm or bodily injury between family or household members.”436
At least two states, Alaska and Minnesota, include the term “terrorist
threatening” or “terroristic threatening” among the activities that constitute
domestic violence. For example, Alaska defines domestic violence as:
one or more of the following offenses or an offense under a law or
ordinance of another jurisdiction having elements similar to these

433.
434.
435.
436.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103(3)(A)-(B) (West 2010).
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-42 (West 2010).
OKLA. STATE. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1(1) (West 2009).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (2007); see also ABACDV, supra note 351.
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offenses, or an attempt to commit the offense, by a household
member against another household member:
(A) a crime against the person . . . ;
(B) burglary . . . ;
(C) criminal trespass . . . ;
(D) arson or criminally negligent burning . . . ;
(E) criminal mischief . . . ;
(F) terrorist threatening . . . ;
(G) violating a protective order . . . ; or
(H) harassment . . . .437
Similarly, Minnesota law provides that domestic violence
means the following, if committed against a family or household
member by a family or household member: (1) physical harm,
bodily injury, or assault; (2) the infliction of fear or [sic] imminent
physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; or (3) terroristic
threats, . . . , criminal sexual conduct, . . . or interference with an
emergency call . . . .438
However, it is clear that neither the term “terrorist threatening” in
Alaska’s definition of domestic violence nor the term “terroristic
threatening” in Minnesota’s definition of domestic violence encompasses
the type of mental abuse which an intimate terrorist perpetrates against his
victim(s) on a routine basis. Minnesota law specifically defines “terroristic
threatening” as “threaten[ing], directly or indirectly, to commit any crime
of violence with purpose to terrorize another . . . or in a reckless disregard
of the risk of causing such terror . . . [,]”439 and even the intentional
infliction of severe mental harm is not considered a crime of violence in
Minnesota.440 Similarly, sections 18.66.990(3) and 25.24.150(c) of the

437. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3) (2006).
438. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(2)(a)(1)-(3) (West 2009).
439. Id. § 609.713(1).
440. KATHLEEN ANN RUANE & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34200,
BURNING CROSSES, HANGMAN’S NOOSES, AND THE LIKE: STATE STATUTES THAT PROSCRIBE
THE USE OF SYMBOLS OF FEAR AND VIOLENCE WITH THE INTENT TO THREATEN 4, n.14,
(2007), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/
RL34200_10052007.pdf (suggesting that a “terroristic threat” in section 609.713 of
Minnesota’s Annotated Statutes proscribes threats of death, serious injury or property
destruction); PAUL STARETT WALLACE, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31314, ANTI-HOAX
LEGISLATION IN THE 107TH CONGRESS: ADDRESSING PROBLEMS SINCE SEPTEMBER 2001 12
(2002) available at http://opencrs.com/document/RL31314/2002-03-01 (noting that
Minnesota Annotated Statutes § 609.713 prohibits bomb scares); see also Leslie Yalof
Garfield, The Case for a Criminal Law Theory of Intentional Infliction of Emotional
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Alaska Code define “terrorist threatening” as very specific acts of physical
violence or a threat thereof.441 Accordingly, this term likewise does not
include the mental abuse, which an intimate terrorist typically inflicts on
his victim(s).
On its face, the term “harassment” in Alaska’s definition of domestic
violence, like the term “harassment” in California’s definition of domestic
violence, appears to be broad enough that it may include all of the types of
mental abuse that an intimate terrorist tends to engage in. However,
Alaska’s statutory scheme specifically provides that “harassment,” in its
definition of domestic violence, is a subset of the crime of harassment in
the second degree,442 specifically:
telephon[ing] another and fail[ing] to terminate the connection with
intent to impair the ability of that person to place or receive
telephone calls; . . . mak[ing] repeated telephone calls at extremely
inconvenient hours; . . . and mak[ing] an anonymous or obscene
telephone call, an obscene electronic communication, or a
telephone call or electronic communication that threatens physical
injury or sexual contact . . . .443
The terms “criminal trespass,” “criminal mischief,” and “violating a
protective order” in Alaska’s definition of domestic violence, quoted
above, are all similarly unavailing in this regard. “Criminal trespass” is
defined as either “enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully (1) on land with
intent to commit a crime on the land; or (2) in a dwelling[ ]”444 or
“enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully (1) in or upon premises; or (2) in a

Distress, 5 CRIM. L. BRIEF 33, 33 (2009), available at http://digitalcommons.pace.
edu/lawfaculty/571 (“[T]he law redresses those who suffer injury from harmful speech
through a series of seemingly innocuous remedies, including financial remuneration or
retribution through minimal criminal penalties.”).
441. ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.807(a)(1)-(3) (2007) (defining “terrorist threatening” in the
first degree as knowingly sending or delivering a “bacteriological, biological, chemical, or
radiological substance or an imitation [of such substance] . . . and, as a result, (1) plac[ing] a
person in reasonable fear of physical injury to another person; (2) caus[ing] evacuation of a
building, public place or area, business premises, or mode of public transportation or (3)
caus[ing] serious public inconvenience”); Id. § 11.56.810(a)(1)–(3), (b) (defining “terrorist
threatening” in the second degree as “knowingly mak[ing] a false report that a circumstance
(1) dangerous to human life exists or is about to exist and (A) a person is placed in
reasonable fear of physical injury to any person; (B) causes evacuation of a building, public
place or area, business premises, or mode of public transportation; (C) causes serious public
inconvenience; or . . . (2) exists or is about to exist that is dangerous to the proper or safe
functioning of an oil or gas pipeline or supporting facility, utility, or transportation or cargo
facility . . .”).
442. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.66.990(3)(H), 11.61.120(a)(2)–(4) (2006).
443. Id. § 11.61.120(a)(2)–(4).
444. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.320(a)(1)–(2) (2007) (stating the definition of criminal
trespass in the first degree).
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propelled vehicle.”445 “Criminal mischief” is defined as damaging various
types of public or private property with no right or reasonable ground to
believe one has the right to do so.446 Finally, “violating a protective order”
in Alaska’s definition of domestic violence means violating a domestic
violence protective order that specifically prohibited the respondent from:
Threatening to commit or committing domestic violence, stalking,
or harassment; . . .
telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating directly or
indirectly with the petitioner; . . .
[entering] . . . the residence of the petitioner, regardless of
ownership of the residence; . . .
appearing at the residence, school, or place of employment of the
petitioner or any specified place frequented by the petitioner or any
designated household member; . . .
entering a propelled vehicle in the possession of or occupied by the
petitioner; . . .
using or possessing a deadly weapon if the court [found] the
respondent was in the actual possession of or used a weapon
during the commission of the domestic violence; or . . .
[refusing] to surrender any firearm owned or possessed by the
respondent if the court [found] that the respondent was in the actual
possession of or used a firearm during the commission of the
domestic violence[.] 447
In short, just as is the case with respect to the definition of domestic
violence contained in California’s child custody law, the only acts of
mental abuse that appear to be included in other states’ definition of
domestic violence for child custody purposes are a perpetrator’s credible
threat of physical violence, a perpetrator’s unauthorized contact with the
victim, and a perpetrator’s invasion of the victim’s privacy.
The failure of the great majority of states to take mental abuse
seriously, even in the child custody context, is perhaps most clearly
evidenced by their careful distinction between “child abuse” and “domestic
violence” in their child custody laws. That is, most states, like California,
tend to explicitly include mental suffering or mental injury in their
definition of “child abuse.”448 However, even those states that recognize a
445. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.330(a)(1)–(2) (2007) (stating the definition of criminal
trespass in the second degree).
446. Id. § 11.46.475–486.
447. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.740(a)(1), 18.66.100(c)(1)–(7) (2012).
448. All states except Georgia and Washington include some form of emotional
maltreatment in their definition of child abuse or neglect. Definitions of Child Abuse and
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rebuttable presumption against granting custody to a perpetrator of
“domestic violence” tend to provide that a party’s past child abuse must
only be considered by a family court in determining the custody
arrangement that is in the best interests of the child.449 These states do not
stipulate that a party’s past child abuse triggers the presumption against
awarding custody to that party.450 In other words, they provide that

Neglect: Summary of State Laws, Child Welfare Information Gateway, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, July 2009, at 3, available at www.childwelfare.gov/systemw
ide/laws_policies/statutes/defineall.cfm (accessed July 10, 2010). “Approximately 32 States
. . . provide specific definitions of emotional abuse or mental injury to a child.” Id. at 3–4.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.6 (West 2010) (“[T]he term ‘child abuse or neglect’
includes physical injury or death inflicted by other than accidental means upon a child by
another person, sexual abuse . . . , neglect . . ., the willful harming or injuring of a child or
the endangering of the person or health of the child, as defined in section 11165.3, and
unlawful corporal punishment or injury . . . .”); Id. § 11165.3 (“[T]he willful harming or
injuring of a child or the endangering of the person or health of a child,” means “a situation
in which a person willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon,
unjustifiable pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully
causes or permits the person or health of the child to be placed a situation in which his or
her person or health is endangered.”); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290(2) (2007) (“‘[C]hild abuse
or neglect’ means the physical injury or neglect, mental injury, sexual abuse, sexual
exploitation, or maltreatment of a child under the age of 18 by a person under circumstances
that indicate that the child’s health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby; in this
paragraph, ‘mental injury’ means an injury to the emotional well-being, or intellectual or
psychological capacity of a child, as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment
in the child’s ability to function[.]”); Id. § 47.17.290(9) (“‘[M]ental injury’ means a serious
injury to the child as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment in the child’s
ability to function in a developmentally appropriate manner and the existence of that
impairment is supported by the opinion of a qualified expert witness[.]”).
449. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 2010) (“In making a determination of the
best interest of the child in a proceeding described in Section 3021, the court shall, among
other factors it finds relevant, consider all of the following: . . . (b) Any history of abuse by
one parent or any other person seeking custody against any of the following: (1) Any child
to whom he or she is related by blood or affinity or with whom he or she has had a
caretaking relationship, no matter how temporary. . . As used in this subdivision, ‘abuse
against a child’ means ‘child abuse’ as defined in Section 11165.6 of the Penal Code and
abuse against any of the other persons described . . . means ‘abuse’ as defined in Section
6203 of this code.”); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(7) (2006) (“The court shall determine
custody in accordance with the best interests of the child . . . In determining the best
interests of the child the court shall consider . . . any evidence of domestic violence, child
abuse, or child neglect in the proposed custodial household or a history of violence between
the parents . . . .”).
450. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(a) (West 2010) (“Upon a finding by the court that a
party seeking custody of a child has perpetrated domestic violence against the other party
seeking custody of the child or against the child or the child’s siblings within the previous
five years, there is a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal
custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the
best interest of the child, pursuant to Section 3011.”); Id. § 3044(c) (“For purposes of this
section, a person has ‘perpetrated domestic violence’ when he or she is found by the court to
have intentionally or recklessly caused or attempted to cause bodily injury, or sexual assault,
or to have placed a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to
that person or to another, or to have engaged in any behavior involving, but not limited to,
threatening, striking, harassing, destroying personal property or disturbing the peace of
another, for which a court may issue an ex parte order pursuant to Section 6320 to protect
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[p]sychological and emotional abuse, absent commission of a
crime or infliction of physical harm, do [sic] not constitute
domestic violence. . . . Psychological and emotional abuse may
still be considered when a judge makes his custody determination
if the abuse affects the child’s well-being, but evidence of
psychological and emotional abuse will be balanced against other
factors . . . .451
In fact, Missouri is the only state that both includes mental abuse in its
definition of “child abuse” and at the same time recognizes a rebuttable
presumption against awarding custody to a party who has committed “child
abuse” as so defined.452

the other party seeking custody of the child or to protect the child and the child’s siblings.”);
ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(g) (2006) (“There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent who
has a history of perpetrating domestic violence against the other parent, a child, or a
domestic living partner may not be awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody, joint
legal custody, or joint physical custody of a child.”); Id. § 25.24.150(h) (“A parent has a
history of perpetrating domestic violence under (g) of this section if the court finds that,
during one incident of domestic violence, the parent caused serious physical injury or the
court finds that the parent has engaged in more than one incident of domestic violence.”);
Id. § 18.66.990(3)(A)–(H) (“[D]omestic violence’ and ‘crime involving domestic violence’
mean one or more of the following offenses or an offense under a law or ordinance of
another jurisdiction having elements similar to these offenses, or an attempt to commit the
offense, by a household member against another household member: (A) a crime against the
person . . . (B) burglary . . . (C) criminal trespass . . . (D) arson or criminally negligent
burning . . . (E) criminal mischief . . . (F) terrorist threatening . . . (G) violating a protective
order . . . or (H) harassment . . . .”).
451. See Bolotin, supra note 364, at 280.
452. MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.050.5 (2012) (“In making an award of custody, the court shall
consider all relevant factors including the presumption that the best interests of the child will
be served by placing the child in the custody and care of the nonabusive parent . . .”); Id. §
452.375.13 (“If the court finds that domestic violence or abuse, as defined in section
455.010 has occurred, the court shall make specific findings of fact to show that the custody
or visitation arrangement ordered by the court best protects the child and the parent or other
family or household member who is the victim of domestic violence . . .”); Id. §
455.010(1)(a)–(f) (“‘Abuse’ includes but is not limited to the occurrence of any of the
following acts, attempts or threats against a person who may be protected pursuant to this
chapter[:] . . . ‘Assault’ . . . ‘Battery . . . ‘Coercion’ . . . ‘Harassment’ . . . “Sexual assault’
. . . ‘Unlawful imprisonment’ . . . .”); Id. § 455.502(1) (“As used in sections 455.500 to
455.538, the following terms mean: (1) ‘Abuse’, any physical injury, sexual abuse, or
emotional abuse inflicted on a child other than by accidental means by an adult household
member, or stalking of a child . . . .”) (repealed 2011). Moreover, the psychological theory
of domestic violence reveals that the states’ distinction in treatment between the mental
abuse of a child and the mental abuse of an adult in states’ child custody schemes itself
appears to be non-defensible. That is, this distinction in treatment presumably is based on
the rationale that an adult can choose to terminate an emotionally abusive relationship
whereas a child cannot. Cf. DUBBER, supra note 236, at 9–10 (stating that “the core
[principle] of criminal law . . . [is that] violent interpersonal crime [is] . . . the ultimate
violation of one person’s autonomy by another . . . Victims who assume the risk of suffering
criminal harm have long prevented, or at least lessened, the offender’s criminal liability.”).
Yet, the psychological theory of domestic violence teaches that, in cases of intimate
terrorism, the intimate terrorist’s pervasive campaign of mental abuse, which is designed to
control his victim(s), can severely diminish the autonomy of even an adult victim. See
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C. FAILURE OF STATES TO INCLUDE INTIMATE TERRORISM IN THEIR
DEFINITIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UTILIZED IN CHILD CUSTODY
PROCEEDINGS
States’ definitions of domestic violence for use in child custody cases
tend to include only credible threats of physical violence, unauthorized
contacts with the victim, and invasions of the victim’s privacy as forms of
mental abuse, in addition to various forms of physical and sexual
violence.453 As discussed above, both the former partner and a child of a
perpetrator of situational couple violence could fear that the perpetrator
might commit some additional act of physical violence in the future
because situational couple violence consists primarily of episodic physical
violence,454 and fear of potential future attack could cause them mental
distress.455 However, as illustrated above, even though children exposed to
intimate terrorism are at risk of suffering much more severe mental and
physical harm,456 the definitions of domestic violence in the states’ child
custody laws largely fail to address an intimate terrorist’s regime of mental
abuse.457 This failure is especially troubling, given that the psychological
theory of domestic violence explains that intimate terrorism is the type of
domestic violence that is transmitted throughout generations of American
families.458
Therefore, if a state hopes to begin to reverse the self-perpetuating
process of intimate terrorism begetting intimate terrorism, it needs to
incorporate the concept of intimate terrorism in its child custody laws. At a
minimum, a state should include mental abuse per se in the definition of

supra note 336. In addition, as stated above, domestic violence experts agree that victims of
an intimate terrorist often choose to remain with their abuser as they are most at risk of
being killed or suffering severe physical injuries when they attempt to escape his regime of
control. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (explaining the empirical evidence that documents
that the greatest risk of death and serious physical injury occurs when women try to leave
their intimate terrorists and coining the term “separation assault” to refer to this
phenomenon); see also NEIL WEBSDALE, UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC HOMICIDE 90 (1999)
(explaining that an attempt to leave a violent partner along with one’s children is one of the
most significant triggers for severe domestic violence and death). Therefore, it is illogical
for state legislatures to conclude that an adult victim who chooses to remain with an
intimate terrorist for some period of time should not be heard to complain that she suffered
mental abuse during that time period.
453. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 371–418, discussing CAL. FAM. CODE §
3044; see also ABACDV, supra note 351.
454. See supra text accompanying notes 92–93.
455. Cf. Susan W. Brenner, Fantasy Crime, available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi
/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=susan_brenner, at 6–7 (noting that a typical
required element of the crime of “stalking” is a credible threat of future physical harm and
some courts have noted that stalking statutes are intended to prevent “emotional harm to
victims.”) (citations omitted.).
456. See supra text accompanying notes 98–115, 286–309.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 51–80, 83–87, 101–15.
458. See supra text accompanying note 331.
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domestic violence used in its child custody cases. In addition, the
psychological theory of domestic violence suggests that each state would
be well-advised to recognize a rebuttable presumption against awarding
custody of a child to a party who has committed mental abuse per se.

VII. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO INCLUDING
MENTAL ABUSE IN THE DEFINITION OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
During the last few years, psychologists have made great strides in
developing and explicating the psychological theory of domestic
violence.459 Their findings, however, have not been widely disseminated in
the mainstream press, and hence many policy-makers are unaware of this
theory.460 Accordingly, state legislators’ failure to include mental abuse
per se in their states’ definitions of domestic violence461 may be largely due
to their lack of familiarity with the psychological theory of domestic
violence, and in particular the distinction between intimate terrorism and
situational couple violence.
Regardless, however, some state legislators may be concerned that
including mental abuse per se in the definition of domestic violence would
unnecessarily infringe their citizens’ state and federal privacy,462 free
speech, and/or parental rights (the right to enjoy the companionship of

459. See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 215, at 209 and passim (stating “it is just a matter of
time until . . . [longitudinal studies of abused children and retrospective studies of abusive
adults] present a comprehensive lifespan developmental portrait of the long-term
consequences of early abuse experiences”).
460. Kenneth Corvo et al., Evidence-Based Practice in Domestic Violence: Towards
Evidence-Based Practice with Domestic Violence Perpetrators, 23–25 (Aug. 1, 2010),
http://www.nfvlrc.org/docs/Corvo.Article.1.pdf (explaining that “[a] rich psychology of
intimate violence perpetrators has developed since the first wave of treatment was
developed. Essentially this research has unearthed what emotions, cognitions and
situational interactions intermingle to generate and support abusive behavior. . . .
[However,] there is a lack of political support to reframe the issue so that implementing an
evidence-based approach becomes feasible”).
461. The definition of domestic violence contained in states’ criminal laws also typically
fails to include verbal or emotional abuse, apart from that derived from a credible threat of
physical violence. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 13700 (West 2009).
462. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I, III, IX, and XIV; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484 (1965) (“The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, as protection against all governmental invasions ‘of the sanctity
of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’”); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (stating that
“specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . Various guarantees create zones of
privacy[,]” and noting that the Third and Ninth Amendments provide additional sources of
the right to privacy); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990) (quoting Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right of the individual to “establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience.”).
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one’s child and raise him/her as one sees fit).463 Given that mental abuse is
difficult to define and even more difficult to prove,464 this concern is
understandable. Accordingly, the constitutionality of a state law limiting or
denying a party custody of a child on account of his or her past mental
abuse is considered in some depth below.
Turning first to an individual’s federal right to privacy, the U.S.
Supreme Court has repeatedly identified the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution465 (in particular, the protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures and self incrimination, respectively) as
the main guarantees of an individual’s right to privacy.466 In addition, the
463. Only a biological parent or legal guardian of a child possesses “parental rights.” See,
e.g., James G. Dwyer, Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of
Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1418 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534–35 (1925) (clarifying that parental rights are unlike other individual rights in that
they are based solely on an individual’s status as a parent or legal guardianship of a child));
see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–55, to
the effect that the “‘liberty of parents and guardians’ includes the right ‘to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control’”).
464. See, e.g., Peter Allen, Shouting at Your Wife May Get You a Criminal Record in
France, MAILONLINE, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article1240770/France-introduce-new-law-banning-psychological-violence-marriages.html
(explaining that since psychological abuse leaves no visible scars, “[m]any believe the
offence will be impossible to prove,” and indicating that the police and courts will not be
able to distinguish “rudeness” from “psychological abuse”). Still, it should be kept in mind
that most crimes happen behind closed doors and yet crimes are routinely proven with
circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Barry Liebowitz, Book ‘Em: Seven Days of Rage—The
Deadly Crime Spree of the Craigslist Killer, CBSNEWS.COM, Sept. 18, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/09/17/crimesider/entry5318109.shtml (“[P]eople can
hide their inner lives very well.”); Alice Green, Criminals Look Like Us, TIMESUNION.COM,
July 17, 2009, http://blog.timesunion.com/alicegreen/category/prisons (“Most people are
able to hide their illegal acts. . . .”); Steve Thompson, Circumstantial Evidence in Criminal
Law, ASSOCIATEDCONTENT.COM, Oct. 20, 2006, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/
71948/circumstantial_evidence_in_criminal_pg2.html?cat=17 (“Circumstantial evidence
plays a large role in most criminal cases . . . Many of the most high profile cases in U.S.
history have been based on circumstantial evidence. For example, the trials of Timothy
McVeigh (OKC bombing), Scott Peterson (murder of his wife), Charles Manson (murder of
Sharon Tate) and others.”). In addition, even proving that a particular person inflicted
visible physical injuries tends to turn into a matter of “he said, she said” and physical abuse
cases often are resolved on the basis of the parties’ credibility. When Will They Ever Learn?
Educating to End Domestic Violence: A Law School Report, American Bar Association
Commission
on
Domestic
Violence,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/etedv/incorp.htm (last visited Mar. 30,
2010). This is due in part to the fact that “many [batterers] routinely deny the domestic
violence and the severity of that violence. When confronted with their abusive behavior,
they tend to blame their partner for provoking it or refuse to accept responsibility for it.”
THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION,
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/help_series/pdftxt/domestic
violencevictimization.pdf. Yet, all fifty states include physical abuse in their definition of
domestic violence. ABACDV, supra note 351.
465. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V.
466. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (“The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, as protection against all governmental invasions
‘of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’”).
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Court has often cited the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution467 as a
guarantee of an individual’s right to protection against government
intrusion into the “private realm of family life.”468 The Court occasionally
has cited the Ninth and Third Amendments to the U.S. Constitution469
(specifically, the protection of rights retained by the people and the
guarantee against occupation of one’s home by the military during
peacetime) as further guarantees of an individual’s right to privacy in
family matters.470
There are also constitutional provisions that relate to an individual’s
parental rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed to the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution471 as the primary
guarantees of an individual’s parental rights.472 However, the Court has
also identified the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (in particular,
its references to the freedoms of speech, conscience, religion, and
association) as either the main guarantee or one guarantee of an
individual’s parental rights, especially in cases regarding a parent’s right to
control his child’s education and religious upbringing.473 In addition, on

467. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
468. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
469. U.S. CONST. amend. IX, III.
470. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (stating that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance . . . Various guarantees create zones of privacy[,]” and noting that the Third and
Ninth Amendments provide additional sources of the right to privacy).
471. U.S. CONST. amend X, XIV.
472. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (“The Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees the right of the individual . . . to establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to his own conscience.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753
(1982) (“[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66
(2000) (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of their children.”); Donald C. Hubin, Parental Rights and Due
Process, 1:2 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 123, 135 (1999) (citing Josephine Fiore, Comment,
Constitutional Law: Burden of Proof—Clear and Convincing Evidence Required to
Terminate Parental Rights, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 140, 141–142 (1982) (in turn citing
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972), Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
639 (1968), Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), and Meyer, 262 U.S.
at 399 (“The right of parents to raise their children is fundamental and falls within the
liberty interest defined by the fifth and the fourteenth amendments.”)); see also In re Gentry,
369 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Mich. App. 1985) (“A parent’s right to the custody of his or her
children is an element of ‘liberty’ guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States.”).
473. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(“T]he right to educate one’s child as one chooses is made applicable to the State by the
force of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”)); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
165–66 (1944) (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (“The
rights of children to exercise their religion, and of parents to give them religious training and
to encourage them in the practice of religious belief, as against preponderant sentiment and
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several occasions, the Court has listed the Ninth Amendment (right to
privacy in family matters) among the Constitutional guarantees of an
individual’s parental rights.474
The rights to privacy, to free speech, and to raise one’s child as one
sees fit are all fundamental liberty interests,475 and the U.S. Supreme Court
has emphasized that a parent’s right to raise his or her child as he or she
sees fit “is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court.”476 Accordingly, the Court has made clear that
any federal or state law that infringes these rights is unconstitutional unless
it “advance[s] a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means
available.”477 This test is referred to as the “strict scrutiny” test.478
At the same time, the Court has made it unambiguously clear that a
state, due to its parens patriae role,479 possesses a compelling interest in

assertion of state power voicing it, have had recognition here . . . [under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments].”)).
474. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (‘“It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.’ . . .
“The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, . . . the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, . . .
and the Ninth Amendment[.]”) (citations omitted); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)
(“[T]he right [of personal privacy under the Ninth Amendment] has some extension to
activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child
rearing and education.”); see also Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247, 1251 (1977) (rev’d on
other grounds, Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (1980) (“[T]he right of parents to the care,
custody, and nurture of their children . . . [is a] . . . fundamental right[ ] protected by the
First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.”).
475. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (right to privacy); Barnett, 319 U.S. at 639 (right to free
speech); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977) (Stewart, J.,
concurring in judgment) (parental rights).
476. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
477. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984) (holding that a Texas law requiring a
notary to be a U.S. citizen violates resident aliens’ fundamental equal protection rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); see also Griswold, 381
U.S. at 485 (striking down Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives as
violating an individual’s fundamental right to privacy); Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (citing Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,
231 (1987) (striking down New York’s “Son of Sam” law, which provided that an “entity”
contracting with a person “accused or convicted of a crime” for the production of a book or
other work describing the crime must pay to respondent Crime Victims Board any monies
owed to that person under the contract” as unnecessarily limiting the fundamental free
speech rights of the accused or convicted individual)).
478. Bernal, 467 U.S. at 219.
479. This phrase literally means [in Latin] “‘parent of the country[.],’” 118 INT’L L.
REPORTS 472 (E. Lauterpacht, C.J. Greenwood eds., 2001) [hereinafter INT’L L. REPORTS]
(quoting Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600, n. 8 (1982) (in
turn quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979))). In Snapp & Son, Inc.,
“Justice White explained that ‘[t]he parens patriae action has its roots in the common-law
concept of the “royal prerogative[,]’” INT’L. L. REPORTS, supra, at 472 (quoting Snapp &
Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 600), and he elaborated that “[t]his prerogative of parens patriae is
inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person
or in the legislature [and] is a most beneficent function . . . often necessary to be exercised
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safeguarding the physical and/or emotional welfare of minor children living
within its boundaries.480 Accordingly, the Court has consistently held that
a state custody law which infringes on individuals’ fundamental rights but
is designed to promote the best interests of minor children is constitutional
under the strict scrutiny test, so long as its infringement of those
individuals’ rights is minimized as much as possible.481 In essence, the
Court has held that the constitutionality of the law ultimately turns on
whether it incorporates sufficient procedural protections to ensure that
individuals’ Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights are not
violated.482
The general test of whether a law satisfies individuals’ Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process rights was set out by the Court in the
1976 case of Mathews v. Eldridge.483 In Mathews, the Court held
that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.484
In cases in which a child custody law has been found to infringe on an
individual’s parental rights, the Court’s assessment of the constitutionality
of the law has largely depended on the procedural protections that the state
has established to ensure the accuracy of its determinations regarding the
plaintiff’s parental fitness and the “best interests of the child.485 Of course,
this approach is logical, given that a state cannot possess a parens patriae

in the interests of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect
themselves.” INT’L. L. REPORTS, supra, at 472 (in turn quoting Mormon Church v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)).
480. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
481. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 645 (1972) (striking down an Illinois law
automatically terminating unwed fathers’ custody of their children upon the death of the
children’s mother because it violated such fathers’ fundamental parental rights and
furthermore did not provide each such father with an individualized hearing regarding his
fitness as a parent).
482. See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 848–49 (1977); Lassiter,
452 U.S. at 27, 31; Santosky, 455 U.S. 745, passim.
483. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (upholding law terminating social security
disability benefits without affording a hearing to the individual concerned).
484. Id. at 335.
485. See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. at 848–49; Lassiter, 452 U.S. at
27, 31; Santosky, 455 U.S. 745, passim (all citing Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
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interest in restricting an individual’s parental rights unless doing so actually
promotes the best interests of the child concerned.486
The cases of Stanley v. Illinois487 and Santosky v. Kramer488 probably
best elucidate the Court’s jurisprudence regarding constitutional challenges
to state child custody laws. At issue in Stanley was an Illinois state law
that treated every unwed father as a nonparent of his children when the
unwed mother of his children died.489 Joan and Peter Stanley never
married but co-habited intermittently for eighteen years and during that
time had three children.490 Upon Joan’s death, Stanley was considered a
non-parent; accordingly their three children were automatically treated as
wards of the state and placed in the care of court-appointed guardians.491
Although Stanley technically was not adjudged an unfit parent at that
hearing, the Court found that this was only because all unwed fathers were
presumed at law to be unfit.492 Unwed mothers, married fathers, and
divorced parents were not subject to this same presumption and could be
separated from their children only after an individualized hearing regarding
their fitness as a parent.493
In weighing the three Eldridge factors, the Court reaffirmed that an
individual’s parental rights are “essential” and noted that “[t]he integrity of
the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”494 Furthermore, it found that even though
Stanley was entitled to apply for the adoption or legal custody of his
children, there was no guarantee that he would be granted either, especially
in light of the fact that he had already been treated by the State of Illinois as
an unfit parent.495 In addition, the Court pointed out that numerous
restrictions are imposed on the legal guardian of a child that are not
imposed on a natural or adoptive parent of a child.496 Therefore, the Court
concluded that Stanley’s parental rights were “seriously prejudiced” by the
above-described scheme.497
The Court then considered the risk that, in the absence of an
individualized hearing, some unwed fathers in Stanley’s position would be
erroneously treated as unfit and the Court found that risk to be

486. See, e.g., Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657–58 (1972) (commenting that “[t]he State’s interest
in caring for Stanley’s children is de minimis if Stanley is shown to be a fit father”).
487. Id.
488. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, passim (1982).
489. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650.
490. Id. at 646.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 650.
493. Id. at 658.
494. Id. at 651.
495. Id. at 648–49.
496. Id.
497. Id.
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unacceptably high.498 In examining the third Eldridge factor, the Court
considered the three interests which Illinois asserted its scheme served: 1)
Illinois’s interest in protecting “‘the moral, emotional, mental, and physical
welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community’ and [2)] . . .
‘strengthen[ing] the minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing him
from the custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety or the
protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without
removal . . .’”499 and 3) “[t]he establishment of prompt, efficacious
proceedings.”500
The Court stated that Illinois’s first interest was “legitimate, . . . well
within the power of the State to implement. We do not question the
assertion that neglectful parents may be separated from their children.”501
However, the Court pointed out that, had Stanley been given the
opportunity to make his case, he may have been found to be a fit parent,
and, had this been so, the Statue’s statutory policy would have been
furthered by leaving custody in him.”502 In other words, the Court found
that Illinois’s statutory scheme was overbroad as a method of achieving this
very important state interest.503 Lastly, the Court noted that “the
establishment of prompt, efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state
ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional
adjudication.”504 At the same time, the Court emphasized that Stanley’s
interests in obtaining an individualized hearing of his parental fitness
outweighed Illinois’s interest in not doing so because “the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.”505 In conclusion, the
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
guaranteed Stanley an individualized hearing on his fitness as a parent
before Illinois could destroy his custodial rights to his children.506 In
addition, the Court held that Illinois’s statutory scheme also violated
Stanley’s equal protection rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
because Illinois provides hearings to all other parents besides unwed
fathers.507
At issue in Santosky was a New York statute which permitted an
individual’s parental rights to be permanently terminated on the basis of a
preponderance of evidence that he or she had “permanently neglected” his
498. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 654–55 (“[S]ome [unwed fathers] are wholly suited to have
custody of their children. This much the State readily concedes, and nothing in this record
indicates that Stanley is or has been a neglectful father who has not cared for his children.”)
499. Id. at 652 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 37, s 701-2).
500. Id. at 656.
501. Id. at 652.
502. Id. at 655.
503. Id. at 656–58.
504. Id. at 656.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 657–58.
507. Id. at 658.
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or her child.508 In this case, in 1973, the Ulster County Child Welfare
Department (Department), had first temporarily removed Tina Santosky
from the custody of Annie and John Santosky II, her natural parents, and
placed Tina with a foster family on the ground that the Santoskys had
“neglected” her.509 Then, approximately ten months later, in 1974, Tina’s
younger brothers, John III and Jed, were removed from the Santoskys’
custody and placed in foster homes for the same reason.510 Although the
Santoskys’ children were removed from their parents’ care due to
“neglect,” Tina and John III had suffered a number of physical injuries in
the Santosky home.511 Finally, in 1978, the Department had petitioned the
Ulster County Family Court to permanently terminate the Santoskys’
custodial rights to Tina, John III, and Jed, on the ground that the Santoskys
had “permanently neglected” all of them.512 The Department’s apparent
motivation in seeking to terminate the Santoskys’ parental rights was to
permit the Santoskys’ children to be adopted by parties who would provide
them with a stable home.513
At the “permanent neglect” hearing, New York law required the
Department to prove two main points. First, with respect to each child, it
was required to prove “that for more than a year after the child entered state
custody, the [Department] . . . ‘made diligent efforts to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship.’”514 Second, with respect to each
child, it was required to prove that the Santoskys “failed ‘substantially and
continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact with or plan for the future of
the child although physically and financially able to do so.’”515 At this
hearing, the Santoskys challenged the constitutionality of the
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.516 The family court judge
rejected this claim and proceeded to find, based on a preponderance of the
evidence, that the Department had proven that the Santoskys had
permanently neglected their children.517 At a subsequent dispositional
hearing, the Family Court judge granted the Department’s petition to
508. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748–49 (1982).
509. Id. at 752.
510. Id.
511. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 781–82, n. 10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) Tina had suffered
injuries in petitioners’ home including a fractured left femur, treated with a home-made
split; bruises on the upper arms, forehead, flank, and spine; and abrasions of the upper leg
. . . John Santosky III . . . was admitted to the hospital suffering malnutrition, bruises on the
eye and forehead, cuts on the foot, blisters on the hand, and multiple pin pricks on the back.
512. Id. at 748–52.
513. Id. at 748 (“stating that “if convinced that ‘positive, nurturing parent-child
relationships no longer exist,’ . . . the State may initiate ‘permanent neglect’ proceedings to
free the child for adoption.”).
514. Id. at 748 (citing New York Family Court Act §§ 614.1.(c), 611) (McKinney 1975
and Supp. 1981–1982) (hereinafter Fam. Ct. Act)).
515. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748–49 (citing Fam. Ct. Act § 614.1.(d)).
516. Id. at 751.
517. Id. at 751–52.
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permanently terminate the Santoskys’ parental rights, stating that the order
was in the best interests of the children.518
The Santoskys appealed this decision to the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, which affirmed the lower court’s ruling.519 The New
York Court of Appeals dismissed the Santoskys’ further appeal on the
ground that “no substantial constitutional question [was]
directly
involved.”520 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari521 and reversed
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals.522
In its opinion, the Court clarified that, in a case involving the
permanent termination of parental rights, a preponderance “standard
reflects the judgment that society is nearly neutral between erroneous
termination of parental rights and erroneous failure to terminate those
rights.”523 The Court then methodically considered each of the three
Eldridge factors. First, with respect to the private interest affected by the
challenged New York law, the Court stated that:
[w]hether the loss threatened by a particular type of proceeding is
sufficiently grave to warrant more than average certainty on the
part of the factfinder turns on both the nature of the private interest
threatened and the permanency of the threatened loss. . . . When
the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks
not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end
it. “If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique kind of
deprivation. . . . A parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of
the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a
commanding one.”524
Next, the Court considered the “risk of erroneous deprivation of private
interests resulting from use of a ‘fair preponderance’ standard.”525 On this
issue, the Court noted that, in a proceeding initiated by a state to
permanently terminate an individual’s parental rights, a number of factors
“combine to magnify the risk of erroneous factfinding.”526 For example,
the Court pointed out, when a state initiates a proceeding to permanently
terminate an individual’s parental rights, it typically can assemble a very
strong case against the individual, especially as it often has first placed the
child in question in protective custody and then supervised the parent’s

518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 752.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 747–48.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 758–59 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761.
Id. at 762.
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interactions with the child.527 The Court stated, “because the child is . . . in
agency custody, the State even has the power to shape the historical events
that form the basis for termination.”528 The Court also emphasized that a
state can initiate a permanent neglect proceeding against an individual an
infinite number of times and present additional proof at each succeeding
proceeding, while a parent whose custodial rights have been terminated
cannot later regain those rights even if the state agrees that he or she is a fit
parent at that time.529
Furthermore, the Court stated, such a proceeding “employ[s] imprecise
substantive standards that leave determinations unusually open to the
subjective values of the judge.”530 In addition, the Court noted, a
preponderance of evidence standard focuses on “the quantity, rather than
the quality, of the evidence.”531 Accordingly, under New York’s statutory
scheme, “a factfinder might decide to [deprive] an individual based solely
on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct [or] . . . idiosyncratic
behavior.”532 At the same time, the Court stated, a requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt at such hearings could be “an unreasonable
barrier to . . . efforts to free permanently neglected children for
adoption[,]”533 because much of the evidence considered at parental fitness
hearings consists of medical and psychiatric evidence and such evidence
does not lend itself to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.534
Considering the third Eldridge factor, the Court considered the
Government’s two interests in maintaining its preponderance of evidence
standard of proof in termination proceedings: New York’s parens patriae
interest in promoting the welfare of its minor children and its interest in
minimizing the expense and effort required of the state in permanent
termination proceedings.535 With respect to New York’s parens patriae
interest, the Court stated that a higher standard of proof in termination
proceedings actually promotes the state’s parens patriae interest because
terminating a parent’s parental rights can only promote the best interests of
the child if that parent is in fact an unfit parent.536 In addition, the Court

527. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763.
528. Id.
529. Id. at 764.
530. Id. at 762.
531. Id. at 764.
532. Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)).
533. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769.
534. Id. (“Like civil commitment hearings, termination proceedings often require the
factfinder to evaluate medical and psychiatric testimony, and to decide issues difficult to
prove to a level of absolute certainty, such as lack of parental motive, absence of affection
between parent and child, and failure of parental foresight and progress.”).
535. Id. at 766.
536. Id. at 767 (stating that “[a]t the factfinding, that goal [of providing the child with a
normal home] is served by procedures that promote an accurate determination of whether
the natural parents can and will provide a normal home”).
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asserted, the risk of an erroneous termination of a parent’s custodial rights
in New York was simply that the child would remain in the “uneasy status
quo” of the foster care system because the state cannot initiate a permanent
termination proceeding until the child has already been temporarily
removed from the parent’s custody on account of the parent’s neglect.537
With respect to New York’s interest in minimizing its expense and effort in
parental termination proceedings, the Court stated that requiring New York
family court judges to base their termination decisions on “clear and
convincing evidence,” rather than on a preponderance of evidence, would
not impose any measurable financial or administrative burden on New
York because these judges were required to apply the higher standard in
other proceedings and hence were familiar with it.538
Given that the state’s interests in avoiding an erroneous decision not to
terminate a parent’s rights were not nearly as strong as a parent’s interests
in avoiding an erroneous decision to terminate his or her rights, the Court
concluded that New York’s statutory scheme was inappropriate because a
preponderance of evidence standard of proof indicates that the
government’s interests and the private interests are essentially equal.539 In
conclusion, based on all of the above-mentioned factors, the Court held that
the termination of an individual’s parental rights satisfies the individual’s
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights only if the termination is
supported by “at least clear and convincing evidence.”540
In light of the above law, it’s possible that a state statute that would
deny child custody after an affirmative determination by a family court that
a party has mentally abused another in the past would not infringe the
accused party’s federal privacy rights. For many years, governments
justified their failure to treat domestic violence as a crime on their stated
desire not to intrude on the privacy of family relations inside the family
home.541 However, beginning in the 1970s, after feminist scholars and

537. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 765–66. As Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices White and
O’Conner) stated in his dissent, however, this aspect of the majority’s opinion appears
flawed. The risk of erroneous failure to terminate a parent’s custodial rights would include
“the risk of permanent injury to the child either by return of the child to an abusive home or
by the child’s continued lack of a permanent home.” Id. at 788–89, n. 13. In particular, in
this regard the majority appears to have ignored the fact that if the state fails to prove its
case in the permanent termination proceeding, under New York’s statutory scheme the
Santoskys could then request a review of the court’s earlier temporary removal order and a
reinstatement of their full custodial rights. Id. at 766, n. 16 (citing Fam. Ct. Act § 632(b)
(providing that “when State’s permanent neglect petition is dismissed for insufficient
evidence, judge retains jurisdiction to reconsider underlying orders of placement”).
538. Id. at 767–68.
539. Id. at 765.
540. Id. at 748.
541. See, e.g., Erin L. Han, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim
Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 160–61 (2003)
(“Traditionally, acts of violence in the home were largely ignored by law enforcement, who
viewed domestic violence as a ‘private’ matter, inappropriate for state intervention.”)
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victims’ rights advocates forcefully argued that governments’ reliance on
the right to privacy to justify nonintervention in domestic violence
incidents effectively granted individuals (typically males) the right to harm
their fellow family members (typically females) with impunity so long as
they did so within the family home, many jurisdictions took a more
affirmative law enforcement stance against domestic violence.542
Furthermore, it is now settled law that, when a victim of domestic violence
has requested or consented to police presence in a private residence, either
the victim has waived the perpetrator’s Fourth or Fifth Amendment privacy
rights or infringement of the perpetrator’s rights is outweighed by the right
of the victim to be free from harm.543 In sum, the general argument that
government intervention in incidents of domestic violence infringes the
privacy rights of the individuals involved has largely been refuted.544
With respect to the specific proposal made in this article that mental
abuse per se be included in the definition of domestic violence used in
contested child custody proceedings, it is important to keep in mind that a
contested child custody proceeding typically follows a divorce;
importantly, the divorce has already abolished the family unit and family
home to which the U.S. Constitution guarantees special privacy
protection.545 Moreover, most of the evidence offered in a child custody
(citations omitted); Emily J. Sack, From the Right of Chastisement to the Criminalization of
Domestic Violence: A Study in Resistance to Effective Policy Reform, 32 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 31, 34 (2010) [hereinafter Sack]. Ironically, for a time police personnel in the U.S.
were encouraged to refrain from interfering in ‘domestics’ on the ground that “preservation
of the family unit and promotion of domestic harmony required that the law not interfere in
spousal relations.” Id.
542. Sack, supra note 541, at 32–33 (“It was the women’s movement of the 1970s that
brought attention to the prevalence of domestic violence, and which initiated reforms in civil
and criminal justice policy to address such violence.”).
543. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115–19 (2006) (“We have . . . lived our whole
national history with an understanding of ‘the ancient adage that a man’s home is his castle
. . .’ [but] ‘where the defendant has victimized the third-party . . . the emergency nature of
the situation is such that the third-party consent should validate a warrantless search despite
defendant’s objections.’’’) (citations omitted.) In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that if police possess probable cause to believe that physical harm to a person inside a
private residence is imminent (e.g., based on neighbors’ complaints to police as well and/or
audible sounds emanating from that residence), any infringement to the residents’ Fourth
and Fifth Amendment privacy rights are outweighed by the government’s legitimate desire
to prevent harm to that person and stop a crime in progress. United States v. Hendrix, 595
F.2d 883, 885–86 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding that if the consent of the threatened
co-occupant did not justify a warrantless search, the police entry nevertheless was allowable
on exigent-circumstances grounds) (cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Randolph, 547 U.S.
at 119).
544. See, e.g., Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or
Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1144–45 (1994); but see
JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS
TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 36, 39, 45, 53 (2009).
545. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“[The Fourth and Fifth
Amendments] apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the
sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life”) (quoted with approval in Griswold v.
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proceeding in support of an allegation that one of the parties has committed
mental abuse in the past consists of the testimony of one or more
participant(s) in a domestic event in which the accused likewise was a
participant.546 The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that disclosure
of information regarding an event by a participant in that event does not
infringe the privacy rights of any other participant.547 This is because none
of the participants possess a reasonable expectation that a fellow participant

Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut statute that forbade the
use of contraceptives violates the right to marital privacy guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution)); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (stating that “[t]he integrity of
the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, . . . the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . and the
Ninth Amendment”).
For example, it is for this reason that the spousal testimonial
privilege is abolished upon the couple’s divorce (Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6
(1954)) and neither the spousal testimonial privilege nor the spousal communications
privilege is available in a civil action, including a divorce proceeding, between spouses (see,
e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §972(a) (exception to testimonial privilege); Manela v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles, 177 Cal. App. 4th 1139, 1147 (2009) (exception to confidential
communications privilege provided in CAL. EVID. CODE §984(a) encompasses divorce
proceeding)) or a criminal prosecution of one spouse for a crime (including domestic
violence) committed against the other spouse (see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §972(e)(1))
(exception to spousal testimonial privilege); CAL. EVID. CODE §985(a) (exception to spousal
confidential communications privilege).
546. As psychological abuse leaves no visible scars, psychological abusers tend to deny
their abuse, and most types of domestic abuse, including mental abuse, takes place outside
the public arena, evidence in mental abuse cases necessarily consists primarily of the
testimony of the parties to various domestic events. Peter Allen, Shouting at Your Wife May
Get You a Criminal Record in France, DAILY MAIL, Sept. 1, 2012, http://dailymail.
co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1240770/France-introduce-new-law-banning-psychologicalviolence-marriages.html. (emphasizing that psychological abuse leaves no scars, which
makes it exceedingly difficult to prove that it has occurred); Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at
284 (explaining that one of the nonviolent control tactics which intimate partners often
employ is denying their abuse); Violence and Abuse, Plymouth City Council, (Sept. 2,
2012), available at http://www.plymouth.gov.uk/domestic_violence_and_abuse-2.pdf.
(“Much of the abuse takes place in private, behind closed doors); see also AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Incorporating Domestic Violence
Legal Issues into Law School Curricula, in WHEN WILL THEY EVER LEARN? EDUCATING TO
END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A LAW SCHOOL REPORT, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov
/ovc/publications/infores/etedv/incorp.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2009) (reporting that, “[i]n
domestic violence cases, complex issues often arise regarding the credibility of
witnesses[.]”).
547. U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (interpreting Title III of the Federal
Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510–2522) and stating that “[f]or constitutional purposes, no different result is required
if . . . [a participant] instead of immediately reporting and transcribing his conversations . . .
either (1) simultaneously records them . . . (2) or . . . simultaneously transmits [them]”); see
also Rathbun v. U.S., 355 U.S. 107 (1957) (“We need not say that a man may never make a
record of what he hears on the telephone by having someone else listen . . . as in the case at
bar, even by allowing him to interpose a recording machine.”); Carol M. Bast, Conflict of
Law and Surreptitious Taping of Telephone Conversations, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 147, 148
(2009–2010) [[hereinafter Bast].
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to the event will not divulge information regarding the event to one or more
nonparticipants.548
The Court has specifically held that admission into evidence of a
surreptitious recording of an event made by a participant does not infringe
upon the federal privacy rights of any other participant to that event,549
concluding that no participant in such an event possesses a reasonable
expectation that another participant will not record it.550 Therefore, even if
a state’s inclusion of mental abuse per se in its definition of domestic
violence were to encourage people to make surreptitious recordings of
domestic events for use in a potential custody dispute in the future, such
recordings do not infringe the federal privacy rights of any of the
participants to such events.551 In addition, forty-one of the fifty states
(referred to as “one-party consent states”) agree that a participant to an
event who surreptitiously records the event does not violate his or her
fellow participants’ privacy rights.552 The remaining states (referred to as
“two-party consent states”) generally prohibit surreptitious recordings
unless all of the participants have agreed to the recording553 and provide
548. See, e.g., John H. Case, Gilbert B. Feibleman & Mark Gruber, Electronic
Eavesdropping and Wiretapping: How 20th Century Technology Can Cause 21st Century
Headaches for You and Your Client, 82 (2004), available at http://www.feiblemancase.com/
documents/2004_wiretapping_updated.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Case].
549. White, 401 U.S. at 751.
550. Abraham Abramovsky, Surreptitious Record of Witnesses in Criminal Cases: A
Quest for Truth or a Violation of Law and Ethics?, 57 TULANE L. REV. 1, 9, 34 (1982); see
also New York City Bar Ass’n, Formal Opinion 2003-02 http://www2.nycbar.org/
Publications/reports/show_html_new.php?rid=122 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“even
though recording of a conversation without disclosure may to many people ‘offend a sense
of honor and fair play,’ it is questionable whether anyone today justifiably relies on an
expectation that a conversation is not being recorded by the other party, absent a special
relationship with or conduct by that party inducing a belief that the conversation will not be
recorded”).
551. White, 401 U.S. at 751.
552. Bast, supra note 547, at 148 (noting that four-fifths of the states agree with the
federal government on this point); see also Richard Turkington, Protection for Invasions of
Conversational and Communication Privacy by Electronic Surveillance in Family,
Marriage, and Domestic Disputes Under Federal and State Wiretap and Store
Communications Acts and the Common Law Privacy Intrusion Tort, 82 NEB. L. REV. 693,
708 (2004) (stating that the Federal Wiretap Act “is mirrored in most state wiretap statutes”)
[hereinafter Turkington].
553. Bast, supra note 547, at 148; see also Lane v. Allstate Insurance Co., 969 P.2d 938
(Nev. 1998) (interpreting Nevada’s wiretap statute, which on its face appears to permit
surreptitious recordings by participants, as requiring the consent of all parties to the
recordings). Note, however, that even most two-party consent states exempt certain events,
such as crimes and other dangerous events. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 633.5 (West
2010) (clarifying that “[n]othing in Sections 631, 632 prohibits one party to a confidential
communication from recording the communication for the purposes of obtaining evidence
reasonably believed to relate to the commission by another party to the communication of
the crime of extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any felony involving violence . . . [and nothing]
renders any evidence so obtained inadmissible . . . .”); Lee Ashley Smith, The Admissibility
of Tape Recordings in Criminal Trials Involving Domestic Disputes: California’s
Proposition 8 and Title III of the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 15
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criminal and/or civil penalties for violations of this prohibition,554 with
some such states mandating that such a surreptitious recording is
inadmissible in any court proceeding.555 Therefore, it is unlikely that a
two-party consent state’s inclusion of mental abuse in its definition of
domestic violence would encourage its residents to make surreptitious
recordings of domestic events. Finally, note that most state courts have
also held that one parent’s surreptitious recording of the interaction
between her child and other parent does not violate the privacy rights of
either her child or the other parent.556 For all of these reasons, a state’s
inclusion of mental abuse in its definition of domestic violence is highly
unlikely to infringe its citizens’ federal or state privacy rights.
On the other hand, a state law authorizing a court’s denial of child
custody to a party who had committed mental abuse per se in the past
unquestionably would infringe that person’s First Amendment free speech,
given that verbal abuse is a form of mental abuse.557 Furthermore, such a
state law would infringe that party’s parental rights if he or she also were
that child’s biological parent. As both free speech rights and parental rights
are fundamental rights guaranteed to every U.S. citizen by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Stanley558 and Santosky559 taught that,

HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 217, 227–28 (2004) (noting that the Victim’s Bill of Rights,
otherwise known as Proposition 8, an initiative approved by California voters in 1982,
effectively mandates that any recording obtained in violation of California’s two-party rule
be admitted into evidence “in criminal trials subject only to federal exclusionary rules”).
Therefore, certain surreptitious recordings of mental abuse do not even violate the privacy
laws of two-party consent states.
554. Case, supra note 548, at 22–23.
555. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (2012); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1 to 5/14-6;
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-40.
556. See, e.g., Turkington, supra note 552, at 708–16 (citing Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149,
154 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding parent’s recording based on rationale that doing so intrudes
on the parties’ privacy rights no more than a parent’s eavesdropping on a child’s
conversation via a home phone line extension (the “extension rationale”))); Newcomb v.
Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536, (10th Cir. 1991) (allowing parent’s recording based on
extension rationale); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977)
(allowing all intra-family recordings pursuant to the since discredited “intra-family dispute
exception rationale”); Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d 744, 748 (10th Cir. 1992) (under
Federal Wiretapping Act, allowing custodial parent to vicariously consent to recording a
phone conversation with a third party so long as s/he has a reasonable belief that the
recording is in the best interest of the child (“vicarious consent doctrine”)); Pollock v.
Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1998) (under Federal Wiretapping Act, allowing
parent’s recording based on vicarious consent rationale); Campbell v. Price, 2 F.Supp. 2d
1186, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (under state wiretapping statutes, allowing parent’s recording
based on a vicarious consent doctrine); Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)
(same); State v. Diaz, 706 A.2d 264, 270 (N.J. Super. App. Ct. Div. 1998) (same); W. Va.
Dep’t of Health & Human Res. ex rel Wright v. David L., 453 S.E.2d 646, 654 (W. Va.
1994) (under both the Federal Wiretapping Act and state wiretapping statutes, allowing
parent’s recording based on vicarious consent doctrine, while holding those provisions
inapplicable to the facts of the case itself).
557. See supra text accompanying notes 59–61.
558. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 645 (1972).
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if the constitutionality of such a state law were challenged, the courts
would subject it to strict scrutiny; and any such law would survive such
scrutiny only if it satisfied the test established by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Mathews v. Eldridge.560 Again, Eldridge requires that, in order to satisfy
the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process
guarantee, the law would have to guarantee each parent in a child custody
proceeding the level of procedural due process dictated by the application
of the following three factors: “the private interests affected by the
proceeding; the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and
the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged
procedure.”561
As the discussion of the holdings in Stanley and Santosky make clear,
the private interests affected by a state’s denial of a parent’s child custodial
rights are quite significant.562 In addition, the great significance of these
private interests increases the risk that a family court will make an
erroneous finding on the issue of a parent’s past mental abuse.563 At the
same time, in a typical child custody proceeding, a family court is not
deciding whether to permanently terminate either parent’s custodial
rights,564 and in both Stanley and Santosky, the complainant was
challenging a law that could result in the permanent termination of his
559. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 745 (1982).
560. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
561. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754; Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
562. As the Court in Santosky stated, “Lassiter declared it ‘plain beyond the need for
multiple citation’ that a natural parent’s ‘desire for, and right to, the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children’ is an interest far more precious than any
property right.” 455 U.S. at 758 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27
(1981) (in turn quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651)).
563. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761–66.
564. In the great majority of child custody cases (typically initiated following a divorce), a
family court does not permanently terminate either parent’s custodial rights but rather only
determines the legal and physical custodial arrangement that will best promote the best
interests of the child at that point in time. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 25-411(A)(2007) (At any time
after one year has expired from the date of the previous custody order, a person may make a
motion to modify a custody order.) One could argue that the distinction between a family
court’s temporary denial of child custody to a parent based on a finding of his or her past
mental abuse and the permanent termination of a parent’s custodial rights is more illusory
than real, given that family courts try to promote a stable living environment for a child and,
to that end, are generally reluctant to modify a custody order. In fact, the family courts in
some states are only permitted to amend a custody order if the moving party can establish
that the child’s circumstances have changed significantly. See, e.g., R.S.W. § 26.50.130 (In
Washington State, a court will also consider a petition for modification of a custody order
“if there is reason to believe the child’s present environment may seriously endanger the
child’s physical, mental, moral or emotional health.”) In general, a parent awarded joint
custody may petition the court for modification of the order based on the failure of the other
parent to comply with the provisions of the order any time after six months have expired
from the date of the previous joint custody order, except that a parent may always petition
the court for modification of the previous joint custody order on the basis of evidence that
domestic violence involving a violation of section 13-1201 or 13-1204, spousal abuse, or
child abuse occurred since the entry of the joint custody order).
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parental rights.565 Certainly, a parent who was denied custody of his or her
child on account of his or her past mental abuse could find it very difficult
to reacquire his or her custodial rights, especially in a state that recognizes
a rebuttable presumption that the child’s best interests would not be
promoted by the court’s grant of custodial rights to that parent. Still, he or
she possesses at least a chance of obtaining custody of his or her child until
his or her custodial rights are permanently terminated. Therefore, on
balance, a court likely would conclude that the private interests in this case
are exceedingly important, but they are not as important as the private
interests were in Stanley and Santosky.
Without question, a state law intended to prevent minor children from
being exposed to mental abuse promotes a compelling parens patriae
interest of the state. The psychological (or trauma) theory of domestic
violence reveals that it is the internal trauma from which an abuser is
suffering that causes him/her to abuse others; accordingly, a parent who has
committed mental abuse in the past presents a real threat of subjecting or
exposing his or her child to such abuse in the future.566 Moreover, even
children who merely witness a parent’s mental abuse can suffer very severe
mental and/or physical injuries, including the failure to develop an
autonomous personality.567 In contrast, the Court in Santosky pointed out
the only risk to the children of the court’s failure to terminate their father’s
custodial rights was that they would be returned to the foster care system
(not to their possibly abusive father).568 Here, a state possesses yet another
compelling reason to ensure that young children are not exposed to a
parent’s mental abuse, which is that the psychological theory of domestic
violence teaches that such children are more likely to abuse others as adults
and thereby perpetuate the cycle of domestic violence.569
As the Court in Santosky noted, a state does not possess a parens
patriae interest in denying a parent custody of his or her child until the
state has in fact established that the parent is unfit.570 Still, in this case, in
determining the level of proof required to prove that a parent has been
mentally abusive, courts should consider the fact that this type of abuse
does not leave visible scars and as a result is particularly difficult to prove.
Finally, in child custody cases, most family courts around the country
are required to consider any child abuse that a party committed in the
past,571 and furthermore, most states include “mental abuse” in their
definition of child abuse.572 States just do not treat mental abuse as
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–49; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646–49.
JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 8, 26; Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 284.
See supra text accompanying notes 105–06, 110–15, 172–75, 279–309.
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769–70.
DUTTON, supra note 215.
Santosky, 405 U.S. at 766–67.
ABACDV, supra note 351.
See supra note 448.
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“domestic violence,”573 probably because approximately one half of the
states mandate that a finding of past domestic violence triggers the
rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a party with a history
of domestic violence.574
The great majority of family courts around the country have had a fair
amount of experience reviewing mental abuse claims in child custody
proceedings, which is helpful for two reasons. First, this fact would
decrease a state’s cost of implementing a new definition of domestic
violence, at least in child custody cases. More importantly, family courts’
long experience in handling mental abuse claims suggests that their rate of
erroneous findings of past mental abuse should already be low.
In light of the competing interests described, if a parent were to
challenge a state law denying his or her child custody rights based on a
finding of his or her past mental abuse, the U.S. Supreme Court most likely
would hold that the law must afford any such parent an individualized
hearing on the issue. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not require a state to hold a
formal hearing before it infringes a fundamental liberty interest of an
individual.575 However, it does require a state to provide such an individual
with some opportunity to be heard and confront the witnesses and evidence
against him or her.576
In all likelihood, the Court would hold that the proper standard of proof
at such a hearing would be a preponderance of the evidence. Adoption of a
“clear and convincing” or “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof
most likely would exclude many meritorious claims and thereby endanger
the population, but a “substantial evidence” burden of proof certainly
would not be sufficiently protective of an accused parent’s interests. There
is an enormous evidentiary obstacle for a party attempting to prove
another’s past mental abuse, the great harm a child can suffer at the behest
of a mental abuser, and the ever-continuing cycle of trauma begetting
trauma balanced against the extremely valuable liberty interest of a parent
to enjoy the company of his or her child and raise that child as he or she
sees fit. The Court in Santosky held that a “clear and convincing” standard
was appropriate in that case, but there the interest of the father in avoiding
the permanent termination of his parental rights was much higher than an
accused parent in this case.577 Furthermore, there the risk of harm to which
the children were exposed by the state’s failure to terminate the father’s
custodial rights was much lower than when a custody court is considering

573.
574.
575.
576.
577.

ABACDV, supra note 351.
Id.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
Id. at 264.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982).
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whether to temporarily deny custody of a child to a party on account of that
party’s past domestic violence.
This article recommends that all family courts recognize a rebuttable
presumption against awarding sole or joint custody to a party who has
committed mental abuse in the past. However, given that such a
presumption increases the risk of a family court reaching an erroneous
finding that a party committed verbal abuse in the past, this article likewise
recommends that any state which recognizes such a presumption 1) ensure
that the presumption be rebutted with proof no greater than a
preponderance of the evidence and 2) specify with particularity the types of
evidence which could rebut the presumption, either initially or later in a
modification heading (as some states’ custody laws already do). Officials
in states should be free to decide what evidence they find credible on the
issue of the parent’s parental fitness, but provision of a clear roadmap
toward reunification of child and parent, at least over time, would seem to
greatly reduce the incidence of erroneous abuse findings and thereby fortify
the statute against constitutional attack.
Last but not least, a state could further reduce its incidence of
erroneous abuse findings by providing a clear and comprehensive
definition of mental abuse in its child custody law. Such a definition
should provide that mental abuse (1) is a course of conduct or series of
events (2) which has no legitimate purpose and (3) which the perpetrator
knows or should know could traumatize his intended victim and any other
witness to his abuse in his household. If a state incorporated such a
definition of mental abuse into its custody laws, then no one could be
denied custody of a child “based solely on a few isolated instances of
unusual conduct [or] . . . idiosyncratic behavior.”578 As the court in
Santosky feared could happen as a result of the statute challenged in that
case.579 Such a definition would be especially helpful if it included a list of
specific behaviors, which, if repeated, would constitute mental abuse.
In the next section of this article, U.S. anti-bullying statutes,580 U.S.
anti-hazing statutes,581 and the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment582 (CAT) are
reviewed for any guidance they may be able to provide regarding legal
proscriptions against mental abuse. Each of these schemes is similar to a

578. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)).
579. Id.
580. See infra text accompanying notes 583–613.
581. See infra text accompanying notes 614–35.
582. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 93rd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/39151 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT]. This followed the General Assembly’s
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, Annex, U.N.
GAOR, 30th Sess., 2433 plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 9, 1975).

WRIGHT MACRO 4.10 430 (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2013]

TORTURE AT HOME

4/10/2013 6:05 PM

551

proscription against mental abuse in domestic relations because they
prohibit mental abuse that flourishes on account of the ongoing contact
between perpetrator and victim, in a particular setting—a school, a social
organization, or a correctional institution—that society in general
promotes.

VIII. REVIEW OF OTHER LEGAL SCHEMES REGULATING
MENTAL ABUSE
A. PROHIBITIONS AGAINST BULLYING583
Montana is the only state that does not have a law targeting school
bullying,584 and many states enacted anti-bullying legislation within just the
last few years.585 In May 2010, Massachusetts enacted what its legislators
claim “is the most comprehensive and best piece of anti-bullying
legislation in the country.”586 It prohibits bullying on school grounds,
school buses, or school-sponsored activities.587 It defines “bullying” as:

583. For a good discussion of several such statutes, see Susan Hanley Kosse, Robert H.
Wright, How Best to Confront the Bully: Should Title IX or Anti-Bullying Statutes be the
Answer?, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 53, 62–69 (2005) [hereinafter Kosse & Wright].
584. Dena T. Sacco et al., An Overview of State Anti-Bullying Legislation and Other
Related Laws, KINDER & BRAVER WORLD PROJECT, 3, n. 2 (Feb. 23, 2012)
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/State_Anti_bullying_Legislati
on_Overview_0.pdf (stating that “[a]s of January 2012, 48 states had enacted legislation
requiring school districts to adopt policies regarding bullying” and “South Carolina and
Montana do not have anti-bullying bills as addressed in this document, nor does the District
of Columbia”) [hereinafter Sacco] (citing, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ANALYSIS OF STATE
BULLYING LAWS AND POLICIES XI (2011), http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/bullying/statebullying-laws/state-bullying-laws.pdf (reporting that, as of April 2011, forty-six states had
enacted anti-bullying legislation) [hereinafter DOE REPORT]); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 1332-14-12-13-32-19 (2012); Youth Bullying Prevention Act of 2012 , D.C. Act 19-11
(2012), http://dcclims1. dccouncil.us/images/00001/20120510093523.pdf; see also Sameer
Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws, Cyberbullying Laws, THE CYBER
BULLYING RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 2012), http://www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying_and
_Cyberbullying_Laws.pdf; Ross Brenneman, Another Good Reason to Stop Bullying:
Paperwork, Rules for Engagement (Oct. 19, 2012 5:07 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/ed
week/rulesforengagement/2012/10/bullying_causes_a_lot_of_paperwork_so_please_just_st
op.html?qs=ross+brenneman; Rules for Engagement: A look at school culture & student
well-being (Oct. 2012) http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/ rulesforengangement/2012/10
(noting that “[e]very state but Montana has a bullying law of some kind”).
585. Jennifer Dounay, State Anti-Bullying Statutes, EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE
STATES, http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/60/41/6041.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013)
(reporting that, by April 2005, only seventeen states and Guam had enacted anti-bullying
statutes).
586. Jessica Van Sack & Joe Dwinell, Senate and House Pass Anti-Bullying Bill,
BOSTONHERALD.COM, Apr. 29, 2010, http://bostonherald.com/news_opinion/local_politics/
2010/05/gov_deval_patrick_signs_anti_bully_bill; Hillary Chabot, Gov. Deval Patrick Signs
Anti-Bully Bill, BOSTONHERALD.COM, May 4, 2010, http://news.bostonherald.com/news/
politics/view.bg?articleid=1252208.
587. S. No. 2404, 186th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/
legis/bills/senate/186/st02pdf/st02404.pdf.
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The repeated use by one or more students of a written, verbal or
electronic expression or a physical act or gesture or any
combination thereof, directed at a victim that (i) causes physical or
emotional harm to the victim or damage to the victim’s property;
(ii) places the victim in reasonable fear of harm to himself or of
damage to his property; (iii) creates a hostile environment at school
for the victim; (iv) infringes on the rights of the victim at school; or
(v) materially and substantially disrupts the education process or
the orderly operation of a school. . . . [B]ullying shall include
cyber-bullying.588
The legislation requires school employees to report suspected bullying
to the principal. It requires principals to investigate such reports, convey
the results of their investigations to the parents of the alleged victim(s) and
the alleged bull(ies), and take disciplinary action.589 All public and private
schools are required to offer an anti-bullying curriculum, school officials
are mandated to obtain special training so they can recognize bullying, and
students are required to receive education in bullying every year.590 In
another example of states taking action against bullying, Alabama enacted
a law in 2009 that makes it illegal for students to “engage in harassment,
intimidation, violence, or threats of violence on school property, on a
school bus, or at any school-sponsored function,”591 and it requires each
school to develop policies designed to encourage students to report such
behavior.592
State legislatures have enacted anti-bullying statutes because of the
serious physical and mental harm that victims of bullying suffer as well as
the tremendous harm that society suffers on account of bullying.593 The
various definitions of bullying adopted by state legislatures and boards of
education also recognize that bullying is characterized by the bully’s intent
to control the victim.594 These laws give credence to a bully’s desire to
reduce the victim to a state of severe emotional upset, so that he or she is
then empowered to inflict even greater harm on, and exert even greater
control over, the victim.595 In other words, these laws acknowledge that
bullying is a system of domination that is self-perpetuating, which, like

588. Mass. S. Res. 2404.
589. Id.
590. Id.
591. ALA. CODE § 16-28B-4 (West 2009).
592. Id.
593. See, e.g., DOE REPORT, supra note 584, at ix.
594. Kosse & Wright, supra note 583, at 54, n.3.
595. See, e.g., Mark Dombeck, The Long Term Effects of Bullying, American Academy of
Experts in Traumatic Stress, aaes.org, 2012, http://www.aaets.org/article204.htm
[hereinafter Dombeck]; Angela Oswalt, Bullying and Peer Abuse, SEVEN COUNTIES,
http://www.sevencounties.org/poc/view_doc.php?type=doc&id=38393&cn=1262
[hereinafter Oswalt].
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torture, hazing, and domestic violence, is a form of abuse that erodes the
victim’s autonomy and ability to resist the bully’s domination over time.596
While some statutes leave the definition of bullying to the state board
of education or individual school districts, a number of statutes contain a
definition of bullying.597 Some anti-bullying laws focus more on the
bully’s intentions, some focus more on the reasonableness of the
perpetrator’s actions, some emphasize the effect of the perpetrator’s acts on
the victim, others, and/or the educational process, and some consider
multiple factors.598
Colorado’s anti-bullying statute, for example, emphasizes the bully’s
intentions. It provides that bullying is: “any written or verbal expression,
or physical act or gesture, or a pattern thereof, that is intended to cause
distress upon one or more students in the school.”599 Similarly,
Connecticut’s anti-bullying statute focuses on the bully’s intentions and
defines bullying as:
[A]ny overt acts by a student or group of students directed against
another student with the intent to ridicule, humiliate or intimidate
the other student while on school grounds, at a school-sponsored
activity or on a school bus, which acts are committed more than
once against any student during the school year.600
Washington’s statute emphasizes the effect of the perpetrator’s acts on
the victim and/or others. It provides that:
“Harassment, intimidation, or bullying” means any intentional
electronic, written, verbal or physical act, including but not limited
to one shown to be motivated by any characteristic in RCW
9A.36.080(3), or other distinguishing characteristics, when the
intentional electronic, written, verbal, or physical act:
(a) Physically harms a student or damages the student’s property;
or
(b) Has the effect of substantially interfering with a student’s
education; or
(c) Is so severe, persistent, or pervasive that it creates an
intimidating or threating educational environmental;

596.
597.
598.
599.
600.

Dombeck, supra note 595; Oswalt, supra note 595.
DOE REPORT, supra note 584, at 25.
Kosse & Wright, supra note 583, at 62–64; Sacco, supra note 584, at 4.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1(1)(b)(2012).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d (West 2011).
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(d) Has the effect of substantially disrupting the orderly operation
of the school.601
Likewise, Florida’s anti-bullying statute602 provides that “each school
district shall adopt a policy prohibiting bullying and harassment”603 and
shall define these activities “in a manner that is no less inclusive”604 than
the following definitions:
(a) ”Bullying” means systematically and chronically inflicting
physical hurt or psychological distress on one or more students and
may involve:
1. Teasing;
2. Social exclusion;
3. Threat;
4. Intimidation;
5. Stalking;
6. Physical violence;
7. Theft;
8. Sexual, religious, or racial harassment;
9. Public humiliation; or
10. Destruction of property.605
and
(b) ”Harassment” means any threatening, insulting, or
dehumanizing gesture, use of data or computer software, or
written, verbal, or physical conduct directed against a student or
school employee that:
1. Places a student or school employee in reasonable fear of harm
to his or her person or damage to his or her property;

601. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285(2) (West Supp. 2010). See also OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 339.351(1) (West Supp. 2009) (Bullying is “any act that substantially
interferes with a student’s educational benefits, opportunities or performance, that takes
place on or immediately adjacent to school grounds, at any school-sponsored activity, on
school-provided transportation or at any official school bus stop, and that has the effect of:
(a) Physically harming a student or damaging a student’s property; (b) Knowingly placing a
student in reasonable fear of physical harm to the student or damage to the student’s
property; or (c) Creating a hostile educational environment.”).
602. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2009).
603. Id. § 1006.147(4).
604. Id. § 1006.147(4)(b).
605. Id. § 1006.147(3)(a).
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2. Has the effect of substantially interfering with a student’s
education performance, opportunities, or benefits; or
3. Has the effect of substantially disrupting the orderly operation of
a school.606
Finally, Michigan and Louisiana’s anti-bullying laws are good
examples of statutes that focus on the reasonableness of the perpetrator’s
actions. Michigan’s law provides that “[b]ullying means any written,
verbal, or physical act, or any electronic communication, that is intended or
that a reasonable person would know is likely to harm 1 [sic] or more
pupils . . . .”607 Louisiana’s law states that:
The terms ‘harassment’, ‘intimidation’, and ‘bullying’ shall mean
any intentional gesture or written, verbal, or physical act that:
(a) a reasonable person under the circumstances should know will
have the effect of harming a student or damaging his property or
placing a student in reasonable fear of harm to his life or person or
damage to his property; and
(b) Is so severe, persistent, or pervasive that it creates an
intimidating, threatening, or abusive educational environment for a
student.608
Significantly, these statutory definitions of “bullying” do not
distinguish between the bully’s infliction of physical harm and the bully’s
infliction of mental harm except to suggest that the bully’s main intent is to
cause the victim mental pain.609 A bully’s infliction or threat of physical
harm or property damage in order to create emotional upset in his or her
victim is consistent with the modus operandi of an intimate terrorist or
torturer.610 The examples of proscribed behaviors provided in the various
state anti-bullying statutes help provide clarity. Furthermore, these statutes
reveal that a bully is able to cause his or her victim mental pain through the
infliction or threat of physical injury, mental injury, or property damage, or
a course of conduct that creates a hostile, intimidating environment for the
victim.611 Of course, it is the ongoing connection between abuser and
victim that affords the abuser—here, referred to as the bully—the

606. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147(3)(b). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West.
Supp. 2009) (defining “harassment, intimidation or bullying” together).
607. MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 380.1310b(8)(b) (2011).
608. LA. REV. STAT. § 17:416.13. (2012).
609. See, e.g., DOE REPORT, supra note 584, at 131–46 (Appendix C); Bullying
Definitions in State Anti-Bullying Statutes, National School Boards Association (Feb.
2012), http://www.nsba.org/SchoolLaw/Issues/Safety/Definitions.pdf.
610. See supra Section III.A.1–2, and text accompanying notes 83–87, 101–15.
611. Supra note 609.
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opportunity to perpetuate a hostile, intimidating course of conduct.612
Finally, these anti-bullying statutes seem to require only a “reckless” or
“knowing” mens rea. This aligns with this article’s suggestion that a
definition of domestic violence should require that a perpetrator possess
only a “reckless” or “knowing” state of mind, given that most abusers tend
to deny, minimize, and rationalize their abuse and thereby make it difficult
for their victims to prove that they possessed the “specific intent” to harm
them.613 All of these aspects of anti-bullying statutes suggest useful
components of a psychologically sound definition of domestic violence.
B. PROHIBITIONS AGAINST HAZING
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “hazing” as “[t]he practice of
physically or emotionally abusing newcomers to an organization as a
means of initiation.”614 Hazing is common in a wide variety of
organizations, including gangs, organized crime syndicates, the military,
athletic teams, private clubs, and school organizations.615 The essential
element of hazing is an organization’s control over its individual members,
in particular its newest recruits.616 That is, “[t]he [hazing] process appears
to involve [behavior that is] self-destructing and re-constructing rather than
self-enhancing . . . [,]”617 and the serious harm that this process can cause to
individual victims as well as society in general has long been recognized.618
Forty-four states prohibit hazing today,619 typically providing that the
state can impose a civil fine, criminal sanction, or both on a person who

612. See, e.g., Randall Collins, The Inflation of Bullying: From Fagging to CyberEffervescent Scapegoating, SOCIOLOGICAL EYE (July 7, 2011), http://sociologicaleye.blogspot.fr/2011/07/inflation-of-bullying-from-fagging-to.html (stating that “[b]ullying
is not a single event but an ongoing relationship”; see also Brandl et al., supra note 115, at
40 (noting that, in “UI [Undue Influence], domestic violence, stalking, and sexual assault
cases, . . . [t ]he victim and exploiter are in an on-going relationship”).
613. See Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 424.
614. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 736 (8th ed. 2004).
615. HANK NUWER, THE HAZING READER passim (2004) (discussing hazing processes in
various contexts, including college sororities and fraternities, various military organizations,
and sports teams) [hereinafter NUWER].
616. Id. at 73.
617. Id. (citing John van Maanen, Doing New Things in Old Ways: The Chains of
Socialization, in COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ORGANIZATION: INSIGHTS FROM THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 211–47 (J. L. Bess ed., 1984)).
618. Julia Fisher, The Pain of Pledging: Hazing, THE CORNELL DAILY SUN, Feb. 4, 2010,
available at http://cornellsun.com/node/40541 (reviewing numerous examples of hazing
from as long ago as the 1800s and documenting the enormous emotional and physical injury
suffered by hazing victims).
619. Education
Commission
of
the
States,
State
Anti-Hazing
Laws,
http://www.ecs.org/html/document.asp?chouseid=4483 (last visited May 20, 2010) (citing
StopHazing.org, State Anti-Hazing Laws, http://www.stophazing.org/laws.html (last visited
May 10, 2010) (compiling the forty-four state anti-hazing statutes)); see also Kappa Alpha
Psi, Hazing Laws, http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.kappaalphapsi1911.com/resource/resmgr/
docs/state_hazing_laws.pdf (last visited Jan 2013).
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participates in a hazing event.620 In addition, some states permit a hazing
victim to recover civil damages from a responsible party.621 A few states’
anti-hazing statutes encompass all group initiation or pre-initiation
activities, but most anti-hazing statutes are specifically directed at school
groups.622
Only fifteen of the forty-four state anti-hazing statutes in effect limit
their definition of hazing to conduct that endangers a person’s physical
health.623 The remaining twenty-nine statutes either define hazing to
include conduct that endangers another person’s physical or mental health,
or include in their definition of hazing specific activities that could only
endanger a person’s mental health; these activities include forcing a person
to appear in public partially or totally nude, carry pornographic materials in
public, or commit a crime.624
Most of the anti-hazing statutes stipulate that the mens rea required for
a finding of hazing is recklessness,625 prohibiting willful or reckless hazing.
A few statutes proscribe willful or knowing hazing, and a few statutes
prohibit willful, knowing, or reckless hazing.626 Though some of these
statutes may not contain a definition of these mental states, in a legal
context, willful conduct is generally defined as conduct that “proceed[s]
from a conscious motion of will . . .”627 On the other hand, “[a]n individual
acts ‘knowingly’ when he acts with awareness of the nature of his
conduct,”628 and he acts recklessly when he “does not desire harmful
consequence but . . . foresees the possibility and consciously takes the

620. Id.
621. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 245.6(e) (2008).
622. Id. § 245.6(b) For example, Section 245.6 of the Penal Code of California (otherwise
known as “‘Matt’s Law’ in memory of Matthew William Carrington, who died on February
2, 2005, as a result of hazing”) defines hazing as: “[A]ny method of initiation or
preinitiation into a student organization or student body, whether or not the organization or
body is officially recognized by an educational institution, which is likely to cause serious
bodily injury to any former, current, or prospective student of any school, community
college, college, university, or other educational institution in this state. The term ‘hazing’
does not include customary athletic events or school-sanctioned events.”
623. See sources cited in supra note 619 (revealing that the anti-hazing statutes of only the
following states are so limited: California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Virginia, and Wisconsin).
624. See sources cited, supra note 619 (illustrating that the definition of hazing in
Michigan’s anti-hazing statute includes forcing another person to commit a crime and the
definition of hazing in Idaho and Oregon’s anti-hazing statutes includes forcing an
individual to appear in public partially or totally nude, forcing an individual to carry
pornographic materials in public, transporting and abandoning an individual, assigning an
individual to commit pranks on others, and (in Oregon) compelling a person to act as one’s
personal slave).
625. See supra note 619.
626. Id.
627. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1599 (6th ed. 1991).
628. Id. at 872.
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risk”629 or “does not care about the consequences of his or her actions.”630
Finally, none of the anti-hazing statutes provides that a victim’s consent
constitutes a defense to hazing, and thirteen of these statutes specifically
state that a victim’s consent does not provide a defense to hazing.631
For example, Massachusetts defines hazing as:
[A]ny conduct or method of initiation into any student
organization, whether on public or private property, which
willfully or recklessly endangers the physical or mental health of
any student or other person. Such conduct shall include whipping,
beating, branding, forced calisthenics, exposure to the weather,
forced consumption of any food, liquor, beverage, drug, or other
substance, or any other brutal treatment or forced physical activity
which is likely to adversely affect the physical health or safety of
any such student or other person, or which subjects such student or
other person to extreme mental stress, including extended
deprivation of sleep or rest or extended isolation.632
Similarly, Texas provides that hazing means:
[A]ny intentional, knowing, or reckless act occurring on or off the
campus of an educational institution, by one person alone or acting
with others, directed against a student, that endangers the mental or
physical health or safety of a student for the purpose of pledging,
being initiated into, affiliating with, holding office in, or
maintaining membership in any organization. The term includes:
(A) any type of physical brutality, such as whipping, beating,
striking, branding, electronic shocking, placing of a harmful
substance on the body, or similar activity;
(B) any type of physical activity, such as sleep deprivation,
exposure to the elements, confinement in a small space,
calisthenics, or other activity that subjects the student to an
unreasonable risk of harm or that adversely affects the mental or
physical health or safety of the student;
(C) any activity involving consumption of a food, liquid, alcoholic
beverage, liquor, drug, or other substance that subjects the student
to an unreasonable risk of harm or that adversely affects the mental
or physical health or safety of the student;
(D) any activity that intimidates or threatens the student with
ostracism, that subjects the student to extreme mental stress,
629.
630.
631.
632.

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1298 (8th ed. 2004).
Id. at 1299.
See supra note 619.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 17 (2008).
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shame, or humiliation, that adversely affects the mental health or
dignity of the student or discourages the student from entering or
remaining registered in an educational institution, or that may
reasonably be expected to cause a student to leave the organization
or the institution rather than submit to acts described in this
subdivision; and
(E) any activity that induces, causes, or requires the student to
perform a duty or task that involves a violation of the Penal
Code.633
The most important implication of the anti-hazing statutes with regard
to states’ legal regulation of domestic violence is that most state
legislatures have concluded that controlling another human by breaking his
or her independent will or spirit (the essential element of hazing) can be
effected either by endangering a person’s physical health or by endangering
his or her mental health. As an intimate terrorist’s goal is likewise to
completely control his victim,634 the state anti-hazing statutes provide
strong support for the adoption of a definition of domestic violence that
encompasses both physical harm and mental harm. The mens rea of
recklessness incorporated into most hazing definitions suggests that the
same mens rea should be included in a definition of domestic violence.
This is the case because perpetrators of both hazing and domestic violence
endanger their victims’ physical and mental harm, not for the purpose of
harming their victims, but for the purpose of controlling them. Given this,
in many cases a prosecutor could find it very difficult to establish that a
perpetrator of hazing or domestic violence willfully or knowingly
endangered his victim’s physical or mental health. Nonetheless, as a
perpetrator’s actions endanger his victim’s physical or mental health, the
perpetrator should be held accountable for his actions.
The fact that several anti-hazing statutes explicitly provide that a
victim’s consent cannot constitute a defense to hazing has important
ramifications in the domestic violence context. A number of courts and
legislatures have considered the effect of an autonomous adult’s consent to
hazing, and they have consistently concluded that “[c]onsent . . . certainly
should not be a bar to prosecution; intelligent consent cannot be a defense
when the public conscience and morals are shocked.”635 Such courts and

633. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.151 (Vernon 2006).
634. See supra text accompanying notes 85–87, 101.
635. People v. Lenti, 260 N.Y.S.2d 284, 287 (N.Y. County Ct. 1965); see also Vera
Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 165, 179 (discussing how the Model Penal Code § 2.11(2)(b) “recognize[s] consent as
a defense for the harmful conduct of the perpetrator and bodily injuries of the victim only
when those harms were ‘reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful
athletic contest or competitive sport . . . or other concerted activity not forbidden by law’”
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legislatures have reasoned that if a state considers endangering another
person’s physical or mental health to be immoral and therefore proscribes
such conduct in its criminal law, the fact that a person has consented to be
the victim of such conduct does not alter the immoral, and hence criminal,
nature of the perpetrator’s act.636
Similarly, a domestic violence victim’s choice to remain in a
relationship with his or her abuser should not constitute consent to abuse,
and, in any case, a victim’s consent to abuse should not vitiate or mitigate
the perpetrator’s abuse of the victim. As discussed above, an adult victim
may wish to maintain a relationship or home with an abuser for many
reasons unrelated to a desire to be abused. In addition, a minor who is
being abused by an adult in his or her household or who is forced to
witness another person’s abuse is typically unable to leave home and
support himself or herself and thereby avoid exposure the perpetrator’s
abuse. Moreover, endangering the physical or mental health of a family
member certainly is as morally offensive as hazing. For all of these
reasons, a definition of domestic violence should likewise include the
proviso that the appearance of consent by an adult or child victim is
irrelevant.
Finally, the examples of hazing provided in the various anti-hazing
statutes, such as those quoted above, help provide parameters for the
nebulous crime of hazing. This article suggests that the provision of
similar examples in a definition of domestic violence would help clarify the
often intangible, but nonetheless horrific, crime of domestic violence.
C. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
Whether in a “humanitarian” (international conflict) context or a
“human rights” (peacetime) context, the “prohibition against torture” is a
peremptory norm of international law and has acquired the status of jus
Such a principle is “accepted and recognized by the
cogens.637
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no

and stating that “[i]t is likely, although not specifically provided, that other harmful, hostile
activities, such as hazing, are . . . not covered by . . . [this provision]”).
636. Lenti, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 287. Some hazing experts have noted that the very nature of
hazing is that its victims are subject to the arbitrary whim of the perpetrator(s) and are
deprived of meaningful advance knowledge of, or control over, the details of their hazing.
NUWER, supra note 615, at 95. This would suggest that many hazing victims could not
provide informed consent to their hazing in any case. However, as People v. Lenti makes
clear, a victim’s consent to hazing is irrelevant regardless of whether such consent is both
voluntary and informed.
637. Louis-Philippe F. Rouillard, Misinterpreting the Prohibition of Torture Under
International Law: The Office Legal Counsel Memorandum, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 9, 17
(2005) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§§ 102, 702 (1987)) [hereinafter Rouillard].
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derogation is permitted[.]”638 For example, even “[a] treaty is void if, at the
time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law.”639 It is debatable whether the prohibition against cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment likewise is a jus cogens
principle,640 but it certainly constitutes customary international law and is
reflected in numerous international treaties.641 In 1984, the General
Assembly of the United Nations adopted the binding CAT,642 and, as of
November 19, 2012, 153 nations were parties to the treaty.643 The United
States signed the CAT on April 18, 1987,644 the Senate approved the treaty
on April 30, 1994,645 subject to certain rules, understandings, and
declarations646 and the U.S. Congress officially ratified the treaty on
638. Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the
Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 742 n.6 (2003) (quoting Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]).
639. Vienna Convention, supra note 638.
640. Rouillard, supra note 637, at 22.
641. THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 598–99 (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). “Customary international law results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987).
“Thus, for customary law the ‘best evidence’ is the proof of state practice, ordinarily by
reference to official documents and other indications of governmental action.” Id. § 103
cmt. a.
642. CAT, supra note 582.
643. Id.
644. Id.
645. Pub. L. 103-236, 506(a), 103rd Cong. 2d Sess. (Apr. 30, 1994).
646. U.S. reservations, declarations, understandings, Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily
ed., Oct. 27, 1990). These reservations, understandings and declarations (RUDs) primarily
concern the U.S.’ understanding that the definition of “mental torture” in the CAT includes
only “specifically intended . . . prolonged mental harm caused or resulting from (1) the
intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain and suffering; (2) the
administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the
personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will
imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or
application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly
the senses or personality.” Id. at II.(1)(a). The definition of “torture” in the Torture
Prevention Act of 1991, which provides a civil remedy against torture committed by a
foreigner on foreign soil, contains the same narrow definition of “mental pain or suffering.”
Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, at § 3 (1992). Furthermore, in its RUDs to its ratification of
the CAT, the U.S. limited its obligation to prevent other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment in territories under its control “only insofar as the term ‘cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ means the cruel, unusual and inhumane
treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States.” Id. at I(1). As conduct does not violate the Fifth
Amendment guarantee of due process of law unless it “shocks the conscience,” Rochin v.
Cal., 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (forced pumping of suspect’s stomach contents in order to
find drugs is unconstitutional because it “shocks the conscience”), it is unlikely that the U.S.
Supreme Court in the near future would consider mental torture that does not stem from a
threat of physical harm or the administration of mind-altering drugs to constitute cruel,
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October 21, 1994,647 subject to those rules, understandings, and
declarations.
The CAT supplemented rather than supplanted customary, nonwritten
international law prohibitions against torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, and the preamble to the CAT
references earlier treaty provisions prohibiting torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,648 including Article 55 of
the U.N. Charter,649 Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,650 and Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.651
The CAT defines “torture” as:
[a]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions.652
The CAT’s definition of “torture” greatly assists in the effort to
develop a workable definition of domestic violence. First, the definition
makes no distinction whatsoever between the significance of severe mental
pain and suffering and physical pain and suffering. If a government agent’s
intentional infliction of severe mental pain and suffering on a person can
constitute “torture,” so too should a person’s intentional infliction of severe
mental pain and suffering on someone with whom he or she is in a
domestic relationship constitute “domestic violence.”
Second, this

inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. While the U.S.’s RUDs to the CAT are
important to note, the great majority of nations did not condition their ratification of the
CAT on such a narrow interpretation of “severe [mental] pain and suffering” or otherwise
limit the scope of the mental pain and suffering encompassed in the definition of “torture”
in the CAT. See CAT, supra note 582.
647. U.N. Treaty Collection, CAT, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en.
648. CAT, supra note 582, at pmbl. ¶¶ 3–5.
649. U.N. Charter, art. 55, 59 Stat. 1031, 1045 (1945).
650. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A), Annex, art. 5, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 83d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
651. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
Annex, art. 7, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966).
652. CAT, supra note 582, at art. 1.
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definition acknowledges that an abusive government official engages in or
acquiesces in acts of torture in order to coerce, intimidate or discriminate
against a victim. This motivation, of course, is very similar to an intimate
terrorist’s (often unconscious) motivation to intimidate and control his or
her victim. Finally, the CAT states that “[n]o exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political
instability or any other public emergency may be invoked as a justification
of torture.”653 This unequivocal statement clarifies that no excuse or
justification can exonerate torture, just as society can countenance no
justification or excuse for domestic violence.
Given the “invisible” nature of domestic violence, especially mental
abuse, and that perpetrators of domestic violence, especially intimate
terrorists, often deny, minimize and/or justify their violence, the “specific
intent” aspect of the torture definition contained in the CAT should not be
included in a definition of domestic violence. It is unrealistic to expect a
victim of domestic violence to prove that the perpetrator intentionally
inflicted harm on the victim or specifically engaged in domestic violence in
order to intimidate or control the victim. In addition, perpetrators of
situational couple violence do not appear to engage in domestic violence in
order to exert power and control over their victims.654 Therefore, requiring
a knowing or reckless state of mind would better comport with the nature
of domestic violence.

IX. PROPOSED DEFINITION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
In this section, a more psychologically sound definition of domestic
violence is proposed, and states are urged to adopt this or a similar
definition of domestic violence, at least for use in child custody cases. This
definition reflects both situational couple violence and intimate terrorism,
and accordingly includes mental abuse as well as physical abuse. It
furthermore incorporates protections for individuals’ privacy, free speech,
and parental rights under the U.S. Constitution, including those suggested
by similar legal prohibitions against mental abuse. The definition that this
article proposes states adopt, at least for child custody purposes, is the
following:
“Domestic violence” is defined as:
Any act(s) or communication(s) (whether delivered orally, in
writing, electronically, or via body language) which a perpetrator
directs at a protected person or a third person known by a protected
person and which has/have no legitimate purpose as a result of
which the perpetrator (1) willfully, knowingly, or recklessly

653. CAT, supra note 582, at art. 2.
654. See supra text accompanying notes 91–92.
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endangers the physical or mental health of that protected person or
third person; or (2) causes that protected person or third person to
suffer (a) non-consensual or underage sexual contact; (b) property
damage; or (c) financial harm. Constitutionally-protected activity
is exempt from this definition.

The mental health of a person is endangered not by any single act
but by a course of conduct that a reasonable person would believe
creates an intimidating, hostile, or degrading atmosphere for a
target of that course of conduct. By way of example but not
limitation, such conduct may consist of a series of any of the
following: name-calling, insulting, demeaning, glaring, countering,
criticizing, and isolating. “Countering” refers to the practice of
automatically disagreeing with any and all statements which a
person makes. A court shall base a finding that a person’s mental
health has been or is endangered on the basis of a preponderance of
the evidence.
Neither an excuse offered by a perpetrator of domestic violence nor
a protected person or third person’s consent shall diminish the
culpability of, or the severity of punishment imposed on, the
perpetrator.
“Financial harm” is defined as “the use of a person’s financial
assets or exposure of a person to financial liability, without the
consent of that person.” A “protected person” is defined as . . .
[state’s definition].

X. CONCLUSION
The great majority of U.S. states do not include mental abuse in their
definitions of domestic violence, even though mental abuse is the sine qua
non of intimate terrorism, the most dangerous and pervasive form of
domestic violence. Based on a comprehensive review of the psychological
theory of domestic violence and numerous laws outlawing bullying, hazing,
and torture, this article proposes a new, psychologically sound definition of
domestic violence which encompasses mental abuse and at the same time
provides protections against infringements of individuals’ privacy, free
speech, and parental rights. The legal regimes proscribing bullying,
hazing, and torture were reviewed because the psychological literature
reveals that it is the perpetrator’s ongoing contact with the victim which
permits the former to mentally abuse the latter in each of these situations,
which also is the case with domestic violence.
This article concludes that there is every reason for U.S. states to
include mental abuse in their definitions of domestic violence and no
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reason for them not to do so. In fact, it concludes that the states’ failure to
treat mental abuse as domestic violence is greatly facilitating the
perpetuation of domestic violence in U.S. society, as each generation is
permitted to suffer emotional trauma at the hands of family members and
intimate partners and then inflict similar trauma on the next generation. If
states fail to include mental abuse in their definitions of domestic violence,
they are severely limiting the ability of the U.S. legal system to prevent and
sanction domestic violence. While the definition of domestic violence
undoubtedly will continue to evolve, it is hoped that the definition of
domestic violence proposed in this article will help combat the epidemic of
domestic violence in this country.

